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THE CARIBS OF 
WAITUKUBULI 
On the fifth anniversary of Associated Statehood with Britain, 3 November 
1972, the Government of Dominica issued an important publication entitled 
Aspects of Dominican History^g the foreword by E.O. Le Blanc, Premier of 
Dominica, begins as followss 
"KNOWLEDGE of a country's past is vital to enable its people 
to satisfactorily mould the present, and effectively plan the 
future, (...) At this important stage in our development 
when we celebrate our National Day, November 3 1973, an 
occasion which is of special significance to us, marking as it 
does the Fifth Anniversary of our attainment of internal self-
government; an occasion when we should review our past 
performance and chart our future objectives, it is important 
that we are aware of our history". 
On 3 November 1493, - nearly 500 years ago, history also records the 
discovery by the original inhabitants of the island of European people on 
their shores. 
In the same publication, Douglas Taylor assessed the situation of the 
Caribs in no uncertain terms; 
"They were an energetic race then and powerful (...) but 
today the few remaining Carib Indians are a doomed people, 
soon to add the bones of their culture to the fast mounting 
heap left in the wake of civilisation".2/ 
"Unfortunately, no one in the island takes the slightest 
interest in these, the last of the first found American 
people. "̂ 3/ 
1/ Aspects of Dominican History, Government Printing Division, 
Dominica W.I. 1972. 
2/ Douglas Taylor, "Columbus Saw them First", Aspects of 
Dominican History, p.l. 
3/ Douglas Taylor, "The Island Caribs of Dominica, B.W.I.", 
Aspects of Dominican History, p. 66. 
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These quotations are included in these introductory, lines to emphasize 
that the survival as a distinct ethnic minority of the most heroic Carib 
community bears testimony to a solution of continuity which has not been 
bridged during nearly five centuries of actual contact and intercourse. They 
illustrate how Dominica and the Dominicans participate in, and seem, in 
the same process, able to shield themselves from relationships with the outer 
world. The 3 November is an ambivalent landmarks a day of mourning, for it 
recalls a genocide; and a day for commemorating a glorious achievement of the 
society. 
The history of the Dominican Caribs preludes the history of the island's 
peasantry, which will be referred to at a later stage. Both histories originate 
within a regional.frame of reference and end up .in quasi self-centred village 
communities with contacts beyond the horizon with the Orinoco and other 
remote places, but limited interchange with immediate neighbours. They therefore 
exemplify the dislocation and rearrangement of the geographical space, by 
artificially scattering human groups and organizing them in a balkanised 
milieu which remains uncontrollable from their standpoint. 
The reading of Dominica's history indicates that there exist in the country 
levels of social relations, which evolve concommittantly, influence each other, 
and yet remain separated by a world of meanings. Social togetherness is built 
of interlocked practices, corresponding to different rationales. In spite of 
their simultaneity within a uniform island-state (colonial or otherwise) and 
in spite of their reciprocal influence, not all of these practices are consistent 
with a nation-building process and the emergence of a cohesive national ethos. The 
Dominicans of today appear as the net result of these inward and outward oriented 
social negotiations, the numerical significance of the Caribs indicating the 
unquestionable prevalence of outward oriented trends. 
It is recorded that the population of Waitukubuli - as Dominica was 
originally known - prevented any settlement of the Europeans for nearly two 
4/ 
centuries— . Three basic processes are implied in this observations reference . 
to the insertion of the island society into a regional frame of relations, to its 
4/ L. Honychurch, The - Dominica Story, Letchworth Press Ltd., Barbados, 1975, p.16. 
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performance at international level and to the articulation of a self-
centred social organization« 
Dealings of the Carib society with the Spaniards and other Europeans 
showed clearly its potential for concerted regional action. The importance 
of the Dominican leadership (or of the leadership located in Dominica) grew 
proportionately as the Spanish empire widened. The indomitable population 
became for the invaders an unbearable nuisance. In 1519, the island was 
included in the bishopric of Puerto Rico; the inhabitants had presumably 
to provide tithes. An all out war was declared against the Caribs, and an 
expedition organized to free "island like Dominica for Spanish settlement". 
The would-be governor of Dominica was "soundly beaten" by the Caribs in 1525-^. 
At the beginning, from 1514, with Pedro de Avila, 1525 with Antonio 
Serrano and throughout the sixteenth century, sailors and colonial authorities 
would harass their superiors, requesting resources to exterminate the 
population. The Caribs in turn would even attack vessels in mid-ocean, so 
much so that 
"An order (was) issued granting all Spaniards permission 
to wage war upon, enslave and sell duty-free, the Caribs 
inhabiting the eastern islands from Dominican to Trinidad".— 
The extermination of the Caribs became more urgent to the Spaniards, as 
colonialisation was progressing in Central and South America. 
By the 1530's, the fleet from Spain to Central and South America would 
call at Dominica for water and wood. From 1543 onwards, a convoy system was 
established to deter enemy attacks, and the island was chosen as the 
necessary stop on west bound voyages. There, boats going to Mexico 
7/ 
(New Spain) would separate from those heading towards South America— „ 
5/ J. Borome, "Spain and Dominica 1493-1647", Aspects „„., p.69. 
6/ Ibid., p. 17. 
7/ Ibid., p. 69. 
i 
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The importance of Dominica for European navigation brought the territory 
into the centre of European rivalries. 
"The course Columbus had taken from Spain on his second voyage 
(September-November 1493) was so good that it was used by 
sailors until steam geplaced sail in the middle of the 
nineteenth century".— 
On a Caribbean self-centred frame of reference was then superimposed a 
competing role in the,international world, located beyond the understanding 
and thereby out of the control of the inhabitants. 
The Caribs could not possibly be victorious in their resistance to 
foreign settlement. They were opposing each European state individually, and 
all of them together. The international and world-wide organization which was 
evolving was uncompromisingly repugnant to a self-centred regional 
organization based on the principles and norms of the local society or societies. 
Inversely the Caribs were as equally repulsive to any European presence. Having 
lost their battle, they became known as savages. As rivalries among European 
countries increased, the situation of the Caribs became more precarious. 
"In 1562, the still greatly harassed residents of Puerto Rico 
successfully petitioned their cabildo (or Town Council) for a ^ 
declaration of war on the Caribs of Dominica and other isles".— 
Submission made in 1571 revealed both the strategic importance of the island and 
the excellence of the resistance organized regionally and locally, by its 
inhabitants. It was proposed at that date to subdue the 
"Indians, to bring settlers and to station permanently four 
boats of fifty tons and two of twenty to protect Spanish 
shipping and forestall 'lutherans' from colonising".— 
, The Caribs had to face confrontation on two fronts, the agressiveness of the 
'lutherans' and the fervour of the 'catholics'; both 'lutherans' and 'catholics' 
were longing for total genocide. 
_8/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.16, 
; 9/ J. Boromê, op. cit., p.72. 
I M / Ibid., p.73. 
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While Spain, which had already dislodged the Arawaks from the larger 
islands of the region, could use Carib territories as calling points, other 
invaders started to settle the small islands one after the other. During the 
1620's, St. Kitts and Nevis had fallen; by the next decade, Antigua, 
Montserrat, Guadeloupe and Martinique were occupied. Dominica - the "natural 
fortress", the "springboard for Carib attacks" - was beseiged and converted 
along with St. Vincent into a last refuge. 
These developments cast some light on the sophistication of the Caribs' 
way of living. First of all, it becomes clear that their adamant resistance 
to the Spaniards fit into an expanding regional organization of Carib space. 
The two hundred year long war was supported by a set of relations between all 
Caribs living in what the European-centered toponymy christened Leeward and 
Windward Islands. Institutions and instruments of this regional political 
organization, gravitating around Dominica, are not known. Most accounts are 
limited to community and island-wide systems, which, from available evidence, 
were secondary in the new dynamics of change resulting from the sudden and 
unwanted arrival of Europeans. Carib villages should be conceived as "cells" 
within island societies which appear in turn as "provinces" of a larger 
whole encompassing the "Eastern islands". 
This became obvious as soon as there were sufficient European resources 
for seriously considering the colonisation of Carib territories. Joseph 
Borome points out that France "planted her flag in Dominica" (1635) and made 
a treaty with the Indians (1645). The same author reports that during the 
time of Spain's predominance in the region, the Caribs of Dominica were 
divided into two groups, each one occupying what the Europeans called the 
Windward or Leeward side. He further adds that "each (group) was ruled by a 
chief sometimes from the same family, who enjoyed largely advisory powers".— 
As time went by, the Windward Caribs established a separate alliance with 
French representatives, while the Leeward ones linked themselves with the 
British. 
"Landing in Dominica in October (1697) (Colonel Tobias Frere from 
Barbados) took the precaution of concluding a treaty with some 
Basseterre Indians. (...) The Capesterre Caribs, loyal to France, 
were miffed at not having been consulted by their Basseterre 
countrymen before the treaty had been signed".— 
11/ Ibid., p.68. 
12/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects .... p.80. 
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It would appear therefore, that villages on the island were articulated into 
two "federations" and both federations were supposed to have a common or at 
least a concerted "foreign policy". Moreover, in 1660, a treaty with the 
Caribs was signed by the English and the French, promising that Dominica and 
St. Vincent would not be settled by either country. Even though it took only 
13/ 
three years for France and Great Britain to break their word— the very 
existence of the treaty reveals a united Caribs front, a confederation of 
Carib territories. 
It also becomes clear that Spain in the previous century was not facing a 
group of disorderly savages nor was Louis- XIV referring to disaggregated 
villages inhabited by primitives as they claimed. For the Caribs to fight from 
Puerto Rico to St. Lucia, regional military actions had to be organized. 
Weapons and means of transportation had to be provided; soldiers recruited and 
distributed in battle formation. A certain division of labour and specialisation 
of tasks must have existed, backed by a body of knowledge and military technology 
complex enough to challenge the European powers during two centuries. And above 
all, an awareness of Carib identity was necessary to ensure cohesion among what 
was in fact one Carib nation. 
During the second half of the seventeenth century, the expanding self-reliant 
organization of Carib space became progressively circumscribed in two single 
territories - Dominica and St. Vincent. The following question put to a missionary, 
Phillipe de Beaumont,'by a Carib around 1655, further testifies to the local concept 
of a "national territory": 
"What is to become of the poor Carib, must he go and live in 
the sea with the fish?"14/. 
At no point in time was Dominica/Waitukubuli an isolated Rousseaunian 
paradise. Moreover, conflict and alliance, consensus and cohesion bound the whole 
Carib nation in one single political formation. A set of incomprehensible 
international relations, centred around European needs and projects, forced the 
people to retreat to Dominica. But even during this process of retreat, a series of 
important social and political alternatives were selected to ensure the survival of 
the nation. 
13/ Ibid., p.80 
14/ L. Ilonychurch, op. cit., p. 21 
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First of all, In the seventeenth century many of the Caribs were enslaved 
in the emerging plantation system, and one of the products of the intercourse 
so established was the son of the English Governor of St. Kitts, the Indian 
Warner, who later became a Carib Chief and was in the employ of the British as 
Deputy Governor of Dominica. Secondly, since the process of setting up the 
Eastern Caribbean plantation economy had a peculiar dynamism of concentration of 
wealth in a few hands, the dispossessed of the new system would follow the 
Carib path and seek refuge in Dominica. The King of France, Louis XIV informed 
that: 
"The Caribs (...) (would) harbour among them runaway slaves that 
are too lazy to work and thus ruin the King's subjects".15/ 
Finally, a number of desperate Europeans, unable to find their way in the 
plantation islands, would gradually infiltrate Dominica, initiating various 
undertakings, servicing the plantation economies. Louis XIV opposed these 
initiatives in 1680, 
"lest it incite the remaining Caribs to continuous war or 
voluntary exile in St. Vincent where they could unite with 
the already distressingly large body of Indians and maroon 
Negroes to prey on French Commerce"16/ . 
Together with the first Europeans came their priests, who were quite 
instrumental in stimulating the 1660 treaty assuring the Caribs that Dominica 
and St. Vincent would remain uncolonised-^-^. Not much resulted from these 
commendable efforts, but they do indicate the basic issue facing the Carib and 
an alternative of development which was discarded by the Europeans. Under 
much pressure deriving from the implementation of French and British policies, 
Dominican Caribs were enticed to side with one or the other. It was becoming 
increasingly difficult for them to repel the European forces or to deal 
en bloc with the internationalization of the archipelago. New alliances 
emerged, the most remarkable one being their joint venture with the British 
against St. Lucia in 1664. The Caribs however, maintained their independent 
military power and those of Dominica raided Antigua in 1674, and Antigua and 
Montserrat in 1676. 
15/ Ibid., p.23. 
16/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.82. 
17/ L. Honychurch op. cit., p.21. 
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As customary, violent reactions from the Europeans were blamed on the Caribs 
who seemed unable to understand their manifest destinyJ In 1683, the King of 
England acknowledged "the necessity of destroying those Caribie Indians" and 
authorized one Stapleton to undertake his "Indian hunting". Damage in Dominica 
was limited but her ally St. Vincent suffered heavily. Three years later, French 
and English officials signed a treaty whereby the island was recognized as neutral. 
L. Honychurch noted, however, that that neutrality should be interpreted as 
18 / Dominica becoming a "no-man's land of battle".— 
Even though Father Labat noted that in 1700, the Caribs were still in 
control of Dominica, at that point in time they had realised that their fate was 
sealed. A mass suicide took place in the cave now known as "la caverne des 
indiens". In 1647, the number of Caribs was estimated at 5,000 and at the end of 
the century there were only 2,000 in 1713, they were thought to be 500 and in 
1730 there seenied to be only 400. 
Taking into account the geographical characteristics of the country7-the" 
successful fight put up by the maroons against much more organized military forces 
at the end of the eighteenth century, and also the small number of European 
population before the 1750's, one cannot explain satisfactorily this abrupt' 
decline in the total Carib population. Two or even five thousand people should 
have found a way to accommodate themselves in the interior, unless they did not 
wish to survive side by side with the newcomers. Migration of the Caribs to the 
Orinoco region, referred to by L. Honychurch, is not unrelated to the repugnance 
of the original islanders to entertain intercourse with the conquistadores. 
Another possible explanation proposed by the same historian is the incidence of 
new diseases brought to the islands by the Europeans. 
In any event, during the first half of the eighteenth century, the 
territory was virtually emptied of its indigenous occupants. Yet the remaining 
Caribs were still fighting. It is reported by the same L» Honychurch, that in 
1722, the arrival of more and more Frenchmen caused the Caribs to panic and 
forced them to quit Dominica. A few years later, when there were supposedly 
only a few Caribs left, the head of the settlers, Le Grand, discovered a plot 
18/ Ibid., p.24. 
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orchestrated by an alliance of Dominican and Vincentian Caribs—. Finally, 
20/ mention is made of an alliance and maroons in 1785—. 
A review of the history of theCaribs up to the eighteenth century reveals, 
that from their initial contacts with the European colonial powers, the island 
and its population were given a place in the midst of the network of 
international relations geared towards extraregional needs. In response, there 
was or there emerged a self-reliant regional organization. The ensuing struggle, 
during which the Caribs were defeated, cannot be adequately reported upon in an 
island by island account. 
The struggle between the Caribs and the outsiders did not, and in fact could 
not result in the modification of the regional system by the international one. 
There were no alternatives and no durable compromises. These struggles were indeed 
a battle of nations, and attempts by the Europeans to co-opt one or the other Carib 
group, or efforts by the Caribs to seek alliance with one or the other European 
powers ended up invariably in the same cul-de-sac: extermination of the defeated, 
antagonism being nurtured by the mutual repellence of the contending communities, by 
the incompatibility of their respective laws of development. 
The present historiography does not deal with the Carib nation as a whole and 
the nature and characteristics of their two hundred year old region-wide political 
organization is not yet unearthed. The case of the Dominican Caribs illustrates the 
strength with which a regional outlook can be rooted locally, as well as the degree 
of antagonism that can exist between regional interests so articulated and world-wide 
interferences in this microcosm. 
It is safe to say that by the eighteen hundreds, the Caribs had been eliminated 
from the making of the official history of the island. No reference to them has been 
found for the nineteenth century. Some limited information is available for the 
19/ J. Boromë, "The French and Dominica" Aspects „. „ p.82. 
20/ Government of Dominica, Dies Dominica, Public Relations Division, 
Dominica 1972, p.11. 
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twentieth century and will be summarised at the conclusion of this chapter„ 
At the end of the eighteenth century, approximately 232 acres of 
land were set aside as a Reserve at Salybia and given by the administration's 
21/ surveyors to the Caribs— . This area was "increased at the expense of the 
22/ Crown domain" and the Reserve enlarged to about 3,700 acres—. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Carib population presumably 
amounted to some 400 souls, sufficiently distinct from the rest of the 
Dominicans and organised according to a separate of norms and principles. 
Even though it was never defined legally who was a Carib and had access to the 
Reserve, no conflict emerged on this ground. 
When in 1930 the local police raided the Reserve in search of some 
presumed smugglers, the population interfered and prevented.their arrest. 
In the riot which ensued, the policemen were duly beaten, four Caribs were 
wounded with gunshots, two of them dying subsequently,. A Royal Frigate, was 
called on the scene and made a demonstration of.force, prompting the Caribs: 
to withdraw to the interior of the island for a while. The Commission of 
Enquiry into these disturbances exonerated the police force and decided.to 
degrade the Carib chief. Such decisions were disregarded by the Carib 
population who refused the substitute to their traditional chief proposed by 
23/ the Government— . 
A rather recent study by Nancy Owen informed that the Caribs, numbering 
in 1975 some 1,500, i.e. 2% of the island's population continue to stress their 
24/ 
ethnic identity, even though their isolation has been greatly reduced— . The 
author believes that they are "culturally more similar (to their non-Carib 
neighbours) than to their aboriginal forbears". They have lost their physical 
distinctiveness, and behave according to norms and. values not much different 
to the "rural lower class afro-dominicans". Their religion - Roman Catholicism ~ 
their language, their dwellings, and agricultural enterprises are alike. It is 
further suggested that the reason they continue to stress their distinctiveness, 
is due to economic, social and political advantages, deriving from the exclusive 
collective ownership of the Reserve's land. 
21/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.90. 
22/ Conditions in the Carib Reserve and-the Disturbances.of-19 September 
1930, Dominica, Report of a Commission, July 1931. H.H.'s Stationery 
Office 1932, p.7. 
23/ Douglas Taylor, "The Island Caribs of Dominica". Aspects ... p.61, 
24/ Nancy Owen, "Land, Politics and Ethnicity in a Carib Indian Community" 
Ethnology Vol. 14, No. 4 London 1975, p.p. 385-393. 
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lt appears nonetheless, that certain "anomalies" still persist; a Carib woman 
from the Reserve married to a non-Carib loses her rights and privileges, while a 
male remains free to marry non-Carib women, she and her offspring being entitled 
to reside on the Reserve. This procedure is not totally inconsistent with the 
25 / • accounts on the traditional marriage relations — . 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Dominican Government has 
connected the Reserve with the limited network of highways, built two primary 
schools to service the population, and taken steps to upgrade the health conditions. 
Nonetheless, Owen concludes: 
"Despite improvement in their circumstances, the Caribs are 
far from being assimilated into the Dominican society. 
(...) They are still regarded as a distinct group by other 
Dominicans. (...) Most Afro-Dominicans have little regard 
for the Indians whom they view as very shy, secretive people 
prone to drunkeness and capable of outbursts of violence. 
(...) In short, the Caribs still occupy a low place within 
Dominican society, however, they still continue to possess 
advantages which other rural peasant farmers lack" 26/. 
25/ Douglas Taylor, "Kinship and Social Structure of the Island Carib", 
Aspects ooo p.p. 18-43o 
26/ Nancy Owen, op. cit., p.391. 
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II 
THE EARLY SETTLERS 
Among the underprivileged and exploited people running away from, the 
plantation islands, special mention has to be made of the Africans. It has 
already been pointed out that Dominica offered a safe harbour to enslaved 
people who extricated themselves from bondage. 
"Even before the European occupation of the island, Negro 
slaves had escaped to Dominica or been captured by the 
Caribs from settlements on other islands. When the French 
arrived, there were already a few Maroons living in Carib 
villages or in their own settlements in the forest" 27/. 
There are not much data on social organization of these first blacks 
who settled in Dominica previous to the occupation of the island by the 
Europeans. Honychurch records that many early French settlers had to 
request the authorization from Carib chiefs to establish themselves. One 
may infer that this was also necessary for the Blacks, escaping the 
plantation societies with not much resources. .It would follow that these 
early "maroons" had to learn a lot from the Caribs to adapt many, of the 
local techniques to their own way of living. Their settlements should have 
been similar to the Carib villages, at least in their external aspects. 
The same historian notes that: > ' 
"In the safety of the mountains (the Maroons) built huts, 
planted gardens and even raised small livestock such as 
chickens" 28/. 
It is also interesting to emphasize that by mid-century, it was found 
necessary to forbid the purchasing of boats constructed by "runaways" on 
29/ 
pain of confiscation— . It would seem therefore that some interchange was 
developing between the independent Blacks and the European settlers, and 
moreover, that these Blacks did not confine themselves to the "safety of the 
mountains". 
27/ Honychurch, op. cit., p.53. 
28/ Ibid., p.53. 
29/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763" Aspects ... p.86. 
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The relationship between the independent Blacks and the white community 
deserves some reconsideration and will most certainly provoke new historical 
research or new interpretations. Normally, the word "settler" is reserved for 
the Europeans, while independent Blacks are conceived as "runaways". Not all 
Europeans who embarked in the American adventure were noble conquistadores, 
high officials in some king's navy or rich planters. Europe was plagued by 
national and international conflicts, and the greater visibility of the latter 
should not obscure the relevance of the former. The fabric of what was to 
become Dominican society is not understandable without this data. 
The seizure of the Eastern Caribbean brought the Caribs in contact with a 
multitude of European "runaways" to whom the opportunities offered within the 
plantation islands - even though attractive when compared to what they experienced 
in their mother countries - were far from glamorous. The new social structures 
which emerged around the plantations generated their own series of inequalities, 
affecting indentured and poor whites, freed coloured people as well as enslaved 
Africans. 
"These early (European) settlers (basically wood-cutters) were a 
rough hardy group and little organised rule or justice prevailed. 
(:•.) It was a society in which only the toughest survived. Their 
houses were cf roughly sawn timber with thatched roofs of roseaux 
and palm branches and one or two rooms. Settlements were strung ^q/ 
along the coast in the isolated bays and flat coastal areas (...)"— . 
All sorts of outcasts drifted to the island of their own violition. 
Some of these pioneers "were rather a bad sort", and the achievement of peaceful 
intercourse among these "grass root entrepreneurs" was a real performance. 
Reference is made by Jr Borome of a "somewhat Hobbesian atmosphere of bellum 
31 / omnium contra omnes"— , and it is known that up to 1749 the French Governor 
32/ of Martinique was inviting buccaneers to become cultivators— . 
30/ Honychurch, cp. cit« , p.25. 
31/ J, Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.82. 
32/ Ibid., p.85« 
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The colonization of Dominica was not sponsored overtly. It was carried 
out by private individuals their sole resource being their audacity and 
33/ 
ingenuity, It "had not cost France one sou"— . Besides the prohibitions 
or at least the indifference of the administrative authorities, the pioneers 
had to face the opposition of the planters of Barbados"and Martinique, 
trying to prevent any diversion of metropolitan resources earmarked for 
assistance to the plantation islands. They had to negotiate some acceptable 
modus vivendi among themselves, to cajole the Caribs, and defend themselves 
against the pretence of the French, if they were British, or of the British 
if they were French. In fact at some point in time, they seemed more 34 / inclined to deal with pirates than to search for official sponsorship— . 
Any possible difference between African and European settlements up to 
1740 approximately, derived basically from the need faced by the Blacks, to 
maintain themselves at a safe distance from the neighbouring plantation 
systems and their authorities, inasmuch as they were black. Individual 
whites might have had problems with "forces of order", but the activities 
of the white settlers, as a community, were complementary to the plantation 
economy and welcome. Activities of the black community were by definition a 
challenge to enslavement and tended to be more inward oriented. Besides this 
fundamental point, Whites and independent Blacks during the first half of the 
eighteenth century should be considered both either as settlers or as runaways 
in their self-motivated efforts to inhabit Dominica. 
"Most of the small farmers in Dominica before 1740 did not need 
and could not afford many extra labourers. Their holdings were 
worked by family and friends paid in kind. Apart from limited 
supplies of coffee, cotton, cocoa and. tobacco, their main cash 
crop was ground provisions for feeding slaves in the larger 
French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe. These islands 
also provided Dominica with a trade in timber needed for 
building ships, carts, gun carriages, mills, houses"35/. 
33/ Ibid. 
34/ Ibid -
35/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.26. 
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It is important for the understanding of the basis of social intercourse in 
the island to bear in mind that Whites and Blacks had to rely on their own 
inventiveness to survive, originating a set of social relations between the two 
communities and with the Caribs, on which at a later date would be superimposed : 
attempts to establish a plantation system. 
During this period, France's patronage - via Martinique - was extremely 
discreet > and based on the idea that even though the King did not own the 
territory, the people living there were still his subjects. They elected a settler -
who incidentally was living on a plot of land granted to him by a Carib Chief - and 
36/ 
who in turn was recognised as Commander by the Martinican authorities (1728)— . 
In 1730 there were not yet any European settlements. A missionary who visited the 
island at that date reported having "found 500 persons living scattered, isolated -37 / everyone in his woods, no village (...)— . 
From 1735 onwards, the Governor of Martinique appointed two successive 
representatives and established an embryo of administrative, judicial and military 
38 / system. "Obedience (to the new Commander) was won through strict order"— . 
"To encourage the development of plantations by reassuring 
security of persons and property, (the Governor of Martinique, 
1749) organised the militia companies (...) dividing the 
island into eight districts and assigning to each, for the 
most part, a captain, a lieutenant and a sub-lieutenant"39/. 
From that point in time, more resourceful settlers took residence in the 
island, among them the Jesuits who organised a rather large and complex estate at 
Grand Bay, From 1730 to 1743 the total population under French control multiplied 
40/ fourfold, and from 1743 to 1763 it increased from 3,030 to 7,890 inhabitants—. 
The number of enslaved Blacks, living in these settlements, kept increasing as 
one approached the second half of the century. "Free negroes" in this context were 
very few and this is quite understandable, if they could just walk out and set up 
their own villages. The number of enslaved increased from 425 in 1730 to 5,872 in 
1763, while the number of free Negroes augmented from 30 to 300 during the same 
period. Compared to the number of Whites in these settlements by 1730, there was 
36/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.82. 
37/ Cecil Goodridge, "Dominica - The French Connexion", Aspects ... p.153. 
38/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.28. 
39/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.85. 
40/ Ibid., p.84 
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nearly one enslaved per white, and three per white in 1763. If one remembers 
that some white planters, the Jesuits for instance, had up to 194 enslaved in 
1763, the ratio of three enslaved per white is inflated and remains highly 
indicative of the type of agricultural and forestal exploitation existing 
during the period. 
J. Borome records around 1750, several trends prejudicial to the 
establishment of a plantation society. People were encouraging the enslaved 
to flee to the mountains, in order to force their masters to sell those 
remaining at cheaper prices. It was found necessary to forbid the selling of 
41/ 
absconded enslaved and to discourage manumission— . Honychurch mentions also 
that since there was much extra land available in Dominica, the enslaved would 
make their own provision grounds to cultivate small crops and raise some 42/ domestic animals— „ 
Provision grounds were found mainly on the largest estates in the 
Caribbean, since small planters did not have enough land (nor their enslaved 
enough time) to take advantage of such facilities. A small planter would 
normally prefer to buy the food requirements for his enslaved on the market, 
while using his productive capacity to the fullest extent possible. The 5,000 
residents counted in 1754 - two-thirds of them being enslaved - were living on 
the periphery of the island on plots varying between four and twenty carres 
43/ (one carre was roughly equivalent to three and one-fifth English acres)— . 
Hence the multiplication of provision grounds in Dominica and the development 
44 / 
of Sunday markets furnished by the "negroes from the plantations"— , gave a 
further idea of an arrangement between enslaved and masters which differed 
from the normal plantation societies. 
Another distinctive feature of the pre-1760 society is the fact that 
most enslaved seemed to have been West Indian born„ If they were African 
born, no socialisation process couldhave ensured their participation in a 
plantation system, however modified, without the extensive use of brute force. 
The early Dominican society was not exempt from such use. In 1735, the militia / r / 
had three hundred men, and in 1744, five hundred of t h e m — . 
41/ Ibid., p.86. 
42/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.27. 
43/ J„ Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.97. 
44/ To Atwood, The History of the Island of Dominica,.West.Indian Studies 
No. 27, Fo Cass, London 1871 pp. 179-180. 
45/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.85. 
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One can safely assume, however, that the rules of the (plantation) game were 
known by enslaved and slave owners, and negotiations to secure a workable 
arrangement in a new context could be carried out. This common understanding 
would also be at variance with normal behaviour in plantation islands, where 
lenient masters would experience more loss of labour due to marronage, than the 
46/ 
savage and brutal ones— . In Dominica, there is definite evidence to the 
contrary. Atwood noted an increase in the number of "runaways" due to the 
"impolitic" behaviour of incoming English settlers and wrote with reference to 
the selling of the Jesuit estates to these planters: 
"Many of the negroes so purchased from the Jesuits, either from 
their attachments to them, or dislike of their new masters, soon 
after betook themselves to the woods with their wives and 
children, where they were joined from time to time by others 
from different estates"47/. 
It would appear therefore, if the enslaved could, in probably the most advanced 
plantation of the mid-eighteenth century Dominica, organise some form of family life, 
with no need to maintain a guerrilla war - as was the only avenue open to family 
life in other Caribbean islands - that marronage was not called for before 1763. In 
fact, when the British took over, the enslaved totalled 5,872, of whom 2,113 i.e. more 
48/ 
than a third were children— . There does not seem to have existed an actual state of 
war between independent black settlements and European ones. Black settlements 
became "maroon societies" after the passage from French to British occupation in 1763, 
when the ensuing guerrilla war developed, particularly against the British plantations. 
Meanwhile, rapport between enslaved and masters looked less inhumane than in other 
Caribbean islands. 
"Dominica's economy was also responsible for the closer relationship 
between slave and master, whites and coloured. This island with its 
small estates of mixed crops, differed greatly from the vast thousand 
acre estates in Barbados, Jamaica or Martinique. (...) It was after 
the 1760's during the expansion of British estates that slavery in 
Dominica developed rapidly in line with other sugar islands"49/. 
46/ J. Fonchard, Les Marrons de la Liberte, L'Ecole,.Paris 1972,.p.157. 
47/ T„ Atwood, op. cit., pp. 226-227. 
48/ Jo Borome, "The French in Dominica, 1699-1763" Aspects ... p.94. 
49/ L, Honychurch, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
-18-
The previous developments were unrelated to any particular characteristics 
of the individuals carrying out these social practices. They derived from the 
structural arrangements in which these individuals evolved. This is clearly 
stated by the historian J. Borome: 
"The development of Dominica and the other neutral isles would . 
have gone along more rapidly, if inhabitants of the French 
islands had not heard the word 'evacuation' ringing in their 
ears for over forty years. The more daring souls who, 
undeterred by risky land tenure, took up residence on the 
neutral isles, lived in the hope of the Governor-Generals at 
Martinique and the Ministers in France could avoid the dread 
contingency and eventually set the isles on a firm colonial 
basis» They were doomed to disappointment"50/. 
Technically, Dominica belonged to the Caribs up to 1763 when at the Treaty 
of Paris, British occupancy was acknowledged by France. The set of economic 
relations, consistent with colonial development and particularly with plantation 
colonies, derives from clear political patronage allowing a limited number of * 
investors to impose an order to suit their own interests. During the first half 
of the century, Paris and London had been issuing constant instructions to carry 
out mutual evacuation of Dominica. France would excel in using delaying tactics, 
but she would all in all find it impossible to establish the political 
structures of colonial oppression—^. 
i 
Public order in Dominica would be negotiated among the European settlers, 
who would also welcome direct instructions from Martinique since these ensured 
the supply of arms and ammunitions. But with an increase in British pressure, 
the would-be planters would sometimes learn that "they were not under the King's 
52/ 
protection"— , while as soon as the pressure diminished, their demands would 
receive attention» Moreover, during the Seven Years' War, they would have to 
withdraw to the woods with most of their belongings, invading thus the 
territory of the so-called maroons - or to abide by the demands of the British 
by reverting to an election of their own leader, assisted by a Council of 53/ Notables and a judicial system, independent of that of Martinique—. 
In this context, therefore, independently of their individual preferences, 
either because the bulk of the white population was "rather of a bad sort", or 
because the French could not always challenge the British, or because the British 
50/ J. Borome, "The French in Dominica, 1699-1763" Aspects ... p.88. : 
51/ Ibid., pp. 88-94. ' 
52/ Ibid., p.90. 
53/ Ibid., p.92. 
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requested it as a guarantee of neutrality, social order had to be based on an 
internal consensus, not necessarily codified in texts of law, which had to be 
consistent with colonial and metropolitan ones. Up to 1763, external 
sponsorship was too weak or too fickle to allow anything durable which was not 
grounded on self-reliance. 
A few years before official cession to Britain, the economic panorama is 
described as follows: 
"There was no expansion of land cultivation because of the uncertainty 
of tenure that caused so many to anxiously await the outcome of peace 
talks in Europe. Still, owners dutifully tendered their 6,069 acres 
of cleared land up some mountain slopes and in patches here and there 
around the coast, notably at Roseau, .LoubiSre and Grande Baye. By 
1763 they were producing 1,690,360 pounds of coffee, 271,650 of cacao, 
17,400 of cotton and 9,973 barrels of manioc. The population numbered 
1,718 whites, 500 free Negroes, 5,872 slaves of which 3,145 were 
working adults and 2,113 children, and 50-60 Carib families"54V. 
54/ Ibid.t p.94. The population data referred to what has been called 
in the text European and Carib settlements. Allusion to the Independent 
Blacks are scanty. In any case, it is doubtful that the number of "Free Negroes" 
included more than the emancipated living in the European settlements. 
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III 
OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
EXTERNALLY ORIENTED ECONOMY 
The incorporation of Dominica into the British Empire in 1763 resulted 
in a reorientation of political, economic and social activity on the island. 
The Crown became the sole owner of the island's assets which were basically 
the land and its location. An observation of the use made of these newly 
acquired resources assists in understanding the colonial history of the 
country, and particularly its political and social fabric, which will be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. 
The vanquished Caribs were totally dispossessed. Their legal status 
with respect to the. land during the second part of the eighteenth century is 
not clear. The fact is that at the end of the century, a Reserve was 
created, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was enlarged 
"at the expense of the Crown domain". One would expect that the concept of 
land appropriation operating among the Caribs would differ from the Western 
idea of ownership rights. In spite of the possible implication of this 
difference for the exploitation of the soil, the colonizers were far from 
beimg concerned by the issue. 
No indication is found as to the relationships between the Black 
population and the land they occupied prior to 1763. On the arrival of the 
British the Blacks might have been considered squatters or "Frenchmen"; but 
reports of armed conflicts with the authorities suggest that they were seen 
as potentially enslaved or so-called runaways or maroons. 
The situation of the Caribs also obtained for the French settlers, who 
by virtue (or maybe by misfortune) of not being British, lost their 
ownership rights and became tenants or lessees. 
In fact, the very Western idea of ownership rights was encroached upon 
and subordinated to "higher principles". In this connection, the seizure of 
Dominica differed in every economic aspect that mattered from what obtained 
in St. Lucia, a few decades later. St. Lucia was conceived as a conquered or 
ceded territory and supposed to be ruled by local laws. It would appear that 
Dominica was viewed as belonging to nobody before the British capture. The 
Crown therefore had a free hand in organizing the country. The most striking 
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indication of its concept of Dominica's economic future may be seen in its policy 
to limit plantation acreages on the initial sale of lands to lots of less than 
one hundred acres, when readily cultivable, or less than three hundred when in 
55 / 
woods and in need of being cleared before exploitation— . These acreages were 
small in comparison to the 1,000-acre estates in the other islands. The net 
result of this policy was obviously to limit the viability of plantation 
development, rendering impossible economies of scale to be gained by the 
exploitation of large estates. In other words, the Crown had no intention of 
making of Dominica an important producer of any colonial staple. 
This policy orientation was not at variance with the propensity of the British 
subjects to settle in Dominica. There was an apparent lack of interest on the part 
of the investors because of the fragility of the defence of the island, especially 
as it was situated between two French territories. An indication of this dis-
interest was reflected in the slow rate of land sales. Between 1764 and 1767, a 
total of 11,217 acres were sold. "This amount was exceeded by the sales in Tobago 56 / for that year (1767) alone— Land sales, however, increased in 1768, the highest 
/ 
sales being recorded in 1771:—' . It will be seen, in the next chapter, that the 
owners were not necessarily settlers. 
LAND SALES 
1768 - 12,000 acres, almost double that of the previous year 
1770 - 14,472 acres 
1771 - 20,401 acres 
1772 - 16,518 1 12 acres 
1773 - 5,144 ^/2 acres, the year in which all arable land had been 
disposed of 58/. 
The initiation of sugar production was of major importance after 1763. Even 
though the annexation of the island came late in the sugar era, attempts were still 
55/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.34. 
56/ B. Marshall, Society and Economy in the British Windward Islands,. 
1763-1823, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica 1972, p.24. 
57/ This came as a result of the recommendation for a separate governor 
for Dominica, with full control over defence. The first British settlers had 
petitioned for this administrative change. 
58/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.31. 
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made by British interests to utilise its virgin soils to boost British 
West Indian sugar production. The effect was to disrupt the diversified 
nature of agricultural production which had evolved during the previous six 
decades, in spite of the insecurity of tenure in a neutral island. It is 
worth noting that this diversity did not include sugar. Although the small 
planters may have been interested, "the authorities in Martinique long 
59/ 
frowned on the idea"— . The interests of the sugar planters in the other 
French islands prevailed to prevent such competition arising in Dominica, 
especially as a surveyor's report stated that "it contained more cultivable ftO / 
land than Martinique"— . On the other hand, the uncertainty of the title of 
the island (i.e. French or British) prior to 1763 prevented the inhabitants 
or other interested persons from investing the considerable sums necessary 
to initiate sugar plantations. 
For a very short period the British planters successfully undertook 
sugar cultivation in the river valleys along the windward coast. Within a 
decade (1763-1773), sugar reportedly topped export lists, exceeding the 
61 / 
sale of cocoa and coffee—. In spite of this success, the growing of sugar 
cane never monopolised agricultural land since many planters cultivated both 
coffee and sugar cane. 
In fact after about a decade of increased economic activity following 
the cession of the island to Britain, there was an economic decline. Sugar 
and agricultural exports in general showed a downward trend after 1778 as 
numerous obstacles emerged in the last twenty years of the century. Sugar 
production decreased during the period of the French occupation, 1778-1784, 
because British settlers reportedly abandoned their plantations. Atwood 
attributes this abandonment to the too ambitious attempts of the British 
settlers to exploit the land for quick profit. The estates apparently 
59/ J. Borome, "The French and Dominica, 1699-1763", Aspects ... p.84. 
60/ Report by Rossain, Surveyor General of the French Windward Islands 
in the 1730's, quoted by J. Borome, Ibid., p.85. 
61/ "In St. Vincent and Dominica where sugar was neither produced nor 
exported before 1763, the British planters concentrated so keenly on this 
crop that it topped the export lists in 1773 with coffee and cocoa dropping 
to second and third places". B. Marshall, op. cit., p.49. 
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proved too difficult to establish and maintain. Atwood reports the existence 
of no more than fifty sugar estates by 1785, "above thirty estates" having 
been abandoned. There was also a high degree of absenteeism by English 
planters and as a result their estates were not well managed. This 
adversely affected crop production. Around this time maroons also posed a 
threat to the existence of estates. In the late 1780's there were reportedly 
not enough cattle or enslaved to support sugar plantations - "from whence in 
a great measure is to be attributed the small quantity of sugar exported from 
62 / this settlement to England".— 
In 1787 there were increases in sugar duties from 12s 4d to 15s per 
hundredweight. According to Marshall the British imposed a reduction of 
bounties and subsidies on British West Indian sugar in 1793, in order to 
capitalise on the high prices in Europe and reduce the price of sugar on the 
c o / 
British market, and opened it up to foreign sugar supplies.— 
But prices were so high that some profit was made. Further increases in 
demand after 1793 was a stimulus to planters to raise their levels of production. 
"The increase in shipments from Dominica and Tobago in this period 
is testimony of the eagerness of planters to capitalise on this 
situation"64/. 
By 1797 however, the result of all these policies was a glut of sugar in the 
West Indian colonies and a reduction in the price of the commodity. Needless to 
say, this contributed to Dominica's depressed economic state. 
The planting of coffee, which was introduced into Dominica by French settlers 
in the early occupation of the island and which remained its most important crop 
was superceded by sugar only by the end of the first decade following the cession 
of the island to Britain. Climate and topography were more suited to the crop 
than to sugar cane, but English settlers concentrated on the production of the 
latter. Within the British colonial empire it was economically disadvantageous 
to produce coffee since the product was not in high demand on this market, and as 
a result excise duty was high. Planters therefore depended on re-export to Europe 
62/ T. Atwood, op. cit., p.18. 
63/ B. Marshall, op. cit., pp.90-91. 
64/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.9 In 1972 sugar production was only 3,000 
hogshead of sugar. 
-24-
for the sale of the produce. The demand and supply situation on the European 
continent was, therefore, of vital importance to the coffee producers. One can 
attribute the survival of the crop to the persistence of French settlers, 
although the British also introduced coffee on their estates. The main areas of 
coffee plantations during the eighteenth century were in the south of the island 
around Soufriere and in the north around Colihaut and Capuchin. 
Coffee harvested on the plantations entered Europe through the intermediary 
of English merchants based in Dominica. After the introduction of the free port 
system, coffee was treated as a good originating from a "foreign country". 
"... all produce entering Great Britain from the island was to be 
deemed foreign and taxed, accordingly. The exceptions were sugar 
and rum produced by the newly settled British planters in Dominica 
. .."65/. 
This disposition was a great disadvantage to coffee production and coffee planters. 
It indicates the limited bargaining power of those planters, as well as a basic 
characteristic of colonial economic policy namely anything not produced by British 
born subjects was foreign. This policy aimed at favouring them and not at providing 
for development, not even for plantation development. 
Under these circumstances, a decline in Dominican coffee production was not 
surprising. A number of other factors could also have caused it. Among these was 
the serious competition which Dominican coffee faced on the European market in the 
early years of the decade. Added to this, in 1774, there was a fall in coffee prices 
due to the increase in duties levied» In that same year it was reported that 
bankruptcies of coffee producers were the order of the day^( 
There was apparently a revival of production by the late 1780's. Atwood's 
description of the island at the time estimates the existence of two hundred coffee 
plantations. These estates were apparently very productive. 
"It is computed that, one year with another, there are between four 
and five million pounds weight of that article produced, and exported 
annually from that island to Great Britain where it fell from £41 15s 
to £51 5s per hundredweight"677 . 
One explanation for the growth in coffee production lies in the high price the 
crop fetched on the international market., and the low price of sugar in the same 
65/ F. Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies, Longman 
Green and Co., London 1953 p.43. Further reference to the Free Port Systems 
are summarised from the study of Armytage. 
66/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.58. 
67/T. Atwood, op. cit., p„81„ See also Sir Francis Watts, Report on the 
Agricultural Conditions of Dominica with Recommendations for their Amelioration, 
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period. Coffee acreages would therefore have increased in preference to 
sugar cane. 
Cocoa was the other major crop grown by French inhabitants, but its 
production was on a much smaller scale. Only limited quantities were 
exported and the crop declined in the latter half of the century, 
apparently because of its low market value at the time. 
The ups and downs of the international market contributed to the lack 
of development of plantation agriculture in the island under its new 
colonial master. Since Dominica was a country of small estates, her 
planters were among the first to be affected. As early as 1772 the expansion 
of agricultural enterprises was halted. The financial crisis in Britain 
adversely affected those merchants who supplied capital to planters. Planters, 
therefore, found great difficulty in obtaining credit to maintain payments on 
their lands or to repay their loans; coffee planters in particular could not 
afford to purchase labour after 1774. 
"Ever since the financial crash of 1772, the Dominican proprietors 
were pressed with demands from their creditors to repay loans 
advanced, and this they could not do", 
"A year later (1776) when it was time to pay installments on lands 
purchased from the Commissioners, the islanders were unable to meet 
them and begged that they be reduced".68/ 
A decade later (1787) there was a continued situation of economic distress. 
"... reports were all of distress, of the burden of mortgages, of 
estates sold for debt"69/. 
In summary, the support of the colonial authorities to the development of 
the island's agricultural potentials was rather dubious. To Britain, Dominica 
was an economic liability. Its soil and weather conditions were unsuitable for 
sugar cane. Moreover available flat arable land was limited. The entire central 
area was very mountainous, leaving only valley and coastal plains for sugar cane 
cultivation. It has been mentioned that these natural conditions were more 
favourable to the cultivation of coffee and cocoa„ 
Bulletin Office, Dominica 1925 p.10, which estimates the existence of 
291 coffee estates in 1792, from which time, production though high, is 
said to have started a gradual downward trend. 
68/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.58. 
69/ Parry and Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies, MacMillan, 
London 1966, p.140. 
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In addition to the obstacles already summarised, the island suffered a series 
of hurricanes in 1779, ,1780 and in 1787; during this last year, there were three 
hurricanes. The 1787 hurricanes apparently destroyed the island's crop of sugar 
and coffee together with all the ground provisions. To that list of calamities 
must also be added the fire which destroyed Roseau with resultant losses amounting r 
to over £200,000^. j 
Before the seizure of Dominica by the.British, . its importance was rated on 
the basis of the military strategy relating to the French colonial territories. I 
After 1763, its main assets continued to be its geographical position, interpreted 
now in the framework of metropolitan trade policy. It laid in the role Dominica could 
play as an entrepot for commerce with foreign customers, normally inaccessible to i 
British merchants. Its perceived importance in this polity strategy was indicated by j 
the creation of two free ports on its territorys Portsmouth and Roseau. 
The passing of the first Free Port Act in 1766 coincided with the period of ' 
highest development of the plantation system. These dispositions aimed in actual fact 
at institutionalising smuggling, by attracting bullion and raw materials from Spanish 
and other foreign colonies and providing them with British manufactures. One can 
distinguish three focal points in the British Caribbean? Jamaica for the northern part 
of the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America; Dominica for the surrounding French 
islands; and Grenada later assisted by Trinidad for the Spanish Main. Hostility betweei 
France and Britain in 1793 divided this development of trade relations into two periods 
During the first, theimovement of raw materials en route to British enterprises was 
predominant; in the second the tendency was gradually reversed and the free ports were 
used mainly to distribute British manufactures on the "foreigrf1 markets. 
The establishment of free ports in Dominica meant that the island became part of a 
large scheme.of expansion of British trade. Unfortunately, even in this area, the islai 
could only achieve a modest place. From 1793 onwards there was not much point in tradii 
with the French islands, either because Martinique was taken over by the British or 
because of the need to,isolate Guadeloupe, springboard of the French Revolution in the 
region. In consequence the relevance of Dominica in the free port system faded out 
rapidly. 
o 
Nevertheless a closer look at.the development of the system, as far as Dominica is 
concerned, gives some insight in the.circumstances of the colony and highlights its 
location on the frontiers of the colonial empires. 
70/ T. Atwood, op. cit., p.49. 
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Initially the free port regulations were inimical to economic production 
in Dominica, except for sugar» For instance, from the inception of the free 
ports there was much concern for the planter interest in Jamaica. The produce 
of the Jamaican planters was protected by restrictions on trade with foreign 
countries in all produce being grown in that island. In Dominica there were 
no such safeguards. 
"The two ports in Dominica, Prince Rupert's Bay and Roseau, could 
admit any product of the foreign West Indies, including sugar, 
coffee, pimento, ginger, molasses and tobacco, all of which were 
prohibited in Jamaica". 
"In Jamaica, several important safeguards were made for the sake of 
the planting interests. Sugar, coffee, pimento, ginger, molasses 
and tobacco (all products grown in the island) were forbidden to be 
imported in foreign vessels"7JL/. 
In fact the free port policy greatly curtailed the agricultural export economy 
in Dominica, i.e. its result was "to restrict a fertile island to the role of a 
72/ 
mere entrepot"—. Seven years after the introduction of the system (1773), 
coffee and cocoa grown in Dominica were admitted on the same terms as sugar, but 
at that point in time the island was about to drop out of the system for a decade. 
Free port trade was allowed to develop in Dominica during a decade 
approximately and it increased trading activity in the town of Roseau, this is 
especially reflected in the increased number of merchants and the general 
population growth. Armytage argued that the system was not successful. Accounts 
of sugar exported from Dominica in 1773 in comparison to that produced in the French 
islands showed that only small amounts were sold to the British merchants in 
Dominica-^% On the other hand, much smuggling continued—( Moreover by 1778, the 
effect of the American war was to cripple the trade - "the system practically ceased 
75 / 
to function"—. From 1778-1784 the French occupied the island and direct trade with 
Britain was forbidden while trade with France and her allies was restricted. 
"During the five years and a quarter, the time that the island of 
Dominica was in the possession of the French, it was resorted to 
by no vessels from Old France; nor was any of the produce of the 
English plantations exported to that kingdom during this period; 
..."76/. 
71/ Frances Armytage, op. cit., p.42. 
72/ Parry and Sherlock, op. cit., pp. 133-134. 
73/ F. Armytage, op. cit., p.44. 
74/ Parry and Sherlock make the same point. "The Act had little effort in 
drawing French sugar into British warehouses, except smuggled French sugar which 
Dominica planters marketed as their own". Parry and Sherlock op. cit., pp. 133-134, 
75/ F. Armytage, op. cit., p.45. 
76/ T„ Atwood, op. cit., p.155. 
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i 
Other means of export to Britain was done at great cost to the proprietors. 
i 
It was not until 1787 that the ports were reopened for trade after the 
repossession of the island by Britain in 1783/1784. Only six years of trade were 
allowed (1787-1793) when war again curtailed trading activities. The war was in 
fact ruinous to the free trade in Dominica because of prohibitions on trade with 
French colonies. By the end of the century the possibility of developing some 
commercial activities in Dominica together with a sizeable merchant class was 
cancelled forever. More often than not, the distressing performance of Dominica -
by European yardsticks - on most grounds of economic organisation is attributed to 
natural factors. Its mountainous topography and its position in the path of 
hurricanes are blamed for most failures experienced by the inhabitants and used as 
a justification for the limited availability of British financial resources. Surely 
the island was not the ideal terrain for producing sugar cane. Yet coffee could not 
take hold of the economy. The real issue is however whether investments necessary to 
develop the territory were too voluminous and subject to too much risk, or simply 
untimely. 
It would be difficult for the non-Carib Dominicans to acknowledge the peculiar 
way in which the aborigenes had won their war against the European invaders. Their 
two hundred year old resistance slanted the evolution of the country toward, a 
marginal course from which it had never recovered and has very few prospects of 
recovery. The whole question of the insertion of the island into the world economic 
and political system has been affected ever since; and it is necessary to view the 
establishment and deployment of colonial rule against this background. 
The evolution of a European oriented economy in Dominica had been in the 
following quandry. When the time came to organise "its exploitation according to 
European patterns, resources eventually available for this purpose would be allocated 
after an assessment had been made of their impact on recurrent military expenses 
assigned f or the protection of existing plantation societies. Furthermore, the 
plantation system being then in full bloom, the opening of new areas to cultivation 
had to yield returns which could compare to the rate of profit prevalent throughout 
the system. In fact expected returns from Dominica would have to compensate largely 
for the eventual decrease in the allocation of capital earmarked for the established 
jplantocracies, in order to justify the overruling of their objections. So with or 
without suitable geographical circumstances, Dominica would have had to overcome more 
obstacles than any other Caribbean island in order to secure economic development 
according to European standards. 
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Therefore the only asset of the island which was readily exploitable -
always within a European oriented development - was its geographical position. 
Now it became impossible to give a long term economical use to its location, 
since by the time the European rivals had cornered the Caribs and by the time 
one of them could unequivocally claim and assert its ownership of the 
territory, long standing trade relations between them were impracticable. 
They could only relate for the purpose of defeating each other. 
Hence the sole alternative left for Dominica's participation in the 
Western world was its usefulness as a military base. In periods of 
confrontation there would be no conditions for economic investments in the 
island. ' The hinterland remained untouched. When the metropolitan country 
was not at war with its neighbours, as obtained during the XlXth. and XXth. 
centuries, the garrison was so reduced that no real advantage accrued to the 
territory, and the hinterland was still ignored. It is in this context that 
the Dominicans could on their own organise some development of their land, 
and only in this context that the difficult geography of the island can be 
seen as a deterrent to sustained growth. 
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IV 
PLANTERS AND MERCHANTS 
Plantation development was stimulated in Dominica after 1763 when the island 
became British under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. It has already been noted 
that at this point in time most plantation islands were fully organised and 
rivalries between France and Great Britain for an hegemonic position in the 
Caribbean were at their highest point. The questionable predominance of Britain 
in this part of the region and its occupation of a Relatively unexploited territory 
located between two French strongholds reveals certain underlying characteristics 
of colonial island societies. Among other characteristics, such as the subordination 
of economic-to political concerrr^-f the importance of national affiliation in the 
arrangement of these societies, and more precisely, the predominant role of ascribed 
loyalties in the emergence of cohesive economic ^"élites, must be highlighted. 
78/ 
Even though the geopolitical situation of Dominica is seldom overlooked—, it is 
not commonly related to its poor economic achievement. A major hindrance to 
development seems to be located in the type of international relations affecting the 
country. 
After the 1763 cession of the island, all lands in the territory became the 
Crown's property. The policy enacted then gave a clear indication of the general 
thrust towards political control as opposed to economic exploitation. The newly 
acquired lands were sold at public auction to British subjects throughout Britain. 
The buyers were, in a significant proportion, speculators who had no intention of 
cultivating the land, but to use "their title deeds to borrow money in Britain and 79/ hopefully sell land at a profit"— . 
77/ "As it was, Dominica was forced in the early days to develop one crop, sugar, 
for which the land was not particularly suited, while crops like cocoa and coffee which 
might have done better in hilly country, were neglected". F. Armytage, op. cit., p.43. 
78/ "If Dominica had value at dll during the century after the European incursion, 
it was primarily a strategic one, as it lies almost in the centre of the great crescent 
of islands comprising the Lesser Antilles". B, Cracknell, "Caribbean Island with a 
Problem". Royal Geographical Society, London, Nos. 6 and 7, 1971, pp. 463-470. 
79/ L. Honychurch op. cit., p.34. 
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Absentee ownership was very common and managers and overseers were not of 
the "best character". 
80 / 
"It is no wonder that the estate goes to ruin and destruction"—. 
Most British planters who took residence in Dominica, were not in a position 
to establish viable enterprises. Their land allotments being limited, they 
only had access to insufficient capital resources. This, added to their 
inexperience of the milieu, resulted in accelerated bankruptcies. 
"By this imprudent conduct of such of the new settlers, after 
they had spent considerable sums of money which they had 
borrowed on their plantations so situated, (in unsuitable 
areas), and having lost a number of negroes and cattle by the 
dampness of the climate in those places, together with the 
difficult and laborious roads to them, they were at length 
driven to the necessity of abandoning their possessions to the 
mortgagees in Europe"81/. 
These new settlers were then overwhelmed by debts; their mortgagees 
82 / "being merchants in England"—. 
"seem to be disposed to let their land remain in the same 
neglected, abandoned situation they have been in these 
several years past, to the great hindrance of the prosperity 
of that valuable island, as well as their own detriment"83/. 
Finally, to really have access to land resources and to manipulate freely 
their economic value, the would-be planter had to be of British nationality, 
other considerations being secondary. 
"French settlers already on the island were not allowed to dispose 
of their lands without the permission of the Governor and had to 
pay an annual rent on every acre they owned"84/. 
80/ Ibid., p.43. 
81/ T. Atwood, op. cit., pp. 75-75. 
82/ B. Marshall, op. cit^ p.216. 
83/ T. Atwood, op. cit.? p.34. 
84/ L. Honychurch, op. cit.. p.34. 
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French planters of Dominica, were seen, and actually paw themselves, as enemies 
of their British counterparts. 
"When Dominica was ceded.to Britain, French influence had been 
paramount for nearly one hundred years. The more wealthy of 
the old French inhabitants, who sold out and retired from the 
colony, bore but a small numerical to those who elected to 
remain and who soon afterwards, under the denomination 
of new or adopted subjects, early formed a strong party, who 
. set themselves in opposition to and at variance'with the 
British-born subjects who restored to Dominica as purchasers 
of Crown lands. They were not granted any of the privileges 
which were extended to them in Grenada, such as being 
nominated to the Council or elected to thé Assembly.in limited 
numbers. This discrimination had the effect of increasing 
their animosity and with undisguised anxiety they continued to 
look forward to another war and recapture"85/. 
To the prohibition for adopted subjects to participate in decision-
making bodies, were added further impediments as far as the administration 
of justice was concerned. 
"The too-hasty, introduction of English legal system and efforts 
to restrict the administration of justice to the English-speaking 
section of the communities raised doubts as to whether there was 
much concern for a proper administration of justice"86/. 
The relevance of national affiliation was further reinforced in 1784 with 
the so-called "American loyalists", the "Dominican" planters having urged the 
British Government to offer Crown lands and other concessions to those who 
87 / opposed the independence of the American U n i o n — . 
Dominica had no special agronomic virtue as far as sugar çane was concerned 
but th&£Duntry had resources and tradition in.the production of coffee. Cocoa 
was another plantation crop adapted to its topography. Now if one could1 imagine 
the country divided into large flourishing coffee or cocoa plantations, i.e. 
organised as a plantation island, a class of planters with some degree of political 
85/ C. Goodridge, "Dominica - The French Connection", Aspects ... p.155. 
86/ Ibid., p.158. 
87/ L. Honychurch, op. cit.tp.52. 
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bargaining power could have emerged, demanding from the colonial authorities 
the sharing of their total hold with local interests allied to corresponding 
lobbies in London, or elsewhere. Investments to enslave a sizeable labour 
force and to ensure at the same time, the geopolitical function of the 
island would have been several times higher than what was needed for a 
destitute economy. So much so, that this rising plantocracy would not have 
been solely of British stock. 
Therefore, while the opposition between enslaved and free population 
remained the fundamental element of the colonial political structure, a 
conflict between British and French planters developed as a secondary but i • 
relevant set of contradictions. The relations between the two main European 
groups in Dominica closely reflected the rapport between the respective 
metropolitan countries. "Foreign" Frenchmen would visit "adopted Frenchmen" 
88 / 
and spy on British military installations—. Dominica had, according to 
Goodridge, an internal enemy of much greater physical force than the dependable 
subjects of the Crown? ' 
"From 7 September 1778 to 4 January 1784, the colony was again 
placed under the government and laws of France and those 
gentlemen who were new subjects the day before, became (...) 
the most hostile and violent of Frenchmen"89/ 
During the restoration period, the French enacted a series of retaliatory 
measures, tending to draw the British population to a subservient position 
apparently more pronounced than the one they knew before their victory. 
It went to the point that during the fire in Roseau of 16 April 1781, French 
soldiers would assist primarily French residents. Every measure was taken to 
90/ make the British uncomfortable— . It would be understood that many of the 
88/ J.A. Borome, "Dominica during French Occupation 1778-1784", 
op. cit., p. 103. 
89/ C. Goodridge, op. cit., p. 155. , 
90/ '̂ Fearful of plots, (Duchilleau). had private letters opened, forbade 
more than two Englishmen to assemble in any place, and went so far as to 
order them to extinguish lights in their house after 9 p.m. and not to walk 
in the streets without carrying a lighted lantern that their movements might 
be followed." J. Borome, "Dominica during French Occupation 1778-1784". 
Aspects ... p.106. 
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French planters were, to say the least, deceived when they had to return under 
British rule: • 91/ 
"Many of them sold out and went, with Spanish permission, to Trinidad"—. 
It is important to look more closely at this internalization of metropolitan 
rivalries, which is quite uncommon in the Caribbean societies, and at its eventual 
consequences. Discrimination against French or British planters would have been 
unnecessary if rivalries between the mother countries had not been so acutely felt. 
Such an impact of external relations on the makings of a local society appears to 
be related not only to the strategic position of the territory, but also to the 
concrete nature of these relations at a given point in time. 
92 
Actually, and m the same Caribbean context, wealthier planters in St. Domingue—' 
did not hesitate to call upon Britain to safeguard their economic interests, 
endangered by France's political evolution. Moreover, French planters in 
"Ste. Lucie la Fidèle" did not challenge British supremacy with such vehemence 
once the takeover was completed and their property rights guaranteed. Differences 
between the behaviour of Dominican planters and their counterparts in St. Domingue 
and St. Lucia relate to the events surrounding the Revolution of 1789 and the early 
and monetary abolitionist stand of Republican France. The title of "Ste. Lucia 
la Fidèle" was due to the action of French soldiers and "maroons". Profoundly 
anti-abolitionist, St. Lucian planters were satisfied that after the British seizure 
the island would be ruled under the pre-1789 laws. In the case of St. Domingue, the 
"betrayal" of the planters during the,1790's was also consistent with their material 
interests and the basic social structure of slavery plantations. 
Now, evidence of the attachment of the French-born planters to their mother-
country are all prior to the French Revolution and remain consistent with the same 
material interests. After this breaking point, attempts by Victor Hughes, 
representative of the Republic of Guadeloupe, to reconquer the island of Dominica 
were supported by only a few "adopted subjects" and failed miserably. When the b.asic 
material interests of the planter class were threatened by the questioning and even 
sporadic suppression of enslavement by France French planters rapidly dropped their 
ascribed loyalty and accommodated British rule. Dominica received,a large number of 
these so-called royalists from Martinique and Guadeloupe. 
91/ Ibid., p.114. 
92/ "The French inhabitants of Dominica are more numerous than the British and 
(...) have the most valuable coffee plantations in that island". T. Atwood, 
op. cit., p.216. 
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Inversely, while France and Great Britain shared basic policies in 
respect to the enslaved, their rivalry did not foster any misgivings in the 
political loyalties of their respective natural subjects. Both European 
countries promoted and protected the property rights of their national and 
dependable subjects. 
In the circumstances of Dominica, the laws stated the privileges and 
immunities of the nationals and were intended for all of them, without 
distinction between planters and non-planters. Discriminations against 
non-nationals (planters and non-planters) were enshrined in such laws and 
thereby legitimised. 
Since the whole island population was not divided along the nationality 
issue, both sets of judicial precepts would encompass the conditions for 
enslavement and emancipation. The situation of enslaved and freed men were 
not much different under one or the other legal system. The common denominator 
of the nationals of one or the other colonial state being their race, changes 
in social order under British or French rule referred to which type of whites 
were entitled to benefit fully from the global exploitation of the local 
resources - including the enslaved. Reference was also made to the extent to 
which concessions were made to freed persons. 
This pattern of behaviour, far from heightening the role of economic 
interests, put them in the position of an intervening variable in the 
explanation of Caribbean social practices. Indeed French or British planters 
did not settle in Dominica primarly because of their political allegiance, but 
their economic expectations could only materialize thanks to the political 
backing available to them. The primacy of the political structures was essential 
for setting up the fabric of plantation societies and for their smooth ruling. 
One difference between Dominica and other island societies emerged from 
these considerations and was due to the moment and characteristics of the 
intermetropolitan struggles. In the formation of Dominican social structures, 
on the one hand, the division of the whites into natural and naturalised subjects 
was highly significant because the interplay of material interests did not 
intervene to force whites of different national allegiance to form an alliance 
against other members of their own community, namely against the political and 
administrative authorities. 
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On the other hand French and British born planters might have been opposed 
to each other, but they never departed from the main policy of their respective 
Home Governments with respect to the enslaved and freed persons. Therefore, 
Dominica never experienced a longlasting and obviously self-interested alliance 
93/ 
between any sector of the white population with the black or mulatto population—. 
The cleavage between Whites, Browns and Blacks remained entrenched in daily 
practices, and inter-ethnic relations having an enhanced visibility appeared more 
prominent and of greater impact in the interplay of.social factors than in other 
islands of the Caribbean. 
i 
Another difference between Dominica and other Caribbean countries is the 
fact that a continuum of social strata did not actually evolve among the. whites. 
Petty planters became "Grand Blanc" on the local scenery, as far as their access 
to the decision-making .process or their aspira,tion; to Such an access was concerned. 
The description of the white community of the early years of the nineteenth century 
by Governor Provost leaves no doubt on this matter: 
"The island's inhabitants were in general men of small landed 
property (...) whose incomes ,compel them to reside in the 
colony, and the remaindermostly clerks, and attorneys or 
agents to merchants and planters in the.mother country. (...) 
(The community consisted of) persons with very few exceptions 
from the House of Assembly and occupy the other important 
offices in the community"94/. 
It follows that a continuum of overlapping colour strata did not evolve. Poor whites 
and mulattoes never actually shared the same social ladder since all whites were 
salvaged by opportunities offered in the administration of the colony. This will 
constitute the germ of conflicts which will characterize the XlXth. century. 
This course of action which obviously was not unrelated to the lack of differentiation 
in the economic system, created a propitious milieu for the emergence of the mulattoes 
as a specific pressure group. At the same time it enhanced the underlying agreement 
against the non-whites, and exposed the racist character of colonialism. In Dominica, 
distinctions between race and class conflicts would not be obscured by interpersonal 
relations. 
93/ These statements will be qualified in the next chapter. 
94/ B. Marshall, op. cit.i, pp.344-345. 
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Finally, and in an inter-determinate fashion, this arrangement of social 
relations eased the functioning of theisland as a strategic stronghold, and 
by the same token, was a consequence of such a role. Colonial decision-
making was not modified by pressure groups emerging from a set of local relations, 
While Great Britain was rather timid in modifying the economic structure of 
Dominica, it took a series of rather bold steps to capitalize on its strategic 
position for the development of metropolitan trade. In 1766, three years after 
95/ 
the Treaty of Paris, the first Free Port Act was passed in Parliament— . Some 
connection between a flourishing trade and the development of the territory 
hosting the emporium could have been expected. It was a matter of enjoying: 
"to the extent of the trade all the advantages of the foreign 
colonies without being exposed to the expense of establishing 
and protecting them"96/. 
Indeed, the inclusion of Dominica in the emerging network of Free Ports 
brought a substantial increase of activity to the island. 
"Between 177i and i773 the population doubled its numbers, owing, 
wrote the Lieutenant-Governor, ?to our advantages of situation 
for trade and commerce'. (...) All classes in Dominica were 
benefiting from the free port system, and all could unite in 
asking for its renewal (when the first Act expired in 1773)"97/. 
Unfortunately, not much transformation resulted from the passage of goods through 
Dominica. The merchants never established themselves in the island. They 
developed no sense of loyalty towards the host country, and contrary to the 
planters, 
"their personal interests can seldom have been as completely 
involved in the general state of the West Indies"98/. 
95/ "The intention in opening free ports had been to extend the sales of 
British manufactures, and receive in return raw materials produced in foreign 
islands". F. Armytage, op. cit.,p.58. 
96/ Ibid. 
97/ F. Army tage, op. cit.,, pp. 44-45. 
98/ Ibid, p.7. 
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Atwood noted an aversion to forming matrimonial connections among the white 
population of that period. He attributed this aversion to the idea that 
"voluntary exile" to which the Europeans submitted themselves was believed to 
99/ last only for a few years—. 
Indeed, the relative buoyancy was ephemeral; as soon as the hostilities of 
the American Revolution commenced, trade came to an end» Atwood observed: 
"Merchants, tradesmen and others withdrew themselves to places 
where the trade and commerce were more brisk, and the planters (...) 
were driven to abandon (their new estates) or to postpone the further 
advancement of them"100/„ 
While the merchants started their desert ion, the English planters were left 
with less access to capital and severe difficulties in realizing their produce 
and soon ran away from the pressure put on them by the "maroons" and the French 
during the 1778-1784 occupation. 
"The English subjects in this island are reduced to near .half their 
number that they were in it shortly after the restoration, and the 
generality of them at present seem disposed to quit it, by reason 
of the ruin of their trade and after disadvantageous circumstances 
which they labour under"101/„ 
In conclusion, among the beneficiaries of the colonization of Dominica 
from 1763 to the end of the eighteenth century, three groups of interests can 
be distinguished: the Crown, the merchants and the planters. It appears 
that policies enacted by the Crown related basically to geopolitical pre-
occupations, and secondarily to facilitating the development of trade and 
commerce. Agricultural development and more generally the establishment of 
a viable economic venture in the island did not seem to have been of any 
specific concern. Trade and commerce stimulated by the Free Port Acts were 
in fact de-linked from the Dominican economy, in spite of some eventual use 
by the locals of facilities servicing metropolitan needs. 
99/ Atwood, op. cit., p.210. 
100/ Atwood, op. cit., pp.106-107. 
101/ Ibid. pp.280-281 „. 
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There were therefore no economic conditions for a group or an embryo 
of social class to clearly differentiate itself from the rest of the population, 
while managing, under the sponsorship of the colonial authorities, the basic 
institutions responsible for economic exploitation» From these early times, 
a definite cleavage developed between the political interests of the British 
government and of its representatives on the one hand, and the economic 
pursuits of the population on the other hand» The Crown never became involved 
in the economic affairs of this colony» 
Among the inhabitants, the merchants were the closest allies of the 
Crown» Contrary to what is commonly observed in other colonies, particularly 
at the heights of their economic exploitation, these merchants did not play 
a role of intermediaries between the local producers and metropolitan interest 
groups. Their business was located on the. lines of exchange linking the 
regional - and in fact "foreign" - producers to the metropolitan manufacturers. 
In these circumstances the population of merchants did not take root in the 
country and imigrated as soon as a decline in their activities became irrever-
sible. 
Normally, planters were strongly dependent on merchants for capital 
investments and realization of their products» In Dominica, plantation 
development being minimal, the underlying conflicts between, planters and 
merchants lost any striking visibility» Merchants and planters had in fact no 
similarity nor conflict of interests. They could in London compete for the 
enactment of policies more suitable to their respective needs, and discrepan-
cies did emerge on this political ground. But once the rules of the game were 
laid down, i.e. once the basic policy of the British vis-a-vis Dominica was 
adopted, both groups pursued their economic interests without interfering one 
with the other» This uncommon relationship derived from the functioning of the 




The planters of eighteenth century Dominica must be disaggregated into two 
significant sub-groups - the British and the French„ While the British occupied 
themselves in the production of sugar, and the French were dedicated mainly to 
growing coffee, no specific economic conflict could hamper their development 
into a plantocracy. The strife in the planter class originated in their national 
affiliation and in the impact of ensuing loyalties in the ruling of a colony considered 
as a strategic stronghold by their respective mother-country» 
' In other words, not only was the whole economic set up of Dominica closely 
conditioned by the political projects of the British or the French governments 
vis-a-vis the island, but the avenues open to the social groups for the control 
of the resources available in it varied according to their respective usefulness 
in the pursuance of these objectives« It is not being questioned whether the 
political objectives of the European governments had an underlying economic 
raison d'etre in Europe; neither is it proposed that the motivation of the 
plantocracy was not of an economic nature. But as far as the fabric of the 
Dominican society was concerned, it seems clear that political dictates consti-
i 
tuted the fundamental frame for economic performances» Political structures 
must be viewed in the emergence of Dominican social structures as the basic or 
infrastructural. layer upon which economic relations inserted themselves» 
Similarly, the local system, not being geared towards the economic 
advancement of its dominant groups, individuals comprising them would tend 
to migrate towards more suitable milieux, leaving the management of the 
economy to second class ent.reprenue.rs» The social structure, instead of 
being organised around the interests of an economic élite, would evolve around i 




BLACK SETTLERS, MAROONS AND ENSLAVED 
There is evidence of Blacks settling in Dominica before the 
introduction of enslavement in the island- Many writers following the 
official historiography, would refer to them erroneously as "runaways" 
or "maroons", but would carefully refrain from using the following 
appellations in relation to White runaways: Criminals, indentured or simply 
destitutes of the European societies« Black settlers must be distinguished 
from enslaved who migrated to Dominica with the first French planters» 
A peculiar set of relations referred to earlier, seems to have evolved 
between this original group of Blacks, the enslaved and the French communities. 
Some witnesses and chronicles, attuned to the cultural frame of reference 
of their time, reported on the practices of "French slaves" as opposed to those 
of the "British slaves" entering the island after 1763. It would seem that: 
"In the good management of slaves the French planters, 
I (an English writer of the period) think it is generally 
allowed, are superior to the English"!02/» 
Atwood's writings would stress the difference in attitude of the enslaved 
103 / before and after the British conquest „ 
102/ L» Honychurch, op, cit», p»27„ 
103/ T» Atwoods, op» cit-» p»506» 
-42-
B. Marshall, following Atwood, reports that: 
"(..») these slaves disliked their new masters and so they 
took off to the woods with their wives and children and were 
joined from time to time by others from the neighbouring estates. 
In the woods they formed themselves into companies headed by chiefs 
and showed their hostility to the British presence in the island 
by making surprise attacks on the plantations, in which they 
destroyed property and killed the white settlers" 104/. 
According to Cecil A. Goodridge, quoting from a document written at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century: 
"The slave population in Dominica numbered almost 30,000 and most of 
them who had by purchase become slaves to British proprietors, as 
well as those of them who had remained the slaves of the adopted 
subjects, having been reared and bred under French habits, the French 
language and the Catholic religion, all of which generated prejudices 
unfavourable to their Protestant masters" 105/. 
In this same order of ideas, Honychurch states: 
"The French slaves took advantage of the change in power in 1760's 
and during this period the first large numbers escaped from the 
French estates" 106/. 
It is utterly confusing to divide the Black population into those of French 
and of British nationality or allegiance. The need to revise these eighteenth 
century common sense ideas,derives clearly from reports of those such as the 
"slave-priests" who had closer contacts with the enslaved. Serious doubts were 
cast on their apparent process of creolisation under thej aegis of one or the other 
group of Europeans, at least in relation to the religious components of this 
process. 
104/ B. Marshall, Qp.clt» p.506. : 
105/ C. Goodridge, J'Dominica.- The French Connexion", Aspects ... p. 156. 
106/ Lo Honychurch,. op.cit.tp.53 (Our emphasis). 
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Fr. R. Proesmans, CSsR, collated a series of testimonies on the 
activities of "slave priests" in an article entitled "Notes on the 
Slaves of the French", which ends with a paragraph taken from the writings 
of a slave priest on the Results obtained with the Slaves. The super-
ficiality of any special French treatment and doubts which assailed the 
Ministers of the Roman Catholic Church are exposed: 
"1. The majority do not come to the Instruction or 
receive the sacrament; 
2. To make them say their daily prayers, their masters 
have to order (several) to be flogged; 
3. Twelve to fifteen women slaves go to communion; and 
4. And there is still hesitation should we give it to 
them" 107/. 
There is no doubt that the distance between the enslaved and the 
slave-masters, as recorded by Proesmans, could have been bridged with the 
passage of time, particularly in a conflictless and idyllic situation. 
This was not the case in Dominica. As a haven for "runaways" of all creeds 
and colours, the island would be the target of established plantocracies. 
Its own planters and would-be planters would localise this conflict by 
dividing themselves along lines of political and national loyalties. This 
cleavage among the slave-owners and would-be slave-owners would affect the 
running of the institutions set up for enslavement and would give special 
characteristics to the environment in which the enslaved workers would have to 
deal with oppression. But at no point in time could the modification in 
their circumstances make the captives protagonists of these cleavages. A 
close look at available data reveals beneath the surface, the commonality of 
interests shared by all planters, irrespective of their nationality, as well 
as the rationale for the practices of the enslaved. 
107/ Fr. R. Proesmans, CSsR, "Notes on the Slaves of the French", 
Aspects ... p.172, 
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The apparent acquiescence of the enslaved to his situation, hinted at by 
the application of seasoned and creole slaves - the enslaved by French planters 
being supposedly more adequately seasoned - has never prevented these planters 
from securing their monopoly on the use of violence. The planters were armed 
and the enslaved not. Individual planters had not only access to weapons and 
ammunitions, but a militia of freed men would be organised and regular troops 
would be made available by both metropolitan countries as basic requirements for 
implementing the enslavement of the bulk of the population. 
Now in a colony where rights of the metropoie were in fact under constant 
challenge, it derived a series of modifications in the implementation of the 
classic model of slavery plantation. All planters were not on equal political 
footing, as in any normal plantation society; some would participate in the 
decision-making processes, while others, could not by virtue of being "adopted 
subjects" of one or the other metropolitan authority. As far as the daily use 
of legitimate violence was concerned, planters falling in the category of 
"adopted subjects" were faced with a certain number of limitations. Their 
recruitment in the militia was also subject to national definitions. 
One becomes aware of these subtleties of the eighteenth century Dominican 
society, in view of special measures enacted in times of severe crises: 
"Duchilleau (Governor in 1778) had the difficult task of making 
of Dominica a little Gibraltar, (.„.). His instructions called 
on him (...) to hasten the immediate fortification of the island, 
maintain a strong garrison, establish military hospitals, form a 
militia of French inhabitants,.forbid.the English .to.assemble,..,. 
disarm those without real estates,.require.all.not.well.known to 
deposit their arms with leading.residents .in each.parish..in case. . . 
of British attack, and prohibit.any.slave.from.carrying arms"108/. 
Severe economic inequalities derived from the political ones which divided 
the planters along national lines. French planters favoured by less political 
support would have smaller plantations and less capital than their British 
counterparts. The latter had better access to what became Crown Lands after 1763 
and had better credit standing in view of their secured ownership rights. Certain 
patterns of behaviour in the rapport of the French with the enslaved, characteristic 
108/ J. Borome, "Dominica during French Occupation, 1778-1784", 
Aspects ... p.105 (Our emphasis). 
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of the island society during the first half of the century, could persist 
beyond that period in which the Black settlement or so called "maroon 
societies" were not molested.. 
However, Dominica being in any case a second class colony and its average 
planters rather modest ones, the enslaved benefitted from what could be 
considered as special treatment from their petty masters, British and French 
alike. This special treatment did not actually originate from some unique 
"savoir-faire" - neither thé British nor the French deserve any second place 
on this ground. It derived from insufficient political and international 
trade back-up to provide them with enough labour force even for their 
second-rate enterprises and to supply them with adequate weaponry for ensuring 
their monopoly on the use of violence necessary to force the workers to 
perform according to classical plantation norms. 
The evidence for this asseveration is to be found in the fact that the 
enslaved could with the complicity of the masters acceed to freedom, by-passing 
existing regulations. Planters would hide "runaways" and utilize their services 
in their own compound, to an extent which made it necessary to pass an Act in 
1773, granting free access to plantation premises to persons searching for 
"runaways". It even became imperative to admit the evidence of enslaved against 
whites in the courts. 
"However, this Act (1775) and others did not have the desired 
effect, and in the last decade of the eighteenth century more 
stringent measures were enforced, in which economic regulations 
and the admittance of slave evidence against whites were 
employed, because of apparent lack of co-operation by some of 
the free population"109/. 
In this chapter as in the previous ones, allusions have been made' to the 
need for clear external sponsorship to implement a policy of enslaving a large 
number of workers. The troops dispatched to Dominica were more concerned with 
regional conflicts than with warfare against the local population^^. The 
possibility of distracting such troops from their prime endeavour would vary 
according to the relative position of the metropolitan.country on the 
109/ B. Marshall, op, cit.»pp,298-299, 
110/ "Disregarding French pleas for economy, (Duchilleau, Governor of 
the island under French occupation) drove ahead with plans for forts and roads. 
He employed engineers, pressed slaves into service, and called in all heavy arms 
and ammunitions" ...) L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.49. 
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international and regional scenario. Troops available to the French colonial 
authorities being more limited, these authorities would realise savings on the 
costs of their war with the British by seeking an alliance with the Black 
settlers and the actual maroons. Atwood is clear on this point: 
J "They (the "runaways") were not, however, often guilty of any material 
imischief, and had never committed murder till the reduction of the 
island by the French; but soon after that happened, the depredation of 
the runaways began to be of a very serious nature; for they robbed and 
destroyed the property, and at length killed some of the English 
inhabitants. Previously they had been engaged by the French for 
defending the island - they were furnished with muskets and bayonets 
and with the same provisions as were allowed the French soldiers\(...)"111/. 
; The "savoir faire" of the French authorities did not relate to their superior 
iaastery in the art of enslaving a population, but to a circumstantial tactic in 
their attempt to colonize the island. In Dominica as elsewhere in the Caribbean, 
às soon as France would dispose of the required resources, she would promptly 
crack down on the "maroons" and the same Duchilleau is a good example of this 
mastery in the technique for colonizing.a country. 
Similarly the French petty planters of Dominica before or after the British 
occupation, would strive to render enslavement within their estates less costly 
than maronage., Failing this, they would behave towards the enslaved as any British 
planter and would not rely on alleged favourable attitudes towards them. This is 
112/ 
documented by Bororne, and the accounts of Honychurch on "The Fighting Maroons" , 
àlso reveals beyond doubt the basic structure of the Dominican society, as an 
institutionalized, sometimes open, sometimes covert, war! between two contending 
groups: the actual enslaved and would-be enslaved (the Black settlers) on the one 
hand, and the planters and would-be planters (the Freed persons) on the other. 
Both British and French had one common enemy whom they referred to as the 
Maroons. Bernard Marshall quotes the Governor of the island who in 1785 described 
them as "an internal enemy of the most alarming kind". They were also referred to 
113 / às "ari imperium in imperio" : . 
Between Black settlers and enslaved an obvious rapport existed of which planters 
were aware. Their practices and those of the colonial authorities reveal that they 
j : < 
111/ T. Atwood, op. cifc>.pp. 227-228. 
112/ J. 
Bororne, "Dominica during the French Occupation, 1778-1784", Aspects. 
... poll2, and L. Honychurch op. cit..p.52 and foil. 113/ B. Marshall, op. cit.Tp.5Q7. 
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considered all enslaved as potential "runaways" unless they were to be freed 
according to the norms of the plantation system, and inversely, a person born 
in a Black, settlement would be seen as a de jure enslaved and treated as a 
runaway. 
Therefore, in the concrete circumstances of day to day living in 
Dominica, the enslaved had at their disposal several avenues to negotiate 
better treatment or, more exactly, to avoid some of the ordeals of enslavement. 
These means originated in the unsettled political domination of the island. 
To capitalize on these dysfunctional aspects of this specific colonization 
process that they experienced, the captives had obviously to rely on their own 
initiatives and abilities. The pursuit of these self-reliant undertakings con-
stitute the cradle of a given anti-colonial outlook, the structural space in 
which a national culture began, 
A proper reading of the exploits by the Dominican enslaved is fundamental 
to dispel a deeply rocted confusion which obscures the understanding of the 
Caribbean standpoints. As recorded, the original group of enslaved in Dominica 
was in a large proportion West Indian born; they were creole or to say the least, 
seasoned enslaved, 
"Few slaves came directly from Africa to Dominica before the 1769's. 
The prosperous sugar islands of Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, 
Guadeloupe and Martinique were far more attractive to the slave 
merchants. Slaves brought to Dominica in the early days were 
transhipped from these larger trading centres and many who came to 
the island were already West Indian born"114/ 
The pattern of rebellious behaviour established by these originally seasoned 
enslaved and which drove them to establish themselves as independent settlers, 
"maroons" oz "squatizers" continued throughout the second half of the eighteenth 
century. In 1785 they threatened "to destroy every English estate in the island"-^^. 
Approximately half of the enslaved belonged to the British "whose plantations in 
particular are but. thinly furnished with them". In fact, on Dominican plantations 
there were less "field negroes" than other categories of enslaved (presumably) 
114/ L,. Honyehurch, op clt.g p,27. 
115/ Bo Marshall, op. cit., p.509, 
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"house slaves" and skilled slaves as masons, carpenters, coopers ..«) . 
The same Atwood proposed that one-third to two-fifths of the enslaved on each 
estate worked as "field negroes". If most plantations in Dominica were small 
when compared to those of the sugar islands, and if most enslaved were attached 
to non-predial activities, it can safely be argued that they experienced less 
hardships than in other Caribbean territories. 
As for the minority of "field negroes" one would be tempted to conclude 
that their exposure to other Caribbean situations, i.e. their seasoning or 
socialisation particularly in the domestic service, would make them less adapted 
to life on the plantations proper: 
"Many of them (the British) brought negroes who had only been in 
the capacity of domestics; some, those who were banished from 
other islands for their crimes, and others purchased negroes just 
brought from Africa, for the purpose of their new estates. These 
were immediately set to work, to cut down massy, hard wood trees, 
to lop and burn the branches, clear the ground of roots, and to 
labour at difficult though necessary business, for which they were 
by no means qualified"117/. 
The argumentation of Atwood does not stand, for most African born enslaved 
were by no means qualified for work in any plantation island„ Yet they did it 
under duress imposed intUeother islands. Furthermore, it was possible after 
the liberation of the captives in Haiti, Guadeloupe and St. Lucia to re-enslave them. 
The eventual acculturation of the enslaved to the conditions of domesticity, or 
their previous experience in a free society was totally irrelevant to account for 
their behaviour» The enslaved chose a set of practices according to their viability. 
In Dominica, there was a possibility of manipulating the conflicts dividing the 
planters, together with the possibilityof establishing independent village societies. 
Such opportunities were open to all enslaved, both Creoles and creolised, domestic 
and "field slaves"« Contrary to that situation, in some other islands the only 
practical solution was to act as a creole or a creolised and so did the enslaved. 
116/ I Honychurch, op, cit., p.43-44. 
117/ To Atwood, op, cit», p.224-225. 
-49-
If as settlers or so-called "maroons" it may have suited the interests of 
the Black population of Dominica to side with the French army, as enslaved -
since in any case they were not permitted to carry arms - they seemed to have 
remained prudently in a non-commital position, when the crisis exploded. 
When the French army disembarked, according to J.A. Borome: 
"panicky women, children and negro slaves darted through the 
streets and waded through rivers to reach places of safety 
outside of town"118/. 
But even as settlers or "maroons", the population evidenced its pursuit of 
objectives rather different from those of the French. For it became necessary 
during this same occupation to dispatch French troops against them so they 
119 / would remain "relatively peaceful" . 
The basic response to slavery plantations of this predominantly creolised, 
relatively well-treated set of enslaved is best summarised in the words of a 
certain W. Atkinson, who in 1782 pointed out that "example has hitherto no 
good effect upon them"^^ They had their own way of dealing with oppression. 
The became so powerful after the French occupation, that they posted in Roseau 
an affiche offering a reward for the head of the Governor "dead or alive". An 
interesting feature of their fight in those days (1785) was their alliance with 
the Caribs-^1^ 
"The colonial society lived in constant fear of slave risings 
and the threat of maroons who had escaped to freedom in the 
hills"122/. 
After a fierce British offensive in 1786 the "maroons" were defeated. 
But class conflicts between the enslaved and the "maroons" on the other hand, 
118/ J. Borome, "Dominica during French Occupation, 1778-1784", 
Aspects ... p.104. 
119/ Ibid, p.112. 
120/ Quoted by J. Borome, Ibid. 
121/ Dies Dominica, op. cit.»p.11. 
122/ L. Honychurch, op. cit.?p.39. 
-50-
and the free population on the other, were further reactivated following the disorders 
provoked by the French Revolution and the achievement of emancipation in the French 
territories. During the summer of 1793, Dominica received between five to six thousand 
royalist refugees from Martinique alone. 
"All but the negroes were admitted lest they should spread pernicious 
doctrines among the British slaves"123/. 
These precautions were of no avail and the struggle of the "maroons" lasted until the 
second decade of the nineteenth century. 
"The eventual suppression of the maroons should not however detract 
from their achievement. Indeed they kept up the most effective 
resistance to enslavement and to white domination of the island.. 
It is clear that their actions were directed to no other.end than 
the overthrow of the white ruling class and they saw that this 
could only be done by an alliance with the plantation slaves who 
were the most subjected group in the society. Instead of openly 
confronting the whites they preferred to use surprise attacks (...) 
and for a period of thirty years they kept them terrified and 
preoccupied and some of them who had estates in the interior parts 
of the island had been forced, because of their activity, to abandon 
them"124/. 
There were two types of Negro marrons (Neg maon) as the black settlers were 
called in Dominica. The classical type who lived in isolated but fortified villages 
before 1786 and after 1802 and who were properly settlers; and the bandits who 
organized themselves between these two dates and could strictly speaking be conceived 
as "maroons": 
"The woods of Dominica were no longer safe, for the maroons (after 1786) 
... For the rest of the century, the maroons never dared to assemble in 
any great numbers together; but flying from place to place in the woods, 
were either killed, taken or surrendered themselves"125/. 
As different from the roaming rebels, the black settlers lived in self-contained 
communities, the organization of which contradicted in every point the plantation 
system: 
123/ C. Goodridge, op. cit., p. 155. 
124/ T. Atwood, quoted by B. Marshall, op. cit., p.515. 
125/ ' L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.55. 
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"By 1785, a string of maroon camps had developed in the centre 
of the island. Each was led by a chief and at this time there 
were thirteen major figures ... These camps were also inhabited, 
by women and children ..."126/ 
"... In 1785 the Mountainous interior which the maroons inhabited 
abounded with fastnesses, places of concealment and roads which 
were almost impassable. In addition, there was a rivulet of 
water on almost 'every acre' and 'great plenty of ground provision 
in all parts'. In 1800 when three detachments of the 9th West 
Indian Regiment penetrated a part of this country, they discovered 
300 acres of cleared land 'fully stocked with all kinds of 
provisions'... 
...Previous to that, Officers reported having seen ... 'as fine 
sugar canes as on any estate in the country'. The mountainous 
interior therefore not only provided the maroons with a haven which 
was almost inaccessible to the whites, but also with all the articles 
necessary for their subsistence"127/. 
It is correct to assume that in times of warfare these communities would 
tend to merge with the maroons, strictve sensu. 
The fact that this counter-plantation system was set up in Dominica by 
seasoned or creóle enslaved puts in a very peculiar light most literature 
related to the process of creolisation. Creolisation when made synonymous to 
resignation and acceptance of enslavement is but one alternative which may be 
chosen presumably by native or African-born Blacks. But once attention is 
paid to the social structure of a country; the behaviour of the.enslaved is 
better explained by the rapport de force between the protagonists of 
plantation slavery, than imputed attitudes of the enslaved. 
126/ Ibid, p.54. 
127/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.506-507. 
INCOMPLETENESS OF THE CLASS STRUCTURE 
The history of Dominica during the eighteenth century offers an excellent 
opportunity to observe the assembly of the components of a Caribbean society, 
the context in which a class structure emerged from their differentiation and 
the extent to which the.ensuing class relations encompassed the daily 
activities of individuals and groups so differentiated. During the first half 
of the century, three groups of people lived on the islands a few survivors 
of the genocide perpetrated against the Caribs, a few independent Blacks, and 
a number of whites and mulattoes mainly, but not exclusively, of French origin, 
accompanied by predominantly creole enslaved. These groups experienced 
different forms of isolation and autonomy, inconsistent with their actual 
relations with the outer world. 
All indications are that the first two groupings were, racially homogeneous, 
while the third was multi-ethnic. The Caribs would presumably tend to safeguard 
their way of living,, while the independent Blacks would start a new society, 
distinct from the European plantation model. There is no clear indication as to 
the extent to which Blacks and Caribs interacted» One can only assume that they 
lived in separate villages in some kind of tribal organization. Forms of 
inequalities differentiating the Caribs and the independent Blacks are not known 
and most probably did not flourish and thus have not been institutionalized in 
their village societies. In any event, it is doubtful that this eventual system 
of stratification referred to economic privileges. Moreover, these bore no 
relevance for the societal fabric in the making. 
Individuals living in the third grouping - the multi-ethnic coastal settle-
ments - were separated along class lines. The slave-owners belonged to different 
European countries or nation-states, and were generally referred to by this 
affiliation. Their settlements could safely be characterized as the European 
sector of the emerging island society; it embodied within its inner fabric the 
bases for class exploitation through legal ownership of other people's labour 
force. Nonetheless, by the very nature of these early developments favoured by 
no clear sponsorship from the colonial empires, the slave-owners did not 
constitute an organic group capable of imposing unilaterally their interests on 
the enslaved. It is not recorded that the treatment of the enslaved during the 
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period under observation could transform into a social concern their "desertions" 
to the independent Black settlements. 
It seems therefore difficult to trace during these formative years an inner 
process of change oriented towards the formation of an embryonic dominant social 
128 / 
class with island-wide perspectives. Coercion and inequalities operating 
within the three significant components of the emerging society were sufficiently 
restricted so as not to affect the relationship between these components. 
At a local level and in spite of the existence of an exploited group of 
enslaved, life in Dominica was largely organized around self-reliant economic 
activities up until the 1760s. The type of activities and the range of manipulation 
of the products so obtained, as well as the potential of such undertakings for 
securing a given level of living varied according to one's participation in one or 
another group of settlers. The significant island-wide cleavages run along these 
nations or. tribal lines, and thus the relevant concept to understand and describe 
the society in the making is the concept of settlers. The three groups of settlers 
did not yet constitute a societal unit and no overall structure had emerged from 
their interrelations. The island harboured then three distinct societies. 
Nonetheless the processes of unification were well en train and the bases for 
a commonality of views and for the creation of a cohesive social system were laid 
down since this period. The adoption of a lingua franca, and the setting up of owner-
operated multipurpose agricultural institutions remained, until the present days, 
witnesses of these early developments. Colonialism interfered with these processes 
and made the enactment of the model of society embodied in these early contacts 
impossible. 
Caribs, independent Blacks and European settlers were equally self-reliant or at 
least in a position to achieve self-reliance. Relations between these groupings 
seemed rather peaceful. Except for the plot by Vincentian and Dominican Caribs, which 
was unravelled rather peacefully, no violent internal conflict was recorded after 1722. 
It appears that one can then distinguish analytically a sector of social life where 
none of these groupings enjoyed any privilege with respect to the other before the 1760s. 
128/ By dominant class is meant a group of individuals entertaining institutionalized 
relations aimed at the implementation of a project of social organization, designed to 
preserve their interests using the resources under their control or at their disposal. 
-54-
This sector comprised activities framed by local parameters. 
Now in view of the very importance of the settlements in which they 
were inserted, the inhabitants of Dominica did not interact on the basis 
of their sole individual ability and worth. They related only as members 
of a given group of settlers. On the one hand, it can be accepted that 
in certain circumstances, the three groups of settlers had equal 
opportunities, and that differences in individual performances arose within 
each group according to their separate systems of stratification. This 
represented only part of the social reality. 
On the other hand, the very existence of three groups of settlers 
remits the analysis to extra-territorial relations. Each group was not only 
exposed to inter-island connections, but actually belonged to a larger social 
unit and their self-representation derived from a region-wide society or more 
exactly from region-wide social categories. One may propose that one of the 
primary elements of a commonality of views among the inhabitants of Dominica 
was the shared idea that local relations were taking place within a regional 
and differentiated space. This larger and all-embracing set of relations 
being propitious to some and dangerous to others, the awareness and subsequent 
assessment of its characteristics by the early inhabitants would influence 
some dimensions of their day-to-day living and would be in actual fact the 
origin of patters of inequalities constitutive of their island-society, while 
at the same time alien to local parameters of social intercourse. 
Extraterritorial relations, as they cut across local practices, i.e. as 
they were internalized by the inhabitants of Dominica, must be seen as the milieu 
of the mechanisms producing social inequalities and class conflicts, consistent 
with the kind of regional integration fostered by colonialism. Activities framed 
by locally originated parameters were conducive to compromise and arbitration. 
Conflicts and dissension built into them did not develop to their fullest. 
These self-reliant activities by the residents of Dominica were evolving in a 
context of conflictive relations between nation-states, the rationale of which 
was totally alien to these activities as such. Changes at the interstate level 
would affect the outcome of daily practices, i.e. the range of manipulation of 
the products of such practices. Residents had no means of influencing the 
relations between nation-states With interests in the Caribbean, nor of fore-
seeing the direction of eventual modifications at this level. Let alone could 
they sponsor any alternative which would suit local interests. Their current 
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behaviour would then be guided by an awareness of the possibility of modifications 
at the referred level and not by an actual forecast of these modifications. 
i 
To understand the principles of social intercourse during the formative period 
of this Caribbean society, it seems useful to note the specificity of some concepts 
commonly used nowadays to refer to similar phenomenon and to avoid transposing them 
to the historical period under study. The idea of international relations alludes 
to what is happening outside a national space of interaction, which may or may not 
affect such a space. The context in which the early Dominicans were living does not 
bear much similarity to this vision of a national or internal versus an international 
milieu. The country was the "national" territory of no specific grouping, except in 
nominal terms, of the Caribs. It is therefore not possible to contrast any set of 
"national" or internal relations to external or foreign affairs. 
One may indeed distinguish self-propelled undertakings as opposed to dependent 
ones. Conflicts between the then existing nation-states and most in particular those 
opposing France and Britain in their relations with Dominica, aimed at establishing 
a dependent colonial system in the island. This system framed any undertakings and 
the rapport between these nation-states cut across the island population. In other 
words, each group of settlers, willingly or unwillingly, was a component of the 
inter-nation system and not of a national space distinct from an international or 
foreign one. Self-reliant activities of Dominica's residents, who were merely minor 
actors in the inter-nation system, had no impact on this system, although directly 
affected by it. 
i Inter-nation relations were self-evident for the Caribs. They had found 
no grounds on which they could entertain some lasting dialogue with the Spaniards, 
the British or the French, in terms that were consistent with their self-concept and 
what they must have conceived as their rightful prerogatives. The independent Blacks 
opposed the Europeans (including the Coloureds) on similar ideological grounds, but 
their presence on the island implied some negotiation with the Carib nation for the 
use of the land they occupied. Whites and Coloureds who settled in Dominica entertained 
identical relations with the Caribs for the use of their territory, and at the same time, 
if they were of French origin, they had to be aware of the English authorities respon-
sible for neighbouring territories, or, if they happened to be British, they had to be 
i 
on their guard against the French authorities. 
i 
During the period prior to 1763, the equilibrium of forces between the different 
nation-states called for the relative neutrality of the island, which in turn made the 
-56-
need for self-reliance imperative and inescapable. This structural arrangement 
explains why the possibility for the French or the British settlers to dominate 
one another or to dominate the Black and Carib settlers could not be actualised. 
It should be emphasized immediately that although the residents of Dominica 
had from this early period reached some form of consensus in a setting which 
might appear-French-oriented, there was no relation between this and France's j 
policies under.the Ancien Regime nor the trends which led to the 1789 Revolution. 
Martinique .and*. Guadeloupe are sufficient evidence of what should be expected from 
both royalist and.revolutionary-versions of France's national ethos of France. 
Forms of evenness evolving before the British occupation derived from mechanisms 
of survival put into motion by the settlers themselves, while patterns of inhumane 
exploitation and class struggle derived from actual or potential external connec-
tions - French or otherwise. 
The eventuality for the British or-the.French colonial Empire to secure . 
possession ..of-Dominica during the Seven Year War (1756-1763) would have implied 
for the different groups of settlers readjustments of their daily practices in 
opposite directions. The residents were, in spite of their relatively peaceful 
inter-action, parties-to the conflict. As long as it lasted.,. Caribs and Blacks 
would not be molested. Both ..French , and English, nationals would need to ensure the 
possibility of seeking refuge in the interior under the control of these settlers. 
Now the pre-eminence of any group of European nationals depended on the issue of 
the war, the conclusion of which was a prerequisite for the establishment of an 
efficient system of inequalities. 
Therefore the rivalry opposing-the nation-states was a parameter qualifying 
the social choices of the three groups of settlers. The aggravation of the 
conflict would condition the development of self-reliance and foster a tendency 1 
toward the emergence of inequalities based on individual achievements. On the 
contrary, the solution of the war was a requirement for the arrangement of a 
system of inequalities based on social values operating among the contending * 
parties and favourable to the component of the European settlers to which ensuing 
status could be ascribed. 
In other words, it is in this dimension where making a living in the island 
was framed by the terms of its relative neutrality, which derived from the 
conflict opposing the metropolitan countries, that the significant social groups 
within which the individuals evolved are defined as communities of settlers, 
aggregated according to their national or pseudo-national affiliation. Through 
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anobservation of this dimension, one arrives at the articulation of a first layer 
of structures- Relations carried out at this level bore no similarity to those of 
the established plantation societies, and were oriented towards the creation of an 
underlying pattern of equalitarianism, or of a system of differentiation based on 
individual achievements„ 
When self-reliance had to be stressed, the.individuals appeared aggregated in 
more or less autonomous communities, entertaining a set of relations which should 
be conceived as forms of social negotiations oriented towards the reproduction of 
each village community in its entirety and specificity„ For these negotiations to 
be carried out, a form of consensus had to evolve, that is to say, certain common-
ality of norms and principles for interaction has to be possessed. This is alluded 
to when one refers to an emerging society in Dominica before 1763. It is at this 
level that one also finds the germs of a national territory, the home-country of 
these groups of settlers. 
But the settlers were part of a larger context, organized according to a 
series of norms and principles inimical to self-reliance. Information on their 
behaviour reveals that they were aware of this fact. This explains the observation 
of seeds of class struggles within the island prior to the institutionalization of 
colonialism. Superimposed on.the first layer of structures, one recognizes than an 
embryonic second layer deriving from the broader frame of action and actualized in 
Dominica through the systematic infringement of the Treaty of Neutrality and the 
repeated ill-disguised refusal of the Governors-General of Martinique to obey the 
instructions on mutual evacuation by both English and French settlers. 
Efforts to capitalize on class exploitation or to protect oneself from class 
exploitation developed more fully after 1763. By focusing on the rearrangement cf 
Dominica's.resources according to the objectives of the colonial empire, one becomes 
aware of the areas of social life where the system of inequalities fostered by the 
metropolitan countries could not in actual fact be implemented. It has been seen 
that the colonial masters did not or could not seriously interfere with the 
economic system of the island. The social consensus deriving from the efforts towards 
self-reliance, even though subordinated to the political and strategical concerns -J 
the metropolitan.countries, was poised to be reproduced indefinitely. The. second 
half of the century was then characterized by the predominance of a class structure, 
laid upon the social cohesion of communities organized along a set of suppressed 
indigenous principles„ 
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In other words, one observes in Dominica, from the earliest stage 
of European interference, the development of a class structure, which at 
the end of the eighteenth century had not embraced or significantly modified , 
all social and economic practices taking place in the territory» Within the 
framework of this overall dominant structure, the population continued to 
carry out a series of activities according to the rationale embodied in the , 
J 
first layer of structural relations identified earlier» 
It is important to register how national affiliation and ensuing ethnic 
identification were of paramount importance during this century, and how in j 
fact a peculiar system of class conflicts derived therefrom and not vice versa» 
"pie population was aware of the impending changes in the power relations and 
knowledgeable of the leeway provided by the inconclusiveness of the international , 
struggle. Since the three groups of settlers were involved willingly or 
unwillingly in these conflicts, economic inequalities among them and within the 
European settlers germinated from this political arena and not from their 
differentiated economic performance. 
The likelihood of a reversal in the political fortune of the great powers 
Explains the actual truce between the three groups of settlers and between 
Europeans of different nationalities. Their economic projects however had to 
cater for viable alternatives once the truce ended. British or French settlers 
could expect to win or lose in the power struggle, Black and Carib settlers had 
no alternative but to prepare for seclusion or at least for withdrawal: not 
only in the physical or geographical sense, but seclusion or withdrawal from 
the institutions to be established after the conclusion of the political 
conflicts and observable in embryo within Dominica or in full blossom in the 
neighbouring islands. This therefore was a basis for the divergence in their 
cultural outlook. 
While the perspectives of an American adventure might have lured the Whites 
out of theJhopeless conditions they were facing in Europe, and while the oppor- „ 
tunities opened to them and to the Coloured in the established plantation 
societies were hardly more acceptable, they chose to launch in Dominica independent 
and self-reliant economic ventures servicing these plantation societies and 
indirectly the European ones. Hence life in a European settlement, in spite of its 
economic structure and potential conflicts with the planters of Martinique and 
Barbados, was a continuation of the plantation system and of European societies. 
As a result of European societies being torn by intestine conflicts, the economic 
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actors in Dominica adopted a pattern of behaviour suited to that circumstances 
their approach to social intercourse in the island privileged the political 
factors and not the organization of an economic infrastructure capable of 
containing and influencing the interplay of political forces« 
The case for the other ethnic segments of the population was quite 
different. The relevence of ethnic parameters in framing the development of 
social inequalities and the scope and perspectives of their basic economic 
practices is best seen by paying attention to the qualitative difference in 
realizing the output of, say, a European and a black woodcutter. For the same 
activity, organized according to identical management pattern (family 
production), both woodcutters would never enjoy the same returns. The isolation 
of the European woodcutter although it might have been real, was not necessary, 
and however poor his community might have been, it could aspire to evolve accord-
ing to the dominant forms of production. This woodcutter could and would then 
realize his production through exchange or barter with any other island of the 
Caribbean. 
The independent Black settlements in the interior of Dominica needed to 
entertain relations with the outer world, particularly to acquire weapons and 
replenish the community arsenal. But these relations would tend to be processed 
through the intermediary of the European settlers within the framework of the 
societal consensus emerging from the need for self-reliance. The concept of 
independent Blacks - as distinct from freed or emancipated Blacks - and henne 
the legitimacy of a Black settlement, being alien to the plantation milieu, 
the isolation of these settlements was necessary, even though it might nor have 
been actual. The independent Black woodcutter, as distinct from an emancipated 
Black woodcutter, could not become a planter, and his community would never be in 
a position to become rich since he was prevented from having access to money and 
capital markets. The labour of an independent Black and the savings of his commun-
ity could notbe transformed into capital investments. Political limitations, 
enshrined in the legal definition of Blacks, would then closely determine t.hei >• 
economic achievements. One is therefore justified in concluding that in Dominica 
economic inequalities derived from political inequalities or from the power 
relations between the different ethnic groups. 
Since the dominant regional system was based on the enslavement of Africans, 
the independent Blacks had also in it some natural allies« They could maintain 
subversive contacts with the system. This eventually would be taken into account 
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by the European settlers for the choice between different alternative courses 
of action. When during the Seven Year War (1756-1763), the French settlers 
were momentarily forced to behave according to the Treaty of Neutrality, they 
rationalized their resistance by arguing that it would "prevent evacuation of 
an island that runaway Negroes from neighbouring islands, might then convert 
129 / 
into an unconquerable Guinea". It is clear therefore that irrespective of 
any- social consensus emerging in Dominica, the seed of class conflicts was 
transferred from the international context to the local set of interactions 
via racism. One is not arguing that race conflicts are prior to class conflicts 
in any context. The point is being made that in Dominica and probably in the 
entire Caribbean where the class structure derived from the European pattern 
of social relations, social classes have emerged after and as a consequence of 
race relations evolved outside the Caribbean by the European colonial powers, 
(and eventually as a consequence of class relations in Europe)° 
As for the Caribs, it is recorded that they also would carry out some 
marginal exchange with the French islands in procurement of rum and other 
foreign produce. When one remembers, however, that the alternative of a mass 
suicide appeared to them as an acceptable solution to their ordeal, one may 
safely assume that in their mind, the process of isolation was increasingly 
perceived as an irreversible trend. 
As a corollary to the previous analysis, it would appear that a second 
element of commonality of views between the inhabitants of the island was the 
awareness of the paramount importance „of political relations in shaping the 
society. The fact that the European settlers in particular the would-be planters, 
had access to the plantation economies organized by their respective mother-
countries opened the possibility for negotiating some sponsorship which was to 
be discreet at the beginning but later becoming total and overt. This alternative 
would justify the expectations towards a dominant class position by either of 
the two important national subsectors among the European settlers. 
For a dominant class to emerge, it would have to rely on the intervention 
of the corresponding national political forces. The space for class formation 
was at no point in time a setting where economic achievement was rewarded, 
129/ J. Borome, "the French and Dominica, 1699-1763" Aspects ... 
p.92. 
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rather it was an arena of power relations external to the territorial society 
in the making. Class formation was therefore subordinated to the relevance of 
national affiliations from which economic achievement would follow. Virtual 
intervention and actual support from the outside upset the equilibrium between 
the communities of settlers and fostered the development of social inequalities. 
This specific dimension of social intercourse is usually more visible to 
traditional historiography. It nonetheless covers only one aspect of Dominica's 
history and is insufficient to unravel the complexity of its social structures. 
Moreover, another set of class conflicts evolved at the same time and hampered 
the functioning of the intended model of social relations. 
Firstly, it has been hinted that the constant threat of evacuation and the 
possibility for Dominica to become either French or British would impinge on 
the performance of the would-be planters and enhance the risks of an option based 
on higher degrees of exploitation of actual enslaved and virtual enslavement 
of the so-called maroons. The European settlers had to keep open their option of 
retreating to the mountains in the event of military attacks from the unfriendly 
expeditions. They could not then antagonize the independent Blacks, nor unduly 
increase the exploitation of their enslaved unless their political situation 
improved substantially. 
Secondly, (due to the political influence of the Martinican and Barbadian 
planter's lobby) logical and legitimate aspirations for evolving from the servicing 
of the established plantation economies to the achievement of full-fledged 
plantation development could not materialize. In other words, the aspirations of 
Dominican would-be planters clashed with the interests of actual planters in the 
neighbouring islands. This suggests the source of some sort of nationalistic 
sentiments, totally consistent with internal class exploitation, and antagonistic 
to similar dominant groups in the neighbouring islands. 
Thirdly, it has been seen that neither Britain nor France was interested in the 
territory because of its agricultural potentials and that their assistance in the 
economic field remained less than adequate. Recurrent experience of the negative 
response from the metropolitan countries underscored the difficulty for the European 
settlers to accede to a clearly dominant class position, which by the same token 
would have enhanced the importance of the internal consensus oriented towards self-
reliance and imprisoned these settlers (especially the French ones whose external 
sponsorship was notably weak after 1763) within a set of circumstances demanding 
some form of egalitarianism. 
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One can then diagnose the elements of double standards in the outlook of 
the would-be planters, especially-those of French descent; these standards 
developed fully during the nineteenth century and explained the hinge-like 
role of the planters in the ruling of the territory. Om the one hand these 
planters expressed a clear conviction of the unfairness of the circumstances 
which prevented them from leading a proper class system, and on the other 
they endorsed by their behaviour the adequacy of self-reliance - and ensuing 
egalatarianism - to these peculiar circumstances. 
It was therefore the task of these would-be planters to transmit to the 
non-white settlers the demands on the territory implied in the arrangement 
of international forces. They were,however, more of a menace than a real 
dominant class; an impersonation of the political economy of the plantation 
system and at the same time the impotent engineers of the system. Since the 
system was a racist one, and since they played this role of "apocalypse 
horsemen" inasmuch as they belonged to different nation-states, on the one 
hand their eventual class position emerged indissolubly linked to their 
ethnic and nationally ascribed peculiarities, and on the other their 
political primacy was an immediate consequence of these ethnic and national 
characteristics. 
Inversely, in response to the practices originating at the level of 
the international political structure and oriented towards the establishment 
of a plantation system, and also in response to the development of plantations 
in neighbouring isles, the Blacks whether independent or enslaved tended to 
react as a social class in the making. The formation of the oppressed class 
among the few inhabitants of Dominica took place with reference to this 
international world, and not in connection with locally oriented phenomena. 
In colonial situations, the development of self-propelled economic 
initiatives was accidental. The case of Dominica derived from its ambiguous 
position as a politically neutral island during the first half of the century. 
The relations of dependence evolving after 1763 did not destroy nor eliminate 
the activities aimed at satisfying local needs; they merely relegated them 
to a secondary position. The development of self-reliant activities and 
organizations appeared from the very beginning inversely proportional to 
the advancement of European-centered ones and not superseded by them. In fact, 
given the repeated failure to establish plantations after the British seizure, 
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Dominica remained an "economically neutral island"s production in the territory 
would be of no consequence to the colonial powers, the sister-islands, their 
plantocracies and merchant classes. 
Now self-reliance in the Caribbean, particularly in Dominica, is not 
meant to be anonymous with self-sufficiency and subsistence. Self-reliant, that 
is self-propelled activities of the local population, had extraterritorial 
implications from the very outset. An overflow of Dominican inward-oriented 
activities would be distributed to the neighbouring islands in exchange for 
articles needed by these same locally-based activities. A set of inter-play 
of international influences in the Caribbean.^^ 
The passage from a settlement colony to a pseudo-plantation colony shows 
how ambiguous dominant influences in the formation of the society derived from 
the policies of the French and the British military establishments. Both 
establishments would strive to bring the resources of the island within the 
projects of their respective governments. Within these metropolitan policies, 
whose implementation was necessary for the emergence of a locally rooted 
plantocracy, military considerations had a clear priority over the question 
of economic advancement. Participation of the Dominican society in the Caribbean 
plantation system through the intermediary of a local dominant class was then 
frustrated, not only because of the confusion arising from an indecisive power 
struggle, but because of the very reason for that power struggle. External 
sponsorship produced a strong but stunted military and administrative machinery 
capable of controlling the island without delivering the counterpart services 
and infrastructural works bequeathed by the colonisers whenever economic 
exploitation was their prime concern. 
External patronage creates, wherever local development is muzzled, the 
necessary conditions for class differentiation. In Dominica, it allowed the 
corresponding national sector in the European settlements to initiate practices 
on an island-wide basis. Dominant class positions derived from ascribed character-
130/ An effort will be made to reserve the term inter-island milieu or 
region to Caribbean self-centered activities while the word international will 
be used preferably when reference is made to activities, organizations, arrange-
ments of social groups in the Archipelago, sponsored by and servicing the 
colonial powers. 
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istics of prime importance for the establishment of colonial order. Concretely 
ethnic and racial characteristics as well as national affiliation constituted 
the central elements for the functioning of the society. Similarly, the 
cleavage between the bulk of the population and the tiny administrative élite 
became unbridgeable within this form of colonialism insensitive to individual 
achievements. 
In view of the simultaneity in the Dominican context of an inward-oriented 
economic system with an outward-oriented political one, the whole process of 
the articulation of social classes remained incomplete. The unpredictability 
of the shifts in power relations between the colonial empires hindered the 
efforts towards self-reliance. Inversely, alternative economic practices to 
uplift the general living conditions in the island could develop fully only if 
they were to be consistent with political orientations originated beyond the 
concern of the actual economic actors of the locality. 
These two overlapping structural arrangements coexisted in Dominica: the 
locally centered one which never delivered its built-in political dimension, 
and the European centered which was initiated in the.international political 
space, but which never thoroughly transformed the economic fabric of the society. 
Ethnic, national and class values intermingled, motivating apparently contradic-
tory practices which may be classified according to the structural ladder to 
which they were related. Economic practices significant for daily subsistence 
and renewal of the society became relegated to the sphere of private and 
community life, while political control, deriving from the world-wide policy 
of the imperial master, failed to establish an institutional infrastructure 
consistent with the empire's economy. 
Taking into account the conflicts in which European slave owners, enslaved 
and independent Blacks were involved, particularly after 1763, it seems fair to 
suggest that the primacy of external political interference over economic 
achievement was not only a social fact, but a guiding' principle of' social choice 
and a basic element in the culture of the emerging society.^ It mu^t have been 
perceived that contending social classes did not evolve from an endogenous 
process, but was created thanks to the political patronage of the colonial 
states. This perception of external dominance seems to pervade class antagonism 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
The practices of the different colonial empires aimed at a basic objective 
of capitalizing on class exploitation, which they arranged: 
i) by sponsoring the access of their nationals to a 
dominant class position; and 
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ii) by providing them, through the slave-trade, with 
a sufficient number of enslaved labourers. 
Since the inhabitants of Dominica were not a central figure in that system, they 
enjoyed some leeway to exercise their self-reliance. This exercise was made in 
the context of and in opposition to the basic policy of the empires. 
It is also fair to conclude that the areas for realising self-reliance were 
laid down by an inversion of the imperial scale of values. Ethnic, national and 
class loyalties in that order would be the parameters for social consensus -
distinct from what usually emerged in a well exploited plantation island but 
yet far away from a cohesive national ethos - bringing together all Dominicans. 
It will be noted during the nineteenth century, that the challenges to the 




TOWARDS STAGNATION - NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMY 
It has been seen that the British had no interest in organizing a 
flourishing economy in Dominica during the eighteenth century. The 
development of trade which derived from the establishment of the free 
port system, did not last. The island, therefore, entered the nine-
teenth century with a productive system which was backward in terms of 
the patterns prevalent in the colonial world. Moreover, during the 
nineteenth century, England initiated the transformation of its economy 
and oriented its activities towards the larger countries of the globe. 
131/ 
The Caribbean as a whole lost its previous importance—— , and conse-
quently Dominica sank into almost total oblivion. 
The outward-oriented economy progressed from a state of depression 
to one of stagnation, with minimal periods of economic recovery. The 
predominance of small farms made it impossible for the island as a whole 
to withstand the changes in the international market on which planters and 
merchants were totally dependent'for a return on their export crop, even 
though the flexibility of these multi-crop ventures assisted in postponing 
total bankruptcy. At different times coffee, sugar, cocoa and limes took 
precedence over each other to each some income for the proprietors and 
provide temporary relief of the economy. The two main crops, coffee and 
sugar, on which the externally-oriented economy was based, underwent 
drastic decline, the former by the third decade of the century, the latter 
towards its end. An effort will be made to describe the process, which 
eventually resulted in the paralysis of the Dominican plantation economy. 
131/ "Even when the expansionist forces reasserted themselves in the 
1840s and 1850s, the British West Indies were not immediate objects of 
interest ... Such unconcern was increased by the declining economic importance 
of the islands and by the British government's completion in the middle of 
the century, of its demolition of the seventeenth-eighteenth century mercantile 
structure. This remodelling of Britain's trade and shipping policy was a 
product of a profound change in her economic situation, and of her relation-
ship with her colonies - especially the West Indies". C.J. Bartlett "A New 
Balance of Power; the nineteenth century", in E..V/. Gouveia and C.J.. Bartlett, 
Chapters in Caribbean History 2, UWI, Caribbean University Press, re-impression, 
1973, P.66. 
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The decline of Dominica's free port trade at the end of the eighteenth 
century continued into the nineteenth. The outbreak of war with France in 1803 
curtailed economic relations with Martinique and Guadeloupe and damaged 
Dominica's importance in the economic geography of the region. The island's 
economic activity further dwindled as a result of the new orientation; of 
British trade towards the Spanish colonies. By 1808, Dominica's role as an 
international entrepot was obsolete and its ports were no longer considered 
part of the free port system. This meant the end of British economic interest 
in the island. 
Parallel to this involution, the weakness of Dominica's plantation system 
which was apparent in the lack of specialization of its agricultural enterprises, 
worsened during the nineteenth century as perennial tree crops took precedence 
over seasonal cultivation. The economy seemed to shy away gradually from labour 
intensive ventures and their implied industrial relations, and developed some 
form or organization half-way between cultivation and simple collection of fruits. 
At the beginning of the period under review sugar cane was a main crop 
however small the acreage devoted to it. Production data show periods of increased 
output, within a general movement towards total decline as they approached the 
end of the century. Besides, production was minimal when compared with that of the 
rest of the British West Indies. 
DOMINICA'S SUGAR PRODUCTION FOR YEARS 1815, 1828, 1882, i-894-132/ 
Year Dominica's Sugar Total Production Dominica's 
Production of British West Production 
















132/ Data derived from E„ Williams, From Columbus to Castro - The 
History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969, Andre Deutsch, London 1970, p. 368. 
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Froml799 to 1807 sugar prices on the international market were depressed 
and this resulted in the slump in production. Throughout the second decade, the 
industry was frequently affected by hurricanes (1813, 1814, 1816 and 1820). As 
a result Marshall recorded a decline in production to 2,500 hogshead of sugar 
133/' ' in 1819. — There was a concurrent reduction in the numbers of the enslaved 
134/ 
labour force. During the five years prior to emancipation, nonetheless, 
Sewell recorded some recovery. He refers to these years as the period of greatest 
prosperity - achieved as a result of the enslavement of the population - with T35 / an average annual export of 6,000,000 lbs. (2,697 tons) .--—--
In the immediate post-emancipation period, 1835-1838, sugar production 
reportedly declined by 33 percent as compared with the years 1831-1834.. By 
contrasting 1831-1834 to 1839-1842, a further decrease of 26 percent is 
, 136/ registered— 
The decline of the estate system in the island followed closely the 
termination of the period of enslavement. Apprenticeship did not prove very 
successful, since it was very difficult to have a hold on the labour force 
in a territory where many acres of unused land were available. The already 
depleted labour force withdrew from the estates with immediate effects on 
production. The cultivation of sugar cane and the other export crops suffered 
substantially. 
The ex-enslaved established themselves on their own, producing 
provisions for subsistence and local consumption; but as the 1897 West India 
Royal Commission Report reveals, these labourers worked part-time on the 
estates for wages. It is worth noting that wages in Dominica during the middle 
decades - 1850s and 1860s - were bigger than in other islands because of the 
scarcity of labour. High wages were the only means of maintaining a somewhat 
steady supply of labour on the estates. 
133/ "In Dominica the repeated hurricanes made the soil very sterile". 
B. Marshall opo cito, p. 105» 
134/ The depletion of the enslaved labour force is referred to later. 
135/ W„ Sewell, Ordeal of Free Labour in the British West Indies,London, 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 1968, p. 161: E. Williams, op. cit.,p. 339. 
136/ W.'L. Burn, Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies, 
J. Cape, London, 1937, P. 12. 
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During the 1850's, the sugar industry showed some revival. Both Sewell and 
Williams make references to the year 1858 to show the relative prosperity of that 
137 / 
period. In 1858 production reached 6,262,000 lbs. (2,796 tons) which was 
higher than the average production of the pre-emancipation years; this increased 
production is attributed to the higher productivity of free labour. The reference 
to free labour could mean the productivity of wage labour as well as the pro-
duction of sugar cane by peasants on their own plots. Peasant production of the 
crop was a very common feature in the island. 
It is difficult to assess how long this period of increased prosperity 
lasted. Data available for the 1860s do not provide a clear understanding of 
the state of the sugar industry. One Dominican planter, who was interviewed by 
the Royal Commissioners, referred to 1865 as a period when the sugar industry 
• , . ' ' j 138/ was comparatively prosperous but sugar was not even then a paying industry. 
139/ 
Another interviewee, however, stated that the industry declined since 1866. 
Yet, the Watts Report provides data for 1875 in which year ¡sugar . supposedly ..represented 
7Q.5 percent ~ ~ o f the total value of the island's products. This could mean 
that although crop production had decreased, sugar still remained the most 
important export staple. 
In 1890, the percentage of sugar in total export was still 43 percent. It 
dwindled nonetheless to a small share and in 1896 represented only 15 percent. 
141/ 
The situation of sugar planters was described as "stagnation and ruin"."= 
Only two estates produced sugar exclusively and acreage 
137/ Williams, op. cit.. , p. 339 and W. Sewell, op. c i t p . 161.. 
138/ Report of the West India Royal Commission, London, H.«M, Stationery 
Office 1897, Appendix C, Part IX, Dominica P. 127. Interview with a proprietor. 
This report is hereafter referred to as the Report of the West India Royal Commission, 
1897. 
139/ Ibid, p. 135. 
140/ Sir Francis Watts,Report on the Agricultural Conditions of Dominica 
with Recommendations for their Amelioration, Bulletin Office, Dominica 1925, 
p. (Hereafter referred tc as the Watts Report). Data as presented in various 
reports are not always consistent. There is some variation. One finds it surprising 
that sugar was still so important. 
141/ Report of the West India Royal Commission, 1897, P. 128. 
-70-
under cane was 975 acres out of 30,000 acres of cultivable land. In the 
Royal West India Report 1897, it is clear that the export of sugar in 
1896 was minimal - "616 tons of raw muscovado sugar and 229 tons of 
142/ 
centrifugal". The industry was in a very primitive state. Only common 
muscovado sugar was produced in addition to quantities of rum. By this 
time, it was realized that there was no need even to attempt the recovery 
of sugar cane, since the export economy had switched to other crops. 
"Since, however, Dominica has never been so great a sugar producing 
colony, as most of the others, and sugar exports now only form 15 
per cent of the value of the whole, it is unnecessary to.discuss 
the question of taking special measures, as far as Dominica is 
concerned, to re-establish the sugar industry there".143/ 
Dominica was the first of the islands "where cultivation (of sugar 
144 / 
cane) fell in desuetude" . The general decline is attributed to similar 
reasons adduced during the previous century: firstly the mountainous terrain 
of the island and the consequent difficulties in cultivation and transportation 
and secondly, in Dominica the multiplicity of small factories and the primitive 
methods used increased the cost of production. In addition to the topography 
of the island the lack of capital prohibited the creation of large central 
factories. As a result, the depressed prices offered for sugar on the internationa 
market made Dominican grown sugar totally uncompetitive. Added to this, the yield 145/ per acre was very low as compared to other British.West Indian islands. In a 
memorandum submitted to the Royal Commission 
142/ Ibid. 
143/ Ibid, p.50, para. 395. 
144/ The Watts Report, p.11. 
145/ "With all possible coaxing our own soil will not, except on a very 
few estates, yield per acre the paying quantity of sugar". Great British 
Parliament, Report of the Royal Commission appointed in December 1882,.to 
Enquire into the Public Revenues,.Expenditures,;Debts and Liabilities of the 
islands of Jamaica, Grenada, St. Vincent,.Tobago, .St. Lucia and the Leeward 
Islands, London 1884, Shannon Irish University Press 1971, Part III, 
Appendix mm, Digest of Evidence. Interview with small proprietor/civil 
servant/merchant. This report is hereafter referred to as the Report of the 
Royal Commission 1884. 
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in 1897 one finds repeated descriptions of the wanton exploitation of 
Dominica's "virgin soil", 
"The object was to get as much profit as possible out of the 
estates, with a minimum expenditure of money for keeping up 
the fertility of the soil, and for manufacturing the sugar 
and its by-products. Very little capital was laid out on 
improved machinery, for the extraction of a greater proportion 
of cane juice, and thus much sugar was left in the canes ... 
The common muscovado sugar was the only kind made in the island, 
and the employment of scientific principles in the manufacture 
of a high-grade product was unheard of on Dominican estates".146/ 
Finally, the planters were able to switch to alternative staples as 
particular crops fetched higher prices on the international market. 
The other export crop, coffee, faced a series of setbacks during the 
eighteenth century. It continued, however, as an important product in the 
early part of the nineteenth century, in spite of the decline in total 
volume of production. During the first two decades, low prices as a result 
of the glut on the coffee market xn addition to damage by hurricanes, accelerated 
the deterioration of the industry. Within four decades - 1790s to 1830s - coffee 
production dropped from between four and five million pounds to 1.6 million pounds, 
perhaps less; production in 1792 amounted to an estimated 4 to 5 million pounds; 
in 1823 2,177,559 pounds, and in 1833 1,612,528 pounds,—'' 
All data on the nineteenth century posit that one of the reasons for the 
rapid decrease in coffee production was an attack of "blight". 
146/ Report of the West India Royal Commission 1897, p.123» 
147/ S. Grieve, Notes on the Island of Dominica,.Adam.and Charles Black,. 
London 1906 pp.39-40» 
148/ Reports by the West India Royal Commission 1897 however, give a 
production figure of 973,754 lbs. cf sugar in 1838. This may be a more reliable 
figure if the decline set in around 1825, but it certainly reflects a steep 
decrease from 1823 production figures, p.125. 
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Reportedly, the attacks of blight which started by the end of the third 
149/ 
decade of the century caused failure of the crops by 1835. In 1832 
coffee was 32 percent of Dominica's exports. The Watts Report put the 
production level by 1848 at about 100,000 - 120,000 l b s . ^ / The West 
India Royal Commission Report-(1897) however, mentions other possible 
reasons which contributed to the decliue of coffee - political distur-
bances, restrictions of the slave trade and the superior profit arising 
from s u g a r x t is noticeable that starting from 1829 the periods in 
which "blight" is mentioned are years just prior to emancipation. The 
year 1829. falls within the period 1820-1832 in which there was increased 
sugar production. The decline then could have been due to the opportunities 
taken by the planters to increase sugar acreage at the expense of coffee, 
(especially as 'the price of coffee was more depressed prior to 1831 -152/ 
relatively than sugar'). This switch in emphasis was an established 
practice in times of good sugar prices since, as observed, most planters 
in the island grew both sugar and coffee. The lack of interest in coffee 
at the time meant that planters could not take advantage of the high market 
prices in 1831. The-decline continued after emancipation. 
Coffee exports for the last decade of the nineteenth century show the 
fluctuations of production. In the year 1884 coffee production reached a 
low of 1,081 lbs, perhaps as a result of the hurricane of 1883, rising 
gradually to 9,591 by 1888, and continuing a slow upward trend to 25,786 
lbs in 1896. 
149/ W,L, Burn, op. cit., p. 173. 
150/ The Watts Report, p. 10.. 
151/ These arguments are also substantiated by a report of 1875, by 
H. Prestoe, a government botanist of Trinidad referred to in the Watts 
Report. 
152/ Minutes.of interview with the Secretary of the Committee of 
West;India Merchants in London in the Report from the Select Committee 
on the Commercial State.of.the West India colonies, London, House of 
Commons, 1832, Shannon Irish University Press 1971, p.36. 
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As regards cacao Sewell noted that the crop was cultivated in preference 
153/ to coffee and sugar in the post-emancipation period. 
"As sugar declined in value, cacao happily rose in price and 
its cultivation was taken up by many persons when the sugar 
estates began to fall".154/ 
Before emancipation the maximum annual production was 9,000 lbs., but in the 
post-emancipation period, around the middle of the century, 125,000 lbs. were 
e x p o r t e d . B y the mid-1880s the value of cacao exports ranged between 20 
per cent and 25 per cent of the total exports of the island. Towards the end 
of the century, production of the crop was gradually increasing. One of the 
problems with cacao estates, however, was their limited capacity to give 
employment to the labour force. 
The situation was the same for limes, which became the second most important 
export crop in Dominica after the failure of coffee and sugar. The introduction 
of lime cultivation occurred in the latter half of the century, reportedly in the 
1860s and the crop acreage was expanded in the 1870s. By 1875, the crop began 
earning greater profits than sugar cane and coffee and was being widely introduced 
on coffee estates. The production of lime and lime juice gained rapidly in impor-
tance and by the end of the century became the leading export of the island. 
Circumstances had forced the Dominican planters to find an alternative crop to fill 
the gap created by coffee and sugar in the export-oriented sector. An interesting 
development, however, was the use of old cane mills to process limes. 
"In their own works, the estates concentrated the juice and many 
of the old steam crushers and boilers can still be seen on some 
estates ..."156/ 
153/ W.G. Sewell, op. cit..p.!62. 
154/ Ibid, p.125. 
155/ Ibid, p.162. 
156/ Report of the Royal Commission 1884,.Part.Ill,.Appendix mm..Interview 
with Dr. Nicholls. 
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The system allowed the planter owning the mill to profit more from the 
relationship with smaller farmers, since smaller planters sold their 
fruit to mill owners, who were in fact larger producers. 
Lime production helped to save the export-oriented sector of the 
Dominican economy in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and 
the early twentieth century. 
"The cultivation of limes did more than anything else to 
tide over the distress caused by the collapse of the sugar 
industry in Dominica".157/ i 
According to information presented to the Royal Commission in 1897, althouth 
the value of the products from lime was high and the cultivation profitable, 
very few (planters and labourers) participated in the income derived from 
the crop. 
"Only a few planters however, made money out of limes whilst 
their neighbours, hoping against hope for the resuscitation 
of the sugar industry, were being ruined".158/ 
The cultivation spread, however, when it was realized that other by-products 
from the fruit, especially the essential oil was also of some value. The 
profitability of the crop in Dominica encouraged a British company,.Messrs. 
Rose and Company of Leith and London, to purchase an extensive lime producing 
property on the island in the early 1880s. The company was the manufacturer 
of products derived from limes and therefore their introduction into the 
island meant that they were in control of production of the crop there and 
undoubtedly created marketing arrangements with smaller lime producers. 
Data reveal clearly the increasingly important role of lime production in 
Dominica's export economy, although, in general, the value of exports decreased 
gradually towards the end of the century. 
157/ West India Royal Commission Report 1897, op. cit.» p.125. 
158/ Ibid. 
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It is now apparent that numerous factors had inhibited the development 
of the Dominican export-oriented economy in the nineteenth century. These 
included, during the first three decades, war with the maroons, natural 
disasters, international war, added to the general instability of the 
European markets and all had the effect of depressing the Dominican economy. 
The great loss of the enslaved between 1808 and 1821 through sale on transfer 
to the other islands was an indicator of the lack of prospects in the island. 
In 1828 it was reported that 
"In Dominica, for instance, even the most productive estates 
were scarcely giving the owners any return on their invest- ^59/ 
ments and the others could not even meet operating costs." 
The extremity of the depression forced the Dominican planters to send a petition 
to the colonial government lamenting their economic distress. This trend 
continued in Dominica throughout the century. Planters found themselves in a 
constant state of indebtedness which was reflected in decreased productive 
capacity. Undoubtedly, British merchants soon lost interest in investing in 
i-1 ~ 1 J ' — ~ -C -,* 4- T-tn-t-n CL1C Xaj-CLliU , pLU1XL.a VVC1 L. L1.W ¿ui.l-iiwum4.u5« 
Throughout the century there is repeated reference to a lack of capital 
in the island. The majority of Dominican estates were encumbered and the 
relationship between merchant and planter meant that the latter was obligated 
to consign all produce to the merchant, through whom he would obtain all his 
supplies and his freight. -M2/ Such a relationship would explain the lack of 
money which affected the island during the whole century. The report in 1832 
attributed the economic distress in the British West Indies to the high pre-
dominance of mortgaged estates. 
"The prevalence of these mortgages ... as not merely a 
symptom, but..a pregnant cause, of the accumulated body 
distress." 161/ 
Undoubtedly therefore, Dominica's plantation economy in the post-emancipation 
period continued to deteriorate. The generally low market prices of sugar meant 
159/ B. Marshall, op.cit^pp. 109-110 
160/ The relationship is referred to in the Report from the Select 
Committee on the Commercial State of the West India Colonies, 1832, op.cit> 
161/ Ibid, p.18. 
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that very little was earned for the island. By 1884 in the Minutes of the 
1 62 / Report by the Royal Commission it is acknowledged that money was scarce 
in Dominica„ 
"People have no money to spend. Estates work only 
three days." 
"The greatest want of the country is to be opened up, 
so as to give employment to labour. Why not get loans 
here as in other places? At present only a few merchants 
support the place." 163/ 
Income in the island -was then dependent on cacao and a small amount of limes, 
the former being grown largely by peasant farmers. 
Abandonment of estates became a common occurrence in Dominica during the 
nineteenth century. In many cases estates could not be sold because of the low 
value of the land and were simply abandoned. One proprieter revealed that of 
his ownership of 100 acres only 15 acres were in cultivation and one estate had 
I6*/ 
not been visited for nine years. 
Apart from the lack of capital to pursue plantation development, abandon-
ment of estates was blamed on the lack of roads in the island. The lack of 
infrastructural development throughout the century is evidence of the lack of 
interest on the part of the colonial government even in the externally oriented 
sector of the island's economy. An interviewee in 1882 lamented that he had 
known estates thrown out of cultivation for want of roads. Another 
admitted that "his greatest trouble was want of good road and (he) had made 
repeated applications without getting anything done." ¿ M / Yet another referred 
to 'the present tracks" - "the conditions of the roads in Roseau is a disgrace 167 / 
to any country claiming to be at all civilised . . . A clearer understanding 
of this lack of infrastructural development is made by a Dominican proprieter 
and civil servant. 
162/ Report of the Royal Commission 1884, Part 111. 
163/ Report of the Royal Commission 1884, appendix mm p. 138 
Interview with a storekeeper, March 1884. 
164/ Ibid, p. 139. Interview with a proprieter. 
165/ Ibid, p. 140. Interview with the editor of the "Dial". 
166/ Ibid, p. 139. Interview with a proprieter. 
167/ Ibid, p. 140. Interview with a merchant/attorney.. 
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"Our roads are no better than they were in the days 
of slavery, some are worse." ± 
This is reported five decades after emancipation (1884). 
The Report of the Royal Commission of 1897 revealed a greater stagnation in 
the economy of the island. The island's revenue declined as the market prices of 
the major crops of cacao and limes continued to fall. The stage was being set for 
a decline in the production of these crops in the twentieth century, as values 
decreased. The abandonment of estates continued and the majority of estates 
remained encumbered. Much of the land remained undeveloped and unexploited and 
there was a high rate of underemployment of the labouring population and a lack 
of money in circulation at all levels of the society. 
The population trend during the nineteenth century is one of the most 
obvious indicators of the economic state of Dominica. The general economic 
decline in the island was reflected in the stagnant and eventually decreased 
population as the depression bacame established and was reinforced. One of the 
most important elements upon which the plantation economy was based, that is 
enslaved labour, was rapidly depleted over three decades.In 1794, Dominica's 
enslaved population was an estimated 30,000. During the pre-emancipation 
period large numbers of the enslaved were removed from the system by sale, 
transfer, exportation or death. Planters could not afford to maintain many of 
their enslaved labour force in times of economic distress. Some enslaved were 
therefore sold while others were removed by their owners to more prosperous 
islands. 
"Between 1808 and 1821, a total of 799 slaves had to be sold 
for debt and 2,197 were removed by the owners chiefly to 
Demerara and Trinidad where prospects were more promising," iZ2.' 
168/ Ibid, p. 143. Interview with Mr. Fadalle, Provost Marshall. 
169/ C. Goodridge, "Dominica - The French Connexion." Aspects ... 
p.157. 
170/ B. Marshall, op. cit.,p. 110. 
-78-
"(...) the heavy exportation of slaves from the island 
started in 1808 and increased as the sugar industry be-
came more and more unprofitable. » 171/ 
Between 1816 and 1819, an estimated total of 5,000 slaves reportedly died from 
172/ 
famine or diseases connected with it. The years 1812-1818 were difficult 
ones when the island was devastated by numerous hurricanes which decreased food 
supply and interrupted trade, causing a disruption in supplies. By 1884 the 
enslaved labour force had been reduced to 14,175, that is, about half its size. 
Based on compensation claims, put forward by Dominican slave owners, Williams' 173/ 
estimate is even lower - 11,664 at emancipation. 
In the post-emancipation period, planters could hardly afford to hire wage 
labour since there was a shortage of money in the island. Consequently the 
numerous types of labour contracts between planters and labourers could not 
satisfy the labouring classes' needs for money. A general.solution was 
emigration of Dominica labour force. 
The inability of the plantation economy to thrive in Dominica and the sub-
sequent abandonment of estates were associated with a depletion in the numbers 
of "whites" in the population. There was an estimated population of 1,361 
174/ 
whites in 1813 ; by the middle of the century (1844) the numbers were 
reduced to approximately 855; ìZiì/ an(j by 1884 whites formed only 1.3 per-
cent of the population (289). 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the export sector of the Dominican 
economy proved that it would not withstand the general depression of prices 
on the international market and it was apparent that regenerative economic 
activity was highly dependent on that sector, through which capital would 







Ibid, pp. 241-242. 
Ibid. p. 227. 
E. Williams, op. cit.,p. 283. 
B. Marshall, op. cit»Tp. 390. 
W. Sewell, op. cit.,p. 161. 
Report of Royal Commission (1884) Appendix zz. 
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The decline of coffee and sugar, the two main crops, also meant the decline 
of the productive factors which contributed to the viability of the plantation 
economy. The result of the depressed market prices was lack of capital inflow 
to the island. The repercussions of this were numerouss for example the system 
of wage labour could not be maintained, and the labour force on the estates 
therefore-dwindled as did the number of planters. Another interesting develop-
ment in the post-emancipation period was the limited development and subse-
quent decline of the peasant economy as the stagnation of the plantation 
economy progressed. In a following chapter, this association will be explored, 




THE MULATTO ASCENDANCY 
One of the distinctive features of the Dominican society during the 
nineteenth century, when compared to other Caribbean societies, was the rise 
of a mulatto oligarchy. This development appeared linked with a nation-building 
process, that is with the perception and initial organization of the Dominicans 
as a differentiated national entity. It is also accompanied by a counter-
tendency - oriented towards the increasing control of all internal affairs 
of the colony by the British Crown, that is the gradual implementation of 
Crown Colony Government. The ambiguity built into these changes and into the 
diverse opportunities they encompassed, was further increased by an inter-
connection of class and race conflicts, which originated from and guided 
practices which were not necessarily compatible. 
The importance of national loyalties in the formation of dominant planter 
and merchant groups during the eighteenth century has been retrieved following 
testimonies of contemporaneous chroniclers of the epoch and of modern historians. 
It can be summarized in the following simple terms: Such persons who belonged 
to the metropolitan country which seized the island were the only ones entitled 
to privileges and immunities: the others, considered as "adopted subjects" and 
eventual enemies, had to face several discriminatory measures. 
Very little data on the century deal with the situation of the free 
coloured people. According to Atwood, they were chiefly of French extraction, 
and their migration was due to racial discrimination ', to which they were subjected 
in the French colonies. Their motives to migrate did not differ then from those 
of the poor French whites; additional racial discrimination, which they might have 
found unbearable, played the role of overt "push" factor in their country of 
origin. 
Atwood also mentioned the remarkable "idleness" and "insolence" of the 
coloureds, together with their competitiveness in small trade and petty commerce, 
traits which usually belong to urban people. He added to his presentation that: 
"There are, however, some of them who are natives of the 
island, who have good coffee plantations." 177/ 
It would seem that the first planters to have lost their linkages with any 
177/ Atwood, op. cit., p.220. 
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"mother country" were the free coloureds, and it may also be assumed that the 
same occurred among the urban people dedicated to other activities. 
In 1822, the coloured people formed an organization 
"To secure the abolition of all laws which deprived (them) 
of the benefits and privileges of subjects as enjoyed by 
other free inhabitants".178/ 
This move was aimed at counteracting the unabated hostility of the local whites. 
In 1830, the local legislature rejected "a directive from the .Ho.me Government 
179/ 
to concede political rights to the free coloureds". Nonetheless in 1831, 
with the passage by the British Parliament of the "Brown Privilege Bill" they 
were granted full social and political rights. From that point on and for two 
consecutive generations, the Dominican coloureds controlled the majority of 
"electives" to the local Assembly. Significantly enough, their main organ 
of expression was a newspaper called The Dominican. Also in quite an illustrative 
manner, the newspaper conveying the views of the whites was entitled The Colonist. 
Opposition between "The Dominican" team and "The Colonist" team was at the 
centre of conflictive practices taking place in different areas of intercourse. 
Three relevant areas can be distinguished - urban/countryside relationships, 
relationships between "educated" (read exposed to British colonial outlook) and 
"uneducated" and interethnic relationships - all of them subsumed in the basic 
field of interaction formed by the latent struggle between the emerging nation 
and British colonial interests.. Opposing class relationships between estate 
owners and West Indian and London merchants will be analysed in the following 
chapter. 
1 7 8/ B. Marshall, op. cif., p.205. 
H i / Ibid, p.208. 
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The participation of Dominica in the British Empire had two facets -
one political, the other economic. In view of the frailty of the economic 
system, that is of its lack of intersectoral linkages and above all of its 
isolation within the regional and the imperial economy, conflicts tended to 
become more visible at a political level. It is from this order of inter-
action that efforts were made to achieve the formulation and implementation j 
of suitable economic policies by the British Government. Finding themselves t 
in the impossibility of controlling the main economic parameters of social 
organization, those who identified themselves as Dominicans had not much 
leeway to negotiate the political hold on their country. Contradiction 
between embryonic national Interests and colonialism implied negotiating a 
re-orientation of the economic fabric of the society with the British or some 
other metropolitan power; by so doing the frontier of any political dissension 
and the viability of an attempt to organize the nation with a minimum degree 
of autonomy was ipso facto established. 
The urban/countryside relationship= originated in the type of linkages 
between the colony and the metropole. Dominica was not a plantatioti island 
and the development of trade through the Free Port System faded out as soon 
as the British manufacturers gained direct access to foreign markets. The 
island remained then as a mere strategic stronghold in the Empire. At first 
approach, Roseau and Portsmouth appeared as modest villages. In fact,' during 
all the nineteenth century the British did not add much relevant urban 
improvement to what the French had bequeathed since the eighteenth century: 
"The Administrator who took over Dominica in September 1891 
(...) observed: 'Roseau contains 7,000 inhabitants (...) 
with the exception of two or three main thoroughfares, all 
the streets are paved with cobblestones dating from the 
French days, while the lighting only consists of a few 
kerosene oil lamps".180/ 1 
These "villages" fulfilled urban functions or more precisely the role of cities 
resonsible for the organization of their hinterland. In view of the peculiarity 
of the local economic system, the impacts of these cities on their zones of 
influence did not evolve beyond administrative and political interferences. 
Based on a depleted economic system, the material interests of both planters 
180/ Honychurch, op. cit., pp.81-82. 
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and peasants had a diminished significance, compensated by an increased role of 
the "citizens", that is of the power base of the political representatives of 
the population. 
It is relevant to highlight how the vision of a Dominican nation emerged 
beyond interests rooted in the limited interplay of economic forces. The 
concept of Dominican as used in the nineteenth century public life was associated 
with the enactment of the Brown Privilege Bill and referred basically to those 
who in fact enjoyed full political rights. It meant, not precisely the inhabitants 
of the island, but alluded to those who represented them and spoke in their name. 
It translated then the relative bargaining power of city dwellers and other 
"citizens". 
Much of the ambiguity deriving from this restricted perception of who were 
Dominicans, needs to be untangled. In 1898, when the "electives" objected to the 
system of Crown Colony Government, a young English planter retorted what would 
have seemed obvious: 
"(He) ridiculed the idea that the electives represented the 
people (in a population of 26,841, comprising 9,000 males, 
barely one quarter of the 612 registered voters had troubled 
to go to the polls in the last election) ..."181/ 
The evidence of this arithmetic escaped the "electives" (those who could be 
appointed by elections) and their supporters. The power base of these "electives" 
was quite comfortable with the de facto and de jure limitations to the exercise of 
political rights. It will be seen in fact no proposal was formulated to enlarge 
that power base. It was not perceived that the 27,000 inhabitants cr the adult 
males among them were capable of voting and being elected. 
The fact that it seemed natural that the politically active persons should 
represent the totality of the population could be explained by the existence cf 
an area of social intercourse where class and urban interests overlapped. As for 
the whites upon whom the Brown Privilege Bill was forced, they not only questioned 
the right of the "electives" to represent the people, they also could not see the 
usefulness of a separate, responsible and representative government. 
181/ J. Borome, "How Crown Colony Came to Dominica", Aspects .,,. p..135., 
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The whites of Dominica, together with the Colonial Office championed 
during most of the nineteenth century two interrelated campaigns, which 
incidentally put in evidence the overlapping of urban and class interests 
within the global context of the conflicts opposing the emerging nation 
to the British Colonial policy. They tried to establish a single chamber 
government integrated into a federation of Leeward (or Windward) islands. 
The native mulatto oligarchy with their urban power base raged an unfettered 
war against these campaigns, to which they opposed the maintenance of a two-
chamber system within a separate and responsible government. 
Traditionally, a two-chamber system constituted the basic formula of 
colonial government. The Executive was assisted by a Council, consisting 
of appointed members, and a House of Assembly comprising "nominees" and 
representatives of the people - "the electives" - chosen by the freeholders 
182 / in each parish. The number of nominees and electives would vary, but 
the composition of the Assembly would follow this pattern. 
At the beginning, only British-born whites were eligible for full 
participation in the political process, and French naturalized subjects 
183 / 
could only vote. During the early years of the nineteenth century, the 
criteria to enter the House of Assembly were: to be free, white, over 21 
years of age, natural born or naturalized subject, protestant and having 
at least 80 acres of land or business in the capital, producing an income 
of £100 per annum.i^/ in 1824, Government and Council had to accept the 
participation of the Roman Catholics (read: French Creoles) in the Assembly, 
because few British whites possessed.the property qualifications. 
"There were four Roman Catholic merchants and 56 proprietors 
and in all they possessed 48 coffee and 15 sugar estates and 
3,134 slaves. But it was not until 1839 that they were given 
privileges equal to the British subjects".185/ 
182/ T. Atwood, op. cit.,pp.197-198. 
183/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p. 103. 
184/ Ibid, p.199. 
185/ Ibid, p.203. 
-85-
As seen already, in 1831 with the Brown Privilege Bill, the free colourede 
achieved equal rights with the whites and being more numerous they soon 
controlled the Assembly. Now the privileged white community being swamped 
by the coloureds soon adhered to the alternative formula of a single chamber 
government incorporated into a General Assembly and Council for the Leeward 
Islands Federation. This proposal was put forward since 1837 by Governor 
Colebrooke.--^/ 
The idea of a single legislative chamber comprising a limited number 
of members all nominated by the Crown, that is Crown Colony Government, 
reappeared in the 1860s and it is significant that 
"such suggestion (was) made locally by William Maclntyre a 
prominent white attorney prompted by the London firm of 
Burnley, Hume and Co. as well as other English owners of 
large Dominica properties whose interests Maclntyre 
represented".187/ 
Under much pressure, the mulatto oligarchy retreated toward a solution of 
compromise, viz; a single Legislative Council divided into equal numbers of 
nominees and electives. This constitutional change was achieved while the 
members of "The Mulatto Ascendancy" wer2 in the minority in the Assembly. 
It may be added that the presence of Her Majesty's Warship "AURORA" assisted 
in deterring the wave of popular manifesteticns. At the next opportunity the 
electorate expressed their feelings by returning a large majority of electives 
chosen from among the Mulatto Oligarchy to the Council. The words of their 
leader, George C. Falconer, at the opening session deserve to be remembared 
even though those words were hardly prophatic: 
188 / "My mission is to crush this House, and it shall be crushed". 
Similarity and conflicts of interests which characterized the interplay 
of practices between the different urban groups and the mulatto oligarchy 
on the one hand, and the opposition of these groups on the other 
186/ J. Borome, "How Crown Colony came to Dominica", Aspects ... p.141. 
187/ Ibid, p.122. 
188/ J. Borome "George C. Falconer", Caribbean Quarterly 1960, Vol. VI,.p 
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hand, can be exposed to a certain extent by analysing the position of the 
Mulatto Ascendancy towards its power base and the main policy measures 
which seemed to have ensured for two generations the loyalty of the 
electorate, or at least the wrath of the expatriates. At the same time, 
the global context in which the local conflicts evolved will be readily 
apparent. 
Concessions to the "Roman Catholic" and "naturalized" subjects, 
the rise of what became the "Mulatto Ascendancy", together with the efforts 
of the expatriates and colonial authorities to impose Crown Colony Govern-
ment and to absorb Dominica's administration in a federation of Leeward or 
Windward colonies, must be assessed against the type of whites who did 
accept the Dominica adventure. It so happened that the nineteenth century 
was not much different in this respect from the previous one. These rather 
poor heirs, viewed by The Colonist newspaper as "the more respectable 
classes of society", totalled 1,261 persons in 1813, nearly half of them 
living in the parish of St. George (where Roseau is located) and 79 in 
the parish of St. John (where the second city is to be found), the rest 
of the white population being distributed in the remaining eight rural 
parishes. 
It has been seen that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the representative basis of colonial government was subject to racial and 
religious qualifications. After the passing of the Brown Privilege Bill, 
it could have been expected that land ownership qualifications would 
become more prominent than racial and religious ones. Beyond the formal 
requisites, however, there was an unspoken understanding which revealed 
a fundamental characteristic of the social system and showed that other 
factors - in a context of economic deprivation - were added to the land 
ownership qualifications for distinguishing among those who participated 
efficiently in the institutionalized struggle for power. 
In the next chapter, some trends, even though frail, toward national 
unity operating around mid-nineteenth century are described. While class 
recriminations of the "Mulatto Ascendancy" and national demands would 
orient social practices toward island-wide solidarity, the probability 
of achieving upward mobility through the political ladder had an impact 
in the opposite direction, suggesting an unavowed acceptance of colonialism 
by the mobile groups. Main avenues of social mobility located beyond 
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economic achievement, exacerbated the rifts between urban and rural areas 
and added to the complexity of the situation. 
The principle of colonial institutions being the exclusion of the bulk 
of the population from political participation, the prudence of the mulatto 
leaders in trying to increase the number of "citizens" becomes a relevant 
issue. During the second half of the century the "electives" proposed on 
different occasions an enlargement of the electorate by reducing the franchise. 
According to their proposal, it would suffice that a freeholder would swear to 
his qualification as a proof of the right to vote, and would show titles as a 
189 > 
proof of a right to hold office. ' The British Government did not oppose the 
proposal frontally, but requested in response the establishment of a registry 
of voters to determine their qualifications. 
"Many members of the Assembly opposed such a step, knowing full 
well that some of them held land they had never seen or occupied, 
while others, on the eve of elections trotted out fictitious 
conveyances that temporarily transferred property from buyers 
to themselves".190/ 
It follows from the proposal that more than landownership qualifications as a 
factor to distinguish voters and non-voters, parameters which determined the 
acceptability of the "word" of a freeholder, would be responsible for such 
distinction. Those who were able to manipulate properly and with the 
connivance of the community existing qualifications, were in the habit of voting 
and being nominated. So the proposal was hardly related to an increased 
participation in the institutionalized political interplay; it tended mainly to 
regularize a de facto situation. 
Now, if people who had not the necessary qualifications used to vote and to 
be nominated, and if the British Government, by simply requesting and not imposing, 
a registry of voters, acknowledged its awareness of the situation, one wonders who 
then were excluded from institutionalized political participation. 
189/ J, Borome, "How Crown Colony came to Dominica", Aspects ... p.121. 
190/ Ibid. 
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The Colonist described in the following terms the House of Assembly 
under the "Mulatto Ascendancy". 
"(The House is) mostly composed of men who are entirely ignorant 
of the first principles of government, and whose only reason for a 
going there is to aggrandize themselves, and to bring ruin on the 
more respectable classes of society. They are uneducated, ignorant 
and revengeful, and most of them have neither status or property in i 
the Island. The majority of these would-be legislators, is made up 
of journey-men printers and tailors, bankrupt shopkeepers, a black-
smith and a few fourth-rate planters. Very,few of them articulate 
English decently and still smaller number are able to write it with 
any degree of accuracy and propriety".191/ 
The quotation is particularly relevant and deserves close analysis, since 
it reveals how the mastery of language is one of the most ancient and 
pernicious forms of distributing rewards in Caribbean societies. The 
characteristics of the "eiectives" were contrasted to those of two actors, 
one barely referred to, the other notably absent. The first ones, placed 
at the top of the social ladder were native speakers of English: the 
British-born local whites. The Colonist took it for granted that "these 
more respectable classes of society" were acquainted with the "first 
principles of government". It actually meant that they were conversant 
with the ultimate principles of colonial government, The other strata, 
notably absent, comprised those who spoke no English at all, the recently 
enslaved blacks who occupied the bottom level of society, lived principally 
in the rural areas and constituted the .appalling majority of the colonized 
people. The status of those strata was ascribed; for the local whites 
downward mobility was as impracticable as upward mobility was for the 
rural blacks. 
The area of achievement - as determined by the colonial order - was 
located between these extremes. It was occupied by a continuum of urban groups 1 
whose degrees of proficiency in the dominant language closely conditioned the 
prestige of the occupations accessible to them. A reduced ranking of occupation 
is presented in the The Colonist's statement, which started with the journeymen 
printers and tailors, bankrupt shopkeepers and blacksmiths to end up with 
fourth-rate planters. 
In the perception of The Colonist, language was not only placed as a 
paramount discriminatory factor of social stratification, but also as a 
191/ Ibid. 
-89-
strong indicator of the attitude to accept such a scale of stratification« To 
the inability to articulate English decently were associated the following: 
being uneducated, ignorants revengeful9 having no status or property in the 
island. Inversely, fluent English speakerss and particularly those who could 
write it properly, were endowed with several virtues, among others they were 
expected to be conciliating (that is not revengeful)„ 
The revengeful lot - found "insolent" by Atwood - had grouses8 and 
The Colonist acknowledged, that they were in a position to aggrandize them-
selves and to modify social order by bringing ruin on "the more respectable" 
ones. In contemporary sociological vocabulary, it would be said that they 
controlled some avenues of upward mobility and could therefore achieve a 
better standing. The milieu of eventual achievement, which disturbed The 
Colonist» was the House of Assembly. 
Taking' into account the actual threat exposed by the newspaper and which 
according to its own testimony was carried out by persons who could hardly 
articulate English decently, one is satisfied that recognition was given to 
another set of knowledge and another form of education fermenting beyong the 
English language reservoir as bequeathed to the local whites. This would 
explain how pseudo-anglicised achievers could threaten the more respectable 
classes of society. 
English cultures as it prevailed in nineteenth century Dominica was 
manipulated from two different angles by the native population. It was enacted 
by the "still smaller number able to write the language with any degree of 
accuracy and propriety". And it was also practised by those who had an exposure 
to and an understanding of the main parameters of this cultural frame, without 
any "decent" proficiency in the language which normally conveys such exposure 
and understanding.. 
Given the proposed urban-based Dominican culture, as a source of social 
objectives distinct from th'ose shared by the local whitess the group of pseudo-
anglicised people constituted the power base of the "electives", those who did 
vote and were motivated enough to do sos even when they were devoid of the 
prescribed qualifications. They must be considered as the first contribution to 
an...enlarged set..of. citizens operating within the institutionalized colonial 
arrangement. On the same basis of an eventual Dominican culture searching 
for adequate instruments to implement locally formulated goals, the natives 
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who "articulated English more decently" would virtually play the role of 
"electives" and finally those of them who mastered the language and its 
orthographic rules have access to the leading posts in the community. 
It is significant that the political arena-of the nineteenth century -
the Assembly and the press - was dominated by two major figures who received 
formal education then outside of the island. The first, Charles Gordon 
Falconer, learnt English In Barbados where he was born and lived for 20 years 
before settling in Dominica in 1839« He was also a Methodist preacher and a 
school teacher. His influence on the political scene lasted at least until 
1870 when he accepted a post in the colonial civil service. The second, 
William Davies, son of a Welchman, was born . in Dominica in 1840. "He 
attended college in Winchester, he became an incisive speaker with an ornate 
and brilliant style", From 1881 when he first entered the Legislative 
Assembly to the passing of the Crown Colony Act at the end of the century, 
he fought The Guardian, the newspaper under his editorship for the main 
political and economic objectives of the coloureds. 
The existence of a cultural continuum of Immediate empirical reference 
was further revealed by the close family ties which evolved among the 
Mulatto Oligarchy, linking<feo those called by The Colonist fourth-rate 
planters and bankrupt shopkeepers, the "still smaller number able to write 
English with some degree of accuracy...". These ties made of the pressure 
group a quasi-clanic affair. Falconer, as political leader, was "unfailingly 
aided by personal ties"; his followers were perceived by the opponents as 
"The Family Party", "The Methodist Clique", "The Mulatto Ascendancy", etc. 
"(In July 1854) there sat among the coloured members of the 
Assembly the sharp-minded and sharp-tongued editor of The • 
Dominican, Charles Gordon Falconer, his brother-in-law (from 
the well-to-do Bellot family), his half-brother (C. Herbert), 
a nephew of Falconer's sister and-assistant editor of The 
Dominican (Thomas,Trail) and two men amenable to Falconer's 
desires (John Hopkins Fillanj a rising merchant and William 
Johnstone)" 192/ 
In 1880, when the group was headed by William Davies, its composition 
followed the same pattern, indicating the intense and constant personal 
192/ J. Borome, "How Crown Colony Came to Dominica"., Aspects..., 
p. 121. 
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interactlon among its members. It will also be noted, the recurrence of 
the same surnames. 
"The electives were James W. Bellot, brother-in-law of 
William Davies and son of Galvan Bellot, owner of estates 
and a Roseau store; William Davies; Henry Hamilton, a small 
shop proprietor of Roseau; A.R.C. Lockhart, an estate owner; 
A.A. Riviere, an estate owner and Portsmouth merchant; and 
D.O. Riviere, proprietor of a shop in Roseau". 193/ 
Such were the "electives" renresenting the peoDle in the Legislative 
AsscrMy. UaerUnss to artri that they voted as a bloc and checkmated con-
stantly their opponents - generally whites who r.at in the House in the 
Capacity of "nominees" of the Colonial authorities. 
Now the concrete exclusion of the bulk of the population - the 
countryside - either by the formal requisites of the electoral processes 
or in simple practice, was recuperated in the rhetoric of the represent-
atives to the House of Assembly through a series of proposals favouring 
apparently these( sajne excluded persons, while entitling the Mulatto As-
cendancy to an entrenched fame of being "liberals". For the newspaper 
The Colonist, the Mulatto Ascendancy also pictured the 'destructives' and 
according to J.A. Borome, "vain attempts were made to stigmatize Falconer 
. 14 194/ as a socialist . — — 
A review of the "liberal" legislation which infuriated the conserva-
tives gives the scope of the open-mindedness of the Mulatto Oligarchy. 
"(...) Falconer, in summarizing the legislative accomplishments 
of a typical year, 1858, catalogued a new poor law, an asylum 
for lunatics, a permanent grant to the infirmary, an increased 
police force, the completion of a Government House and the 
repairing of the Custom House". 195/ 
In 1880, William Davies organized the Party of Progress and fought for 
"progressive legislation as the establishment of a grammar school and 
compulsory education". Moreover, his party, following the Falconerites, 
opposed any measure like federation with the Leeward or the Windward Islands, 
"which was not considered in the interest of Dominica". — — 
193/ Ibid, p.144 
194/ J. Borome, "George Charles Falconer", p.13. 
195/ Ibid. 
196/ J. Borome, "How Crown Colony came to Dominica", Aspects ..., p.126. 
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One finds.-.it. difficult to perceive the reason for. such a strong oppo-
• ' | sition of local and metropolitan whites to these "liberal" measures - and I 
to find out precisely what the. "Mulatto Ascendancy" intended, to destroy 
through their eventual enactment. Actually proposed measures were not exag-
geratedly progressive and. there ..were .instances where it seemed far from clear 
whether .the. Colonial- Government or. the mulatto oligarchy was more favourable 
to progressive legislation. In 1874, a Medical Act requiring all medical 
officers to reside in their districts instead of living in Roseau was opposed 
by both "electives and nominees". 
There are strong indications that the local whites and the Colonial 
Office were not exactly opposing such timid promotion of welfare services, 
per se. The issue was quite different: the coloured oligarchy favoured by 
an urban-based electorate, had been obstructing any increase in local tax-
ation - even earmarked for the upliftment of the conditions of living of 
its constituency - while pressuring the British Government to invest re-
sources for the same purpose. Quite understandably, the local whites could 
not have an interest in channelling metropolitan assistance to boose the 
political influence of their opponents. Their support went to the Crown 
Colony Government formula, that is to say, towards the strengthening of 
metropolitan patronage, from where they drew the legitimacy of their domin-
ance. This interpretation would explain the opinion of The Colonist that 
the main goal of the mulatto electives was to "bring ruin on the more res-
pectable classes of society. 
The liberalism of the mulattoes consisted therefore in using resources 
within their reach - excluding their own resources - to finance their hold 
on the Legislature. Their opposition to Crown Colony Government appears in 
that light as an opposition to the deepening of colonial dependence, but 
not to colonialism as such. Colonial subordination seems to entitle them 
to receiving grants-in-aid. On that basis, being 'self-sufficient' and 
'self-reliant', that is having control of "a separate and responsible 
government", they would organize the economy and the society properly. 
Finally, and logically, the opposition of the "Mulatto Ascendancy" 
to Crown Colony Government was accompanied by a tendency towards economic 
isolation. In 1870, an Act to establish a telegraph system almost failed 
to be approved by the Assembly. 
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"Beneath the hostile arguments lay the conviction that the 
telegraph, would open the Island to capital and enterprise 
which would smash the "power patronage of the local oli-
garchy and, even more important, make resistance to feder-
ation impossible'". 197/ 
Thirty years later, William Davies submitted a letter to the 1897 Royal 
Commission on the Sugar Industry, and the first point he made was to 
plead against opening to the world economy- which- he viewed aa hatful 
tq thfi country. 
i 
"Questions have Been propounded dealing with, coffee, limes, 
cacao, and other, at present, minor products» I wish, to 
warn my countrymen against giving in reply, either on paper 
or viva voce, any information which after publication in a 
blue book may induce tropical agriculturalists elsewhere to 
embark in a competition with us (...). I hope the foregoing 
will be deemed sufficient to prevent any Dominican planter 
from summarizing the results of his lime, coffee and cacao 
business for the benefit of the Commission, and the enlight-
enment of strangers abroad". 198/ 
In spite of the persistent opposition of the Mulatto Ascendancy, 
Dominica became a federal colony within the Leeward Islands grouping in 
1871. From the testimony of the British Government, federation did not 
solve the problem of the isolation of the island, which proved that the 
oligarchy had some good reasons to refuse the formula. 
"In the colonial office, C.A. Harris thought that were it 
not for the generally retrograde character of such a step 
it would be almost as well for Dominica to save its federal 
contribution. I doubt if it adds a single iota to the 
island's prosperity - the federation has left it pretty 
nearly as isolated as before, and it has certainly added 
to its burdens". 199/ 
197/ Ibid, p.124. 
198/ Report of the West India Royal Commission 1897, Appendix C, 
Part IX, Dominica, para. 514. 
199/ J.A. Borome, "How Crown Colony Came to Dominica", Aspects ... 
pp. 143-144. 
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With Federation, not only did the political position of the mulattoes suffer 
greatly, but the local whites also found themselves relegated to a second 
class position on a lower social stratum in comparison to their other 
Leeward counterparts. The point of view of the Mulatto Ascendancy were 
increasingly shared by "unofficial nominees", that is to say, nominees 
holding no office within the Colonial Government. Boromé notes that native 
Dominicans would receive third-rate appointments in the federal 
administration, while Antiguans and Kittians would be sent to 
occupy high positions in Roseau, Moreover, since the Federal Government 
was experiencing increasing difficulties in finding loyal nominees among the 
Dominicans to support its views in the local. Council, residents of other 
islands would be dispatched to Dominica to. play such a role. 
"Dominica (was perceived) as a. puppet in the hands of the 
wire pullers in Antigua". 200/ 
If one adds to this the fact that the plantocracy of Antigua was white, the 
position of these "isolationist liberals" becomes at the start, quite 
understandable. Other reasons will be presented at. a later stage. 
At the end of the century, the economic situation of the island, 
which was already bad, reached the point of crisis. It was decided in 
London, 
"to offer Dominica imperial.aid with Crown Colony 
Government or no imperial aid with continuance of 
the present Constitution". 201/ 
Pressure;, to accept a deepening of colonial relationships became unbearable; 
and in view of its powerlessness in the .face of direct colonial control of 
local resources, the oligarchy brought into.the open the underlying 
assumptions of its objectives and.plan for future society. 
The existence of a distinction between the mulattoes' interests and 
those of the island as a whole, was clear to the British. In 1896, a 
member of Pariliament opposed a grant-in-aid to Dominica arguing: 
200/ Ibid, p. 124. 
201/ Ibid, p. 134» 
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"the money asked for would not aid the poor people, but the 
planters, a 'wealthy, idle, lazy ... drunken lot'". 202/ 
In 1898, the Colonial Office stated in the House of Commons: 
"that the island lay largely in the grip of an 'oligarchy' 
of planters and shopkeepers (whose) disinclinaiioii: to impose 
more taxes on itself and its friends capable of paying could 
no longer be countenanced." 203/ 
The underlying ideological assumptions of the plan for future society 
which emerged from the practices of the élite, were in fact contained 
in its very appelation of Mulatto Ascendancy, during two consecutive 
generations. This appelation hinted at the racist character of the 
whole social organization. Such a characteristic became more and more 
an object of overt reference during the process of imposition of Crown 
Colony Government. In 1886, C.A. Harris of the Colonial Office stated 
"A coloured clique is the worst, form of tyranny that could 
be endured: it is inimical alike to the negro and white 
and by the former race it is hated". 204/ 
In turn, when 1895 Governor Flemming proposed-Crown Colony Government 
to the local Assembly: 
"William Davies, greatly alarmed now personally took the 
editorship of The Guardian, announced the fundamental issue 
to be one of whites and non-whites, declared a race war, 
and swore he would sooner see Dominica reduced to ashes 
than lose its Legislative Assembly". 205/ 
Now, when the resolution accepting Crown Colony Government-cum-financial 
aid passed with the support of a coloured man, the racist ideology of the 
dominant oligarchy blossomed unconstrained: 
202/ Ibid. p. 133. 
203/ Ibid. p. 134: 
204/ Ibid. p. 146. 
205/ Ibid. p. 135. 
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"(Tha Guardian) termed him 'lickspittle' and the most 
justly abused and despised coloured man throughout the 
length and breadth of Dominica, who would go down in 
history as 'the mulatto' who lent himself to the vile 
job of aiding the suppression of. the rights of his 
race'. He sat in his seat ... like a brown diamond:'jn 
a Caucasian setting, (and) simply nodded his head like 
a Chinese doll, together with other government dummies, 
in approval of the measure". 206/ 
It will be remembered that "the right of the race" was contained in 
the Brown Privilege Bill. It will also be noted that in W. Davies' 
diatribes, one race was absent. The self-appointed Dominicans took 
no note and made no allusions to the Blacks: even the diamond was 
"brown". In their ideological frame of reference, opposition to 
the colonial empire reproduced apartheid, putting in evidence the 
limitations of their project of nation'-building. 
In conclusion, social transformation in nineteenth century 
Dominica was conditioned by the fact that the country was located on 
the very margin of the British Empire. It was in this context that 
room was made for a Mulatto oligarchy to cope with the political 
scenery. The oligarchy had to struggle against the whites for the 
control of the colony, but in this conflict, little room was left to 
cater for the interests of the black population, except by 
expressing some moral support from time to time. It will be seen in 
the next chapter that this oligarchy had ..scant economic endeavour 
where some common interests with the black labourers could be shared. 
Hence even though the mulattoes considered themselves as Dominicans, 
these "Dominicans" could not enter in history at this point in time 
for they were lacking in substantive - economic, political and 
ideological - linkages with the masses. The Dominican outlook and 
cultural frame that they evolved in their struggle for power did not 
acknowledge the potentials of the rural and -black masses, and therefore 
did not depart fundamentally from the dictates of the Empire. 
206/ Ibid, p. 136. 
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IX 
THE ECONOMIC RETURNS OF POLITICS.. 
A. Perception of the Dead-end Street 
In the description of the economics of the eighteenth century, the role 
of the coloured people and other freed men remained inconspicuous, since, 
with few exceptions, they were occupied in subaltern trades. Their subsequent 
control of landed properties was not a result of any sort of competitive 
behaviour let alone any vocation of agriculturalist, but rather a consequence 
of abandonment by the white planters. Being basically tradesmen, they 
normally took residence in towns. Marshall observes the following pattern of 
spatial distribution at the beginning of the nineteenth century: 
"In 1813, Dominica had a total free population of 3,111 souls 
in its ten parishes, but only two of these parishes contained 
towns, St. George with the capital Roseau, and St. John which 
contained Plymouth, (sic) In these two urban parishes was 
concentrated 57% of the total free coloured population. The 
parish of St. George had a total free coloured population of 
1,613 souls or nearly 50% of the total population. And of 
these only 392 were living outside the precincts of the capital 
Roseau which accounted for nearly 40% of the total free coloured 
population of the island."207/ 
As has been seen, the cities of the country were not characterized by any 
buoyant economic activities; basically they fulfilled administrative and 
political functions. City dwellers especially the coloureds provided loyal 
supporters for such political platforms which promised increased rewards for 
urban activities. This slant in the local political objectives would counter-
balance the influence of the few planters who belonged to the mulatto strata. 
From the "idleness and insolence" of the mulattoes, perceived by an 
eighteenth century observer to their actual dominance of local political 
relations, one has followed the evolution and failure of a peculiar alliance 
of urban and rural interests. It was acknowledged that the mulattoes constituted 
a specific strata in the Dominican society characterized by a common drive to 
207/ B. Marshall, op. cit.,p.379. 
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control local administration. An attempt will be made in the following pages to 
explore further the reasons for the upsurge of the previously mentioned alliance, 
the secondary role of the planters within the group, and the failure of this élite 
to secure their main objectives. 
Sharp economic inequalities, which did not surface in the accounts of the 
nineteenth century conflicts, separated the mulattoes dedicated to urban-based 
crafts from the estate owners of the same racial group, in spite of their similar 
aspirations in relation to the political and administrative direction of the island 
society. 
"In Dominica ... the free coloureds as a class owned 3,548 slaves 
in 1820 which was roughly one-third of the island's total slave 
population. They also produced in this year, one-fifth of all 
the sugar and coffee grown in the island. But the ¡majority of the 
produce was grown by a small élite of large planters who later 
pressured the whites and the British Government for the removal of 
the disabilities they suffered. In all 3,548 slaves were owned by 
a total of 309 individuals out of a total of over 3,000 ..."208/ 
The first free coloured planters originally appeared in the production of 
coffee, which at the end of the eighteenth century was the main economic activity 
209' 
in Dominica.-—' During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, production 
declined steadily until the industry was virtually destroyed. It is generally 
believed that the destruction of coffee plantations was due to the spread of the 
coffee leaf miner, commonly called blight. Nonetheless, in 1875, the Government's 
Botanist, H. Prestoe of Trinidad, rejected this view and proposed the following ca 
"1. The unsettled and turbulent character of the proprietory 
body at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth century. 
2. The reckless clearing of the forests from 1780 to the 
present time (1875), but specially up to 1830. 
3. The high price of sugar. 
4. The acquisition of land, chiefly in coffee by persons 
without means and without a knowledge of the coffee 
cultivation as it was carried on formerly. 
208/ Ibid, pp. 372-373. 
209/ The Watts Report, op. cit.,p.lO. 
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5. Extensive squatting on Crown lands, abandoned, or partly 
abandoned estates".,210/ 
Unfortunately, the author of these lines did not comment on the five 
explanatory elements he proposed. The thrust of his argumentation none-
theless invites the conclusion that destruction of coffee plantations could 
have been momentary but not definite. Caribbean plantation agriculture had 
flourished with numerous absentee landlords; therefore, even if the new 
owners were turbulent and inexperienced, their enterprises could have 
developed had the conditions existed for such development. Now gradually and 
up to 1897, all absentee metropolitan landowners except two of them, abandoned 
their properties, The reason inciting them to this decision could not have 
been too different from the one which explained the failure of coffee 
production and as a matter of fact indeed the failure of Dominican commercial 
agriculture. The falling away of coffee cultivation was related to the 
maintenance of a cause contained in Item 4, viz. the acquisition of land by 
persons 'without means'; that is with no capital nor means to secure it. 
Besides, England was not a large consumer of the product which faced numerous 
difficulties on the international market. 
The coloured planters were aware of the difficulties caused by their lack 
of capital and the consequent limitations to their entrepreneurial capabilities. 
Theypresented the 1897 West India Royal Commission with repeated testimonies in 
this respect. They insisted on the need to establish in the island a land 
mortgage bank (credit foncier) of the kind operating in neighbouring Guadeloupe 
and Martinique, and pointed out that such a proposal tabled previously in the 
Legislative Assembly, was defeated because "it would interfere with the interests 
211/ of the West India merchants". 
"The only bank in the island does not lend money on mortgage 
and the local merchants are unable or unwilling to do so".212/ 
This seems to indicate that while land in Martinique and Guadeloupe had some 
economic value to warrant a mortgage, as far as Dominica was concerned, the imperial 
210 Ibid, p.10. 
211/ Report of the West India Royal Commission, Appendix C, Part IX, 
op. cit.,para. 522. 
212/ Ibid, para. 511. 
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banklng interests were not convinced of such value. In fact the neighbouring 
islands had the necessary (material and institutional) infrastructure for the 
exploitation of existing land, while this initial investment was never made by 
the British Government in the island of Dominica. 
Actually, the planters' main problem related to the cost of timidness of 
the capital at their reach, since it was not impossible to find capital in 
London which would be risked against future crops. The practice of the London 
merchants was to lend money on a short-term basis, whereas there was need to 
introduce new crops or to expand others than sugar cane (lime, cacao, coffee) 
213/ 
which did not produce returns until five, nine or ten years. Besides, the 
rate of interest was prohibitive and a surcharge had to be added for the West 
Indian intermediaries. 
"The West Indian merchant is the channel through which is doled 
out whatever portion of English capital is to find employment 
in these colonies, and the usual procedure is as follows. The 
merchant in London borrows on his credit, money at one and a 
half, two or two and a half percent in the open market, and 
lends the same to the planter on mortgage at six.' Besides this 
six per cent, there are other commissions on the turnover and 
'pickings' which swell the total percentage to 10 and 12, and 
in some cases to 15. Now, if the planter were to try to borrow 
from the original capitalist at 4 per cent, to their mutual 
advantage, he would not be allowed, because the capitalist would, 
before investing, resort for information to the ring of West 
Indian merchants whose interest is to act as middlemen between 
the two".214/ 
William Davies, leader of the planters during the latter part of the century, 
215/ 
tables before the Royal Commission a letter on the "subjects of Enquiries", 
where he in fact distinguished four different conflictive areas and acknowledged 
in the process that in all four, the planters would be losing their struggle 
unless Metropolitan Government came to their aid. From his own testimony: 
"There is no shirking the confession that, as a class, (the West 
Indian planters) were conservative to a degree and by no means 
over-enterprising".216/ 
213/ Ibid. 




So much for their fame of liberal minded persons! The production of sugar 
cane according to the same Davies, under the cost prevailing in the islands 
had produced enough savings to the "mother country", for her not to impose 
on them the unfair competition of subsidized beet sugar from the European 
continent. The first area of conflicts was then the contradiction between 
the interests of the metropole and those of the colony. 
"The West Indian landed interest has been made the victim of 
the selfishness of the British public and of the fiscal 
policy of the British Government".217/ 
The remedy for this would be to countervail the bounty by imposing "a direct 
duty on all sugars receiving a bounty on exportation". Then it would be 
necessary to tackle the second and third areas of conflict constituted by the 
divergent interests of planters and refiners, and of planters and local 
merchants. Davies was of theopinion that the planters should be able to deal 
directly with the "consuming public". Refining and distribution should be 
placed under their control by providing them with capital, instead of having 
them knocking at the door of the "middlemen" and most particularly of the 
"ring of West Indian merchants". 
In this event, they would only have to overcome their last obstacle: 
the London merchants. The state itself should "supplant the London merchant" 
as money-lender. 
"The ruin of the planter being complete, the resuscitation 
of the industry must commence from the foundation, and the 
British Government is the fons et origo malorem,218/ 
restitution and help must proceed thence (...), The first 
step for the British Government to take is the total or 
partial demolition of the National Free Trade fetish ..."219/ 
Davies1 letter was a clear confession of the inability of the planters to 
operate within a market economy. His argumentation rested on a concrete 
theory of imperialism. Refiners, local and London merchants had ceased to 
be partners in the same economic venture, and were perceived as useless 
parasites enriching themselves at the expense of the planters. Their 
217/ Ibid. 
218/ Fons et origo malorem -
219/ Ibid. 
the source and origin of misfortune. 
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perceived Impotence in the interrelations with these class enemies was expressed 
as a set of lamentations punctuated by occasionally insulting outbursts which 
held not a single threat of retaliation. The state which protects the interests 
of such enemies is made "the source and origin of all misfortune", 
"No other country but Great Britain would so long remain a supine 
spectator of the gradual extinction of an important industry in 
one of its possessions or have exulted with cynical selfishness 
on the fact that one of the dependencies of the mother country 
was being annually 'sweated' to the extent of half a million 
pounds, which is the modest estimate of the saving to the national 
pocket by obtaining sugar under cost of production from these 
islands".220/ 
The savings made by the British public, thanks to the prevailing cost of production 
in the Caribbean - and the 'sweat' was not primarily a planter's perspiration -
were not anymore available for investments in the region. In keeping with the 
principles of the "Free Trade fetish" private and public capital could be put to 
better use elsewhere. The planter class had lost their former allies; and the 
Dominicans, by taking over from the absentees, had localised the decision-making 
process, perhaps because there was hardly any economic decision to be made, 
except the very one taken by the absentees. Another witness offered the following 
comments which are illustrative of the point. 
"Most of the largest sugar estates belonged to absentee 
proprietors ... The absentee proprietors, after several 
years of working the estates at a loss, decided to abandon 
the cultivation of the cane, and to sell their properties. 
And, in time, the sugar estates passed into the hands of 
local men, some of whom, working on the old lines, with 
insufficient capital, essayed the accomplishment of the 
impossible task of 'making sugar pay' ". 221/ 
It should be stressed that while the withdrawal of the absentees could be 
viewed as an entrepreneurial decision based on an evaluation of a given situation, 
the acquisition of their wrecked estates and their exploitation beyond any 
economic rationale does not suggest a ,behaviour based on an assessment of viable 
« 
economic alternatives. In any case, to the argumentation of Davies, the British 
could retort that the source and origin of West Indian misfortune, was in due course, 
the source and origin of West Indian grandeur - as a planter would define it; the 
220/ Ibid. 
221/ Ibid, para. 511. 
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total sum of both arguments being that the planter class could not operate 
without metropolitan sponsorship. Davies was aware of that necessity when 
he wrote; 
"If these remedies are not applied ... in despair, the whole 
of the West Indies will have to turn to the United States for 
help, as the paramount power in this continent. Failing 
justice from Great Britain, we must try to shame the Britons 
into doing their duty".222/ 
The issue should be subject to further inquiries into the economic 
history of Dominica, but available data point to the impossibility of the 
planter class to generate, by its own initiative, merchandise of interest 
for the international market. The system did not provide for savings and 
re-investments. Capital had come from abroad, and hence returns ended up 
abroad, leaving hopefully enough in the country to ensure a vegetative 
reproduction of the-local society. In such circumstances, the economic life 
was abandoned to the control of the "ring of West Indian merchants", 
servicing with not much risks, the limited demand, generated mainly by the 
salaries paid within the public service. 
The fierce opposition to Crown Colony Government and to federation 
depicted in the previous ¡chapter must be seen in the context of the deepening 
economic stagnation of the country. The coloured oligarchy formed by estate 
owners and emerging merchants possessed more treasures than capital. They 
were rather poor and the holding of public offices appeared as their most 
lucrative industry. 
The Royal Commission, enquiring if there was an agricultural society in 
the colony, was answered negatively, and the witness volunteered the following 
comments: 
"There is now no bond of union amongst the planters ...; but in 
the present condition of affairs, (an agricultural society) 
would have to be subsidized by the Government, at all events 
for a time, ... I doubt if sufficient paying members could now 
be got to provide an income necessary for importation of books 
and periodicals and for the expenses of hiring a room for the 
meetings of the members".223/ 
222/ Ibid, para. 514. 
223/ Ibid, para. 511. 
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This poverty must, however, be qualified, and in so doing, one comes back to 
the same issue: 
224 / "Living is cheap", stated another witness, "but there is no saving". 
The case of the most prominent leader of the "Mulatto Ascendancy", Falconer was 
rather pathetic, and the following quotation must be read against the background 
of the fact that Falconer married into one of the richest families of the island: 
"Death removed an office holder and Administrator Bulwer ... 
nominated Falconer as Colonial Registrar. The salary, modest 
enough, was welcomed by Falconer who, though a good 
businessman, had remained relatively poor ... Incompatibility 
of duties, official and journalistic, moved him to resign.from.. 
active participation in the fourth estate".225/ 
Avowed political objectives such as defense of the prerogatives of the people's 
"electives", of internal autonomy, separate and responsible government, and the 
like, were not disassociated from these material facts in the minds of .their 
protagonists. In 1887 Davies and others organized the Dominica Patriotic League 
; i 
"which had as its chief aim: 'to bring about a truly representative form of 
226/ government' ".-— The league also wished 
"for the native-born West Indians equal rights and privileges 
in all other respects with the inhabitants of Great Britain, 
especially in competing for the prizes of the local Civil 
Service".227/ 
224/ Ibid, para. 513. 
225/ J. Borome, George Charles Falconer, op. cit., p. 16. 
226/ J. Borome, 'tiow Crown Colony came to Dominica", Aspects ... p."128. 
227/ Ibid, p. 144. 
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B. Isolation and Emigration, the easiest way out 
In these circumstances, one would expect to observe an i uncontained 
development of peasant economy, particularly among a population which inherited 
from the Caribs and the first Black inhabitants traditions of settling the 
interior in the framework of autonomous free village societies» The history of 
the Black population of Dominica reveals nonetheless rather unsuccessful attempts 
in this direction. 
The enslaved population of Dominica at the beginning of the nineteenth 
228 / 
century is estimated at approximately 30,000 souls. By 1813, according to 
B. Marshall, there were 7,544 enslaved in the parishes of St. George and St. John 
and 12,416 in the totally rural parishes. The same historian notes that in the 
former districts, headed by Roseau and Portsmouth, the ratio of enslaved per white 
reached 11 to one, against 26 to one in the latter. In Roseau only, the historian 229 / reports 421 whites and 2,137 enslaved, i.e. some six enslaved per white. 
With abolition of the Slave Trade during the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, labourers became scarce and fetched high prices. Since a special 
provision allowed an owner to travel with four enslaved as personal attendants, 
"The Dominica and Grenada planters especially, abused this 
section (of the law) in order to supply slaves to Trinidad 
and other colonies which were prepared to pay high prices 
for them".230/ 
Exportation of enslaved seemed to have started from 1808, so that the number of 
them per square mile was 62 in sharp contrast with other islands such as Dominica 
which did not host classical plantation societies. For instance, in Grenada, one 
231 could count 200 enslaved per square mile, in St. Vincent 130, and in Tobago 108. ' 
228/ C. Goodridge, "Dominica - The French Connexion", Aspects ... p.156. 
229/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.390. 
230/ L. Honychurch, op. cit., p.65. 
231/ B. Marshall, op. cit., pp.241-242. 
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According to the Select Committee on the State of the West Indian 
Colonies, 1806-1849, in 1826 the country had 15,392 e n s l a v e d . I n the 
circumstances of a declining enslaved population, the passage of apprentice-
233 / ship went nearly unnoticed in Dominica. According to Augier and Gordon, 
234/ ' the enslaved population amounted then to 14,180. As previously mentioned, 
235/ 
Williams recorded a lesser number of enslaved, namely 11,664 of them. ^ 
From these data, he calculated an average of 11 enslaved per owner and found 
that claims involving less than 10 enslaved amounted to three-quarters of 
the total number of claims. Williams also noted the high proportion of 
enslaved in non-productive activity, the ratio - one domestic enslaved to nine 
field ones - being far less than that observed by Atwood a few decades earlier. 
This trend, probably modified during the short-lived recuperation of 
sugar at the end of the 1830s, seems to indicate that as far as Dominica was 
concerned, enslavement was purposeless. The type of social relations it 
implied and which proved to be economically advantageous for both the planters j 
and the colonial authorities of the region, gave no results worth mentioning ! 
in this context. It would have appeared to the Dominican Black as a mere power 
relation without any immediate and perceptible economic rationale. Slave owners 
were just unable to utilize productively an available labour force they fully ! 
owned. It was obviously not a problem of the negative attitude to work of the ! 
enslaved. In those times, as in the contemporary world, he who owned labour and 
cound not utilize it productively had to sell it to earn a living, unless he 
could establish a viable form of self-employment and a self-propelled venture. 
Exports of enslaved by Dominican planters do not differ theoretically from the 
selling of labour force on today's labour market. 
In a country with land in abundance, attempts at developing a peasant 
society, initiated during the eighteenth century, were pursued with more 
determination during the nineteenth century, under more favourable conditions. 
232/ Report from (the) Select Committee on the State of the West India 
Colonies 1806-49, Appendix 13, p.460 in British Parliamentary Papers, Select 
Committee Reports and Correspondence on the Trade and Commerce of the West 
Indies, 1806-1849 Shannon, Irish Univ. Press. 1971. 
233/ W.L. Burn op. eit„ p.363. 
234/ R. Augier and S. Gordon, op. cit.,Table 83. 
235/ E. Williams, From Columbus to Castro ... p.283. 
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In Dominica, however, efforts to establish a self-reliant peasant eccncmy 
failed on two counts. Before emancipation the maroons were unable to 
withhold the hinterland they had conquered and to negotiate seme workable 
solution with the colonial society. This must have weakened the position 
of the former enslaved, because peaceful occupation of uncultivated land 
also ended up in de-population and bankruptcy. 
The enslaved population of the island suffered severe blows during 
the first two decades of the nineteenth century. In 1812 more than "5 
enslaved freed themselves from Castle Bruce estate. The total number of 
maroons was then estimated at 800. The maroons were active up to 1815 in 
the parishes of St. Joseph, St. Peter, St. Patrick and St. David, that is 
to say, in most of the country. Their fortified camps were located in tae 
most varied places such as Woodford Hill, Hampsteaa, Rosalie, Tabery; 
Pointe Mulatre, Rivière Claire, Morne Anglais, Layou, Colihaut, Dublaue. 
etc. Fifteen different chiefs headed the various groups of maroons and 
among them, it is acknowledged that one Jacko spent over 40 years in the 
2 / 
forest.-^1' It is no wonder that the development of maroon act-vitias. co^k 
place in the surroundings of the British owned sugar estates: 
"It was only after the British firmly took hold of the islcnd 
that major sugar estates were planted. The larger British 
plantations developed in the broad river valleys along the 
coasto To the north there was Hampstead, Hodges, Blenheim, 
Woodford Hill, Londonderry, Melville Hall and Hatton Garden, 
while the plantations of Castle Bruce, Grand Marigot, Rosalie 
and Tabery dominated the Windward Coast".237/ 
Efforts of the authorities assisted by the population of freed, men, that is the 
mulattoes, to suppress the maroons had to match the strength and determination 
?38 / 
of the latter. The whole social system was threatened by marronage.-—' 
In the second decade of the century, assistance had to be requested from the 
Regional Commander in Barbados. 
"The authorities (in London) were astonished that the system 
of internal security which worked elsewhere failed in Dominica 
and despite the colony's anxiety, they declined to give any 
immediate permission for the Regulars to be used",239/ 
236/ In this respect see Honychurch op. citpp.62-63. 
237/ Ibid, p.141. 
238/ B. Marshall, op. cit., p.505. 
239/ L, Honychurch, op. cit.,p.62. 
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As marooxi activities grew stronger, boosted by "deserters" from the Black Regiment, 
orders were given for their "ruthless extermination". The architect of the genocide, 
Governor George Robert Ainslie, was "called back to England to answer for the severe 
measures he had taken »..". 
"Although he had been recalled, Ainslie's' plans were still followed „¿0/ 
and the most decisive blows on the Maroons fell after his departure"»—— 
Not much data have been found on the situation of the enslaved population between 
1820 and emancipation. It has been noted that the few years preceding emancipation 
are considered as the best times for sugar cultivation in the island. In the port-
emancipation period, Dominican labour fetched higher wages than labour in other 
241/ 
Leeward Islands. This situation must be read against the information supplied 
by Alfred C. Leevy in "The Labour Situation less than One Decade after Emancipation". 
He noted the flourishing of provision grounds in the country. 
"The profit of which (provision grounds) often proved to an 
industrious negro much more valuable than wages of the estate 
for the whole year. Strange as it may seem, these vegetable 
products ordinarily fetched very high prices on the market. 
One reason for this was the large scale exportation of yams, 
for instance, to the larger, more prosperous islands such as 
Trinidad and Barbados where the soil was less favourable for 
their growth".242/ 
In spite of the fact that the peasantry should have.access to virgin soil - even 
through squatting - and that provisions had traditionally enjoyed a regional market, 
development of a peasant society seems to have reached an early saturation pointa 
precipitated by a remarkable climate of insecurity. The year 1844 witnessed what was 
known as la guerre n&gre, and referred to the violent reaction to the census by the 
population in several parts of the island - south of Roseau, Colihaut, Ganefield, 
Point Michel, Grand Bay. This census was perceived as a first step towards re-
enslavement. Martial law had to be proclaimed, regular troops, police and militia 
men, and Her Majesty's navy entered into action to control the situation.. The 
rebellion was placated not without several deaths to be deplored and even the suicide 
240/ Ibid, p.63. 
241/ M.A.H. Tempany, Superintendent of Agriculture, Agricultural Labour 
Conditions in the Leeward Islands, Bureau de L'Association Scientifique-Internationale 
d'Agronomie Coloniale, Paris / / p.5. 1 
242/ Government of Dominica, Dies Dominica, Roseau 1972, p.34. 
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of an inhabitant surrounded by a militia» All in all, the events reflect 
the cleavage between the former enslaved and their actual project of 
development on the one hand, and on the other, their perceived helplessness 
in relation to the authorities. 
In 1856, some squatters on the Batalie Estate were faced with two 
alternatives; to pay a nominal rent or to be evicted from their plots. Their 
opposition provoked riots which incensed the temper of the population. The 
elected members of the local Assembly under the leadership of Falconer, 
"called on squatters throughout the island to stick to the 
land on which they had settled and resist any move to eject 
them".244/ 
The local forces of order could not deal with insubordination, and when the 
Governor, with reinforcements sent from Antigua, wished to be transported to 
Batalie Estate, boatmen at Roseau refused to provide assistance. In the end 
the matter was solved to the satisfaction of the estate owners. But the 
solidarity between boatmen, rural squatters and members of the Mulatto 
Ascendancy revealed - as the first recorded alliance of various classes 
against the colonial authorities - the existence of an area of national 
cohesion developing around the issue of landownership, 
In a related fashion riots sprung up in 1893, the tenants opposing the 
administrative authorities on the issue of taxation. One person in La Plaine 
had to face eviction since he was not in a position to pay his dues to the 
State. The villagers rose to his defense and once more the authorities had to 
seek the support of a warship to bring them under control. Four persone were 
killed and several wounded in the process. This incident, which occurred a 
few weeks after the police had brutally cracked down on masqueraders insisting 
on including Ash Wednesday in the. Carnival festivities, also achieved the 
unification of all social classes and received much publicity in the press. 
These elements of national mobilization should be linked to the adamant 
stand of the Mulatto Ascendancy against increases in land taxation, together 
) 
with their relentless acquisition of properties from bankrupt absentees. One 
could, on this basis, infer that during the nineteenth century a broad 
243/ L. Honychurch, op. cit p. 74 „ 
244/ Ibid, p.75. 
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consensus emerged in an effort to secure a hold:on land:as basic national 
patrimony. Since there was no scarcity: of land, opposition between landless 
peasants and estate owners never developed to the. extent of overshadowing 
the antagonism with the colonial masters; so Blacks and Mulattoes did not 
enter in open conflicts on this issue. On the. contrary, together they 
expressed, either through 'riots' or through.the local Assembly and the Press, 
their resentment to what was perceived as harrassment and encroachment by the 
colonial authorities. 
Finally, the census of 1891 showed a population of 26,841 inhabitants, 
less numerous (by 1,370) than ten years earlier, and significantly below the 
early nineteenth century estimates of the enslaved population alone. 
J.A. Borome mentions that during the 1890s the emigration to the gold mines 
of Venezuela and French Guiana was even.more important than during the previous 
245/ decade. According to the West India Royal Commission Report, in 1897, it 
was alleged that 7,000 Dominicans were living in deplorable conditions in 
0 / £ / 
Venezuela. This amount, added to the 1891 population would represent 20 
per cent of the total population at the end:of the century. The testimony of 
247 / a prominent proprietor and planter cast some doubt on the exact figure—— but 
in the year 1896 alone, more than 1,200 Dominicans migrated to Venezuela and 
248/ Cayenne. 
In consequence, the availability of manpower for any local agricultural 
venture was maintained. But in this context of lack of capital, several types 
of labour arrangements (family and community work, metayage, together with 
peonage in addition to salaried work) took shape and were manipulated 
facilitating production beyond the rationale of market economy. 
245/ J.A. Borome, "How Crown Colony Came:to:Dominica"; Aspects ... p.132. 
246/ Report of the'West*India Royal: Commission 1897, op. cit.,p.50. 
247/ Ibid. Appendix C, para. 513. 
248/ Ibid, paras. 533-534. 
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"Besides the larger sugar estates, there were a great number of 
small holdings cultivated in sugar canes. These were the sugar 
properties of the peasant proprietors, and they varied in area 
from a few acres up to fifty or more ... The cane mills worked 
by cattle were of very low power, and only a small proportion 
of the juice was extracted and that was made into the worst kind 
of sugar. As, however, the labour was usually contributed by 
the owners and their families, who placed little value on their 
time, sugar was made by the peasant proprietors after many larger 
estates had stopped working".249/ 
Peonage did not appear in Dominica in its neat characteristics and even it 
it were rather common, it did not seem regulated. It emerged as the 
use of other people's labour force against no stipulated form cf payment 
and no recourse in cases of breach of contract. A Roman Catholic priest 
testifying in 1897 stated that: 
"65 men, formerly bailiffs on estates, have lost their situations 
without any kind of compensation. They were not working for 
wages, but cultivating land for the owner, growing cocoa for the 
estate and ground provisions. They were evicted from their 
holdings without payment for the cocoa. The cocoa trees planted 
by them remain among the bushes and are getting lost and destroyed".250/ 
Another witness, famous and knowledgeable about the island, Dr„ Niehoils 
who was a native, planter, barristerr-at-law, several times elective member 
of the Legislative Assembly, confirmed the situation and added more details; 
"The planters were lamenting better days, but they were paying 
higher wages than now, their estates were encumbered. Plenty 
labour was and is available; wages were and are paid both by the 
day and by the task; ... It has been customary for labourers on 
sugar estates to rent land, or to have land allowed them free „„,; 
the rent was paid in labour, for instance, a day's labour a month 
... The custom has been to grow canes on the metayer system, 
giving one-third of the produce for use of the mill machinery",251/ 
Remarkably the description of the economic situation of the people resembles 
those of the very planters as far as their specific type of poverty was 
concerned. The priest mentioned earlier, who lived in Dominica for about 
20 years and was well acquainted with the condition of the poor among whom 
he did his apostolic work, considered: 
249/ Ibid. para. 511. 
250/ Ibid. para. 538. 
251/ Ibid. para. 512. 
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"their condition (of the poor) worse now than formerly; a great number 
are in want, not in want of food in the country but almost anything 
else; not many earn wages; ...252/ 
The similarity of the basket of food at the disposal of both the rich and 
the underpvivileged in Dominica, indicates first of all a sizeable output of 
peasant economy. But above all, it enhances another fundamental characteristic 
of the Caribbean societies during the nineteenth century, which persists to a 
large extent in contemporary times. It is noted that "a great number are in 
want, not in want of food", but of wages. It follows paradoxically, that peasant 
society in Dominica could not flourish and reproduce itself indefinitely 
precisely because the plantation society was collapsing. The previous quotation 
continues as follows: 
"Wages have decreased principally owing to the fall in the price of 
sugar, also because landowners have no money to cultivate their land; 
the peasant cultivators are distressed, they do not cultivate their 
land, they prefer to go to Cayenne and work for wages".253/ 
This urge for "salaried" work in Dominica within the plantation economy, far from 
auguring ill for the peasantry, must be viewed as a functional requisite of a 
peasant society and one of its pillars. There is no contradiction in this 
proposition, as seen by the witnesses to the sittings of the 1897 Commission 
themselves. Moreover, people wished to earn "wages", but they did not complain of 
lack of work or so-called unemployment. It would be convenient, en passant, to 
analyse more closely certain contemporary situations and to try to understand 
on different bases the negative attitudes of the Caribbean man vis-à-vis salaried 
agricultural work as a permanent form of organization of the workers' life, when 
there still exists possibilities, even though precarious, of independent entre-
preneurial activities. The present level of endemic.unemployment seems to result 
from a disencounter between a real demand of manpower and a supply of labour force, 
available but reluctant to commit itself in the conditions of prolétarisation 
operating in the market. 
"It is not easy to get the people in Dominica to work regularly on 
estates; at Portsmouth an attempt was made to get some land into 
cultivation rapidly, this had to be abandoned owing to the 
irregularity of the labour supply, they could get 100 men one week 
252/ Ibid, para. 538. 
253/ Ibid. 
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and the next week very.few could come; the people are not 
pressed-to-work by necessity; they complain of want of wages, 
but will not work regularly when wages are offered".254/ 
Apparently while the planters were in need of capital» the peasants longed 
for "wages". It is clear that there is a quid pro quo to clarify. In fact, 
and this seems relevant to understand the Caribbean situation, what is called 
wages in the context of plantation and other market economies, becomes 
capital for the peasantry. Having no access to any credit institution, the 
peasants used monetary earnings to fulfil the function of investment. It is 
the need for such "earnings" that is mistakenly taken for want of 'Vages", 
Thence, assumptions of the behaviour of these "wage-earners" in p,conomie 
models based on principles of a free market, only assist in magnifying an 
original error. 
The previous quotations suggest the lack.of money circulation as the 
main cause of emigration. In spite of the de-population process, evidence 
collected by the Royal Commission underlined repeatedly that the depression 
in the sugar industry was not due to a want of labour. Actually immigration 
from Barbados was considered in the context, of settlement on new lands and 
not with the purpose of increasing the supply of agricultural salaried 
workers. 
Another notable Dominican summarized this issue for the benefit of the 
Royal Commission of 1897 in the following terms: 
"Mr. Pemberton stated that many of the population had been driven 
out, and that those who remained are impoverished; the population 
has gone down by about five or six thousand, and the people are 
now very poor; minor products do not put money into circulation 
like the cultivation of cane ... There is a great desire among the 
people to settle on the land, this (is) a country of peasant 
proprietors, but they all want work to supplement their production 
by wages, they come to the estates to work, and their holdings are 
not as a rule, too far off for this".255/ 
It has been argued that Caribbean peasantry is basically dependent upon 
outsiders for the provision of its instruments of production. The Amerindian 
peasantry for instance,.had solved the problem of consumption goods together 
with those of capital goods within its own society. Peasants in the Caribbean 
254/ Ibid. para. 541 (Our emphasis) 
255/ Ibid. para. 513. 
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as newcomers to the world economy, and artisans emerging.from.amongst them, had 
not had the opportunity of-producing their instruments of production, They had 
to rely on other economies and therefore to be involved in the processes of 
exchange of their produce against non-agricultural goods; capital goods, and to 
256/ an extent maybe.as important, manufactures necessary for their daily life. 
The implication of this is a constant need for money - including hard 
currency. These peasant economies cannot operate without a cash crop or access 
to the production of cash crops, and cannot be self-contained and isolated systems. 
In fact, they flourished whenever their links with other forms of production were 
established through the circulation of money. 
If a certain.quantum of instruments of exchange with the outer world is not 
provided for, a process of emigration is triggered. One can even conceive of a 
case where a successful peasant economy, by its very success, provoked some degree 
of out-migration in order to provide for the remittance of cash. A study by 
Andre Corten on the case of the Haitian migrational flow towards the Dominican 
Republic proved that those migrants are not recruited mainly among the landless 
rural dwellers,.-but among the peasant proprietors, and in the purest tradition 
of the island of Dominica, the basis for migrating remained (at least up to 
257 / mid-1970s) the procurement of cash. 
256/ J, Casimir, "Aperçu sur la Structure Economique d'Haiti", America Latina 
Rio de Janeiro 1964, 8(3) pp.48-49. 
257/ André Corten, "Haitis Estructura Agraria y Migración de Trabajadores 
a los centrales Azucareros Dominicanos", M. Acosta et al Azúcar y Política en la 
República Dominicana, Santo Domingo, Ediciones de Taller 1976, 2nd Ed. pp.85-145. 
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C. Conclusion 
Dominica was a colony» It is beyond doubt that the rationale for 
Britain to conquer and retain it was its strategic position. In other 
words, the economy of colonizing Dominica never belonged to the field 
of economics, and the gain of this particular colonial enterprise was of 
a political nature. Hence the basic activities producing "returns" to 
the British Empire consisted of the establishment and maintenance of a 
workable political and administrative system. 
The conflicts of economic interests, that is to say, competitiveness 
for securing major economic advantages, switched from the field of economics 
to the area of politics. White planters, around two per cent of the total 
population at the end of the nineteenth century, opposed coloured ones in 
spite of their commonality of interests in the limited field of economics. 
Coloured planters allied with their relatives - the coloured merchants, in 
spite of divergencies in this same narrow field of economics. The lure of 
upward mobility, based on the racial and racist connotations of this 
arrangement, facilitated the mobilization of coloured tradesmen and artisans 
against the whites, ignoring the presence of large masses of blacks, A 
project of national, unity would take shape, and an ambiguous opposition 
between the interests of the "mother country" and those of its "adopted 
subjects" developed during most of the nineteenth century, alongside with 
an island-wide effort for controlling land resources. 
It is not a discovery to postulate that the mode of insertion of the 
colony within the empire must be maintained as a primary element of ex-
planation of social intercourse evolving therein. In his remarkable letter 
describing the class position of the West Indian planters, William Davies, 
leader of the Mulatto Ascendancy during the decline of its political power, 
put it rather clearly to the West India Royal Commission of 1897, Davies 
referred to the economic aspects of the problem which were escaping the 
control of the local oligarchy concurrently with the progression of 
imperialism. The main economic conflicts would arise increasingly in 
Dominica's relations with the Empire. The internal political aspects under 
the control of the oligarchy were becoming irrelevant for achieving an 
unchallengeable economic pre-eminence. 
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In parallel, the oligarchy which had hoped to become a dominant planter class 
ended up as a ruling elite. At the beginning, it displaced the whites who, during 
the first decades of the nineteenth century, were the only persons eligible for 
nomination to the Legislative Assembly - and;then fulfilled the role.of .spokesmen .of 
the administration in the capacity of "official nominees". At the end of the 
century, the mulattoes were again in a position to displace the whites, and shared 
with them the opportunity of being spokesmen of the colonial authority. They rose 
to these positions through strata mobility and not in their individual capacities, 
since the latter option became possible after the adoption of the "Brown Privilege 
Bill". 
Visible political dissension between whites and mulattoes obscured a more 
profound conflict between the citizens and the politically inactive population. 
The city - as the lieu and cradle of citizenship - emerged as being such because 
of its imperial connections, which prevailed in the end. The spurts of national 
unity were aborted because they lacked the support of economic practices which could 
generate a shared project of nation-building. 
As a corollary, the rift between the citizens due to their differentiated 
participation in the economic fabric of the society became secondary in the 
deployment of their daily practices. The demand for responsible and autonomous 
government against the alternative of Federal Government controlled directly by the 
Crown, became a significant divisive element among the citizens (whites and mulattoes) 
in the search (by both ethnic groups) for a key position in the realization of the 
colonial venture, as proposed by the United Kingdom. 
The limitations of the Dominican national project during the nineteenth century, 
that is the frontier of political dissension between the Dominicans of the period and 
the colonizers, coincided with the margins - of viability of the island's economic 
system. Acknowledgement by .local planters of" the conflicts with manufacturers, 
import/export merchants and colonial authorities, pointed to the awareness of the 
exploitation to which the country was submitted. Some elements logically emerged for 
a national outlook distinct from the colonial one; but the issue of independence at 
any cost never arose. 
The opposition to the "colonial power" - which is not called a "mother country" -
took a different turn from what evolved in the Spanish Main. In this particular case, 
alternative metropolitan powers were anxious to capitalize on divergencies between 
Spain and her former colonies.. In Dominica, the conflicts between "nationals" and 
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"colonists" had no external sponsors and could be diffused by the different 
avenues of upward social mobility based on racial and cultural characteristics. 
A system of political and administrative rewards closely linked to positions 
assigned to different ethnic sub-groups ensured the dominance of a light-skinned 
elite and served as a sop to its unfulfilled economic aspirations. Formal and 
informal requirements for access to these rewards were incompatible with the 
realization of the initial national project which had collapsed. 
This workable solution between the mulatto oligarchy and the colonial 
authorities ignored the circumstances of the peasant and black population. 
Without any channel of institutionalized political expression, or the power 
to oppose the arrangement of colonial forces on other grounds, the peasantry 
chose to migrate with the hope that remittances could be sufficient to activate 
its separate world. Migration was forced upon it, in view of the failure of 
the plantation system of the island and the inability of the economic elite to 
set up viable productive ventures. Isolation, nonetheless, was not built into 
the peasant society, and appeared to have originated in the political arrangement 
fostered by the Empire and in the accommodation of the oligarchy to the colonial 
objectives. These developments set the pace for the formulation of an 
alternative project of nationhood, which did not surface during the nineteenth 
century. 
- 1 1 8 -
X 
AN EXPORT-ORIENTED PEASANT ECONOMY 
The economy of Dominica retains in the twentieth century many of the 
characteristics evolved during the previous century. It remains centered on 
one export crop at a time, produced in conditions which prevent competitiveness 
in the procurement of in-puts and in the realization of out-puts; hence the 
need for continued protection and privileged treatment. From the incapacity of 
the system to generate a demand on the free market for the goods it supplies, 
derives a state of constant readiness to reallocate existing resources 
according to the whims of the international market and to obstruct the movements 
of productive factors. The requirement for this sort of flexibility from the 
productive apparatus militates against any cumulative growth and defeats 
attempts at modernization. Thè frailty even of successful export-oriented 
ventures is heightened by their increasing reliance on cdisaggregated owner/ 
family-operated units of production. Self-employment evolves as the pre-
dominant - though occasionally disguised-form of institutional arrangement 
for agricultural resources. 
It appears that contrary to what is observed in most countries, the 
framework in which Dominica's economic organizations are operating, far 
from calling for gradual concentration of capital, including the applica-
tion of science and technology, and labour resources, provides the rationale 
for the opposite trend. The ambiguous fortune of political negotiations 
with the aim of lessening the effects of unfavourable terms of trade seem 
to dictate a priority need for malleable small scale operations to share 
and absorb the gradual bankruptcy brought about by the steady downfall in 
relative prices of agricultural commodities. The ability to switch, when-
ever necessary, to supply agricultural goods appealing to a set of foreign 
consumers is ensured by preventing the accumulation of fixed capital in the 
productive sector. 
The swiftness with which labour is required to reorient itself towards 
profit-making ventures makes it impossible to organize large masses of 
dispossessed rural workers. Traditional owner-operated organizations cater 
for additional seasonal manpower which is paid for on a task by task basis 
and cannot evolve towards more complex forms of labour division. Similarly, 
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large productive units consistently avoid contracting manpower for given 
periods of time thus retarding the development of unionized industrial 
relations. Trade-unions remain an urban phenomenons while producers' 
associations when limited to rural residents are remarkably weak. 
The major feature of the twentieth century is the progress made in 
the tertiary sector by private investors. The distribution of cash crops 
on the international market provides most opportunities for lucrative 
business. Innovations in the service sector hardly induce any betterment 
in the rest of the economy. The possibility of stimulating a productive 
system so constrained by the worsening terms of trade is non-existent 
in view of the foreign origin and the outward orientation of capital 
operating in it. 
Giving the failings of the private service sector, the state machinery 
without any source of income other than taxation and foreign assistance, 
is bequeathed with the responsibility of promoting agricultural develop-
ment and by the same token, has become the centre of most social conflicts. 
During the previous century social negotiations tended to oppose the 
colony as a whole to the British authorities. They focused on the form 
of participation of the elite in the ruling of the territory. For most 
of the twentieth century society has evolved without registering any 
overt conflict with its rulers. After World War II, following a region-
wide movement and the broadening cf the world-wide market economy, the 
colony moved towards self-government and political independence. Most 
social unrest exploded during the 1970s. This will be described 
subsequently; the present chapter examines the evolution of the export-
oriented economy. 
A. Infrastructural Development 
The state of communication infrastructure is a reliable indicator of 
the progress made by the economy of any given country. In this respect, 
Dominica has lagged behind. Although it is the largest of the Windward 
-120-
Islarids in the Eastern Caribbean, its. topography, climate, lack of invest-
ment interests have to date militated against "growth" in a vein similar 
to that of smaller islands, more amenable to estate agriculture on an 
extensive scale. 
Large areas of the island have remained inaccessible during much of this 
century. With the decline of the limited estate agriculture and the general 
lack of interest of the United Kingdom in the island infrastructure develop-
ment has been neglected. This neglect was evident in the late nineteenth 
century and the situation has varied very little during the course of the 
twentieth century. 
259/ 
A report of 1918 referred to the haphazard nature of road-building 
and to the lack of maintenance of roads in the island, and recommended the 
creation of bridle paths in the valleys to open up productive areas. At the 
time of the Watts report in 1925, coastal communication was minimal. 
Vessels serving the Windward coast were non-existent. Large property owners 
possessed their own sea crafts for transport of their products but smaller 
property owners suffered from a lack of such transport. One can understand 
the negative effect on the productive capacity of small holders - a 
situation of enforced self-subsistence. 
In 1939, the infrastructure remained under-developed. The island is 
referred to as being one of the poorest, only seventy miles of motorable 
roads existed and that included a road of 29 miles which had just been 
completed with assistance from the Colonial Development Fund. Even then, 
258/ The Watts Report (1925) and the West Ipdia Royal Commission Report 
presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, July 1945, hereinafter referred to as the Lord Moyne Report. 
These reports dispel the notion that Dominica is extremely fertile and has 
great potential for agriculture. Watts stated that heavy and frequent rainfall 
rendered agricultural operations difficult and cleared land infertile after 
short periods of use. The Moyne Report al$o maintained that much of the land 
was not easily available for agriculture and that shifting cultivation might 
have contributed to erosion of most of the hillsides. Later reports were not 
available in order to substantiate the above. 
259/ The reference is made to a report prepared by Mr. Bell (Director 
of Public Works, Trinidad) in 1918 quoted by F. Watts in his report (1925) 
op. cit.; p.20. 
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it was difficult, if not impossible, to get from the. north.to the south of the 
island by road.——^ 
Insufficient data on other aspects of economic infrastructure does not 
allow further detail on its development, or lack of it, during the following 
decades. During the first half of the 1970s the decline in production and 
earnings of export agriculture did not assist in modifying the dilapidated 
261/ 
condition of the island's infrastructure. Subsequently, in the interim 
period 1975-1979, prior to independence (1978) there may have been some 
minor development. But whatever progress took place in the latter part of 
the decade would have been nullified as a result of the devastation of 
hurricanes in 1979 and 1980. A United Nations team reported in 1982 that: 
"... the island's development had not only stood still since 
1977, the year of independence, (sic), but if anything it had 
gone backwards." 262/ 
Nothing was left untouched by the hurricane of 1979. Agriculture, industry, 
transport and tourism, electricity and water supply were all disrupted. 
The banana crop was totally destroyed as well as a large percentage of 
coconuts and citrus. 
It has been emphasized that Dominica's recession was even without 
this climatic factor evident: 
"Hurricane David did not conceal the fact that the island's 
social and economic infrastructure had been deteriorating 
for most of the decade". 263/ 
Most analyses emphasize the deficiencies of the road system as well as 
the high costs involved in the building and proper maintenance of roads as 
obstacles to economic development. In the case of Dominica, a good road 
system is necessary to secure access to untapped resources at present 
260/ "The system such as it is, therefore falls short of providing 
adequately through communication by road, between Roseau, the capital and 
Portsmouth, the second town of the island, and the Administrator has there-
fore to make this journey by sea". The Lord Moyne Report, p.407. 
261/ World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Dominica, 18 May 1981, p.l, 
262/ Article in "The Courier" - "Dominica Getting into Forward Gear", 
February 1982. 
263/ Ibid. 
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controlled by the state. It could also ease the situation of farmers working 
on marginal lands or on farms of uneconomical size. The lack of such a system 
is however, an integral part of the social environment being examined and 
does not explain its performance. . 
J.A.N. Burra notes that approximately 92% of ¿he population lives within 
half a mile of the coast. Most private lands¡with sea frontage consist of 
large estates: 
"Behind the plantations and between them, small holdings 
fill in the gaps. The main Crown Lands occupy the interior 
behind the private lands". 264/ 
Therefore when one considers the question of resources under exploitation, 
the deplorable state of the roads is not the issue at stake; the difficulty 
was, rather to set up a proper system of communication infrastructure by 
sea. In other words, with or without a road system, the state of the 
economy would have been the same, given its form of management these last 
centuries. 
"It cannot be overstressed that if private lands are put to 
good use, production will rise without recourse to a very 
heavy feeder road programme, as there are thousands of acres 
lying derelict within a mile or two of existing and planned 
roads". 265/ 
The reason that private lands were not put to good use .therefore seems 
more important than the deficiencies of both land and sea communication 
infrastructure in explaining the island's state of economic development. 
In his Report of 1921-22, Wood states: 
"In my judgement expenditure upon the construction of new 
roads, or even any great improvement of existing ones, is 
out of the question so long as the financial out-look is 
so bad, and, unless steps can be taken to improve the 
markets for Dominica's special products, I do not see 
264/ Report upon Land Administration in Dominica, Roseau, Dominica, 
August 1953 (mimeo). 
265/ Ibid, p.40. 
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much hope of.immediate further development in what is today. • , 
the least developed of all the British West Indian Islands". 
B. Agricultural Development 
Trends in export agriculture during this century generally mirrored major 
developments in the nineteenth century: the economy did not overcome mono-
culture. 
"Historically ... there have been a number of episodes of 
growth and decay of industries based on particular crops» 
e.g. cocoa, coffee, sugar and limes, each rising to a peak 
then declining and leaving remnants of small production. 
When factorB have become favourable some of these have at 
times experienced resurgence in production to again take a 
significant place".±2Z' 
The cumulative expansion of export agriculture continued to be constrained 
by forces which the society could not overcome: complete subjection to volatile 
international markets and total-impotence in relation to-hurricanes and heavy 
rainfalls or alternatively to periods of drought. It will be seen that Dominica's 
inventiveness did not manifest itself in achieving growth, but rather in 
creating mechanisms to shield the social system against possible restructuring 
deriving from the constant eventuality of economic collapse. 
The major crops of the previous century - sugar and cocoa - declined 
gradually to a state of insignificance, while lime production took precedence. 
On the one hand, cocoa production peaked by 1907 and went into a downward 
trend by the end of the second decade. This was concurrent with the increase 
266/ The Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P. West Indies Report, London. His 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921-22, p.77. 
267/ J.B. Yankey in Small Farming Study in the Lesser Developed 
Member Territories of the Caribbean, Weirs Consulting Services Ltd. (pre-
pared for the Caribbean Development Bank) 1976, Vol. 1 (a) Country Reports, 
p. 363. 
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JfLQ / 
in value and the production of limes. One source explains the decline of 
cocoa by 1917 as a result of storms affecting the island in 1915 and 1916, 
F. Watts attributes the downfall to three reasons: 
a) the low price obtainable in the international market; b) the 
general lack of suitability of the cocoa tree to the island; and c) the 
competition of West African cocoa.262/ At this time, the crop was grown 
mainly by peasants and small proprietors. 
On the other hand, exports of sugar by 1906 were "hardly worth con-
sideration". The crop suffered from neglect as the production of limes 
gained in importance and value and as a consequence sugar estates were 
either sold or abandoned, the latter solution being predominant. With the 
low price of sugar during the 1920s there was no return to its cultivation. 
The West Indian Sugar Commission (1930) referred to the fact that sugar 
had almost entirely disappeared in D o m i n i I t is also stated that "No 
271/ 
sugar had been produced in Dominica for many years". By the end of 
the decade (1930s) the Moyne Commission makes no mention of Dominica in 
its discussion on the sugar situation. 
268/ Cocoa/Limes Export Value 1897, 1907, 1917: 
Cocoa Limes 
1897 9,307 £ 18,721 
1907 48,950 77,407 
1917 8,842 204,899 
Data derived from Bell, Young and Nicholls, Notes on Dominica and 
Hints to Intending Settlers, 1919, p.12. 
269/ The Watts Report, p. 9, Dominica, 1925. 
270/ Report of the West Indian Sugar Commission, Part IV, London, 
H.M. Stationery Office,. 1930, p. 25, para 5. 
271/ Ibid, p. 47, para. 114. Perhaps reference is made to the export 
of sugar. 
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Within the first three decades of this century lime production soared so 
that Dominica became known as the world's largest exporter of limes. Of the 
four islands of Dominica, Saint Lucia, Montserrat and Grenada, where limes 
were produced in great quantities for export early in this century, only 
in Dominica did the crop gain such pre-eminence as the leading export crop. 
The value of lime and lime products increased from 26.1% of total exports 
at the end of the 19th Century (1892) to dominate the island's exports by 
the middle of the second decade of the 20th Century. At that time such 
272/ products represented over 90% of the value of total exports. 
In spite of its apparent prosperity, the industry was beset by serious 
problems during the period referred to above. F. Watts reported that in 1903 
there was a drop in production caused by serious drought as well as an attack 
273/ 
of scale insect. Then followed a rapid recovery and stable levels of 
production. However, in 1915 and 1916, the crops were severely affected by 
disastrous storms 
In addition to the above-mentioned reversals, external factors came into 
play. The island's export trade in fresh limes and lime products was severely 
hampered by metropolitan countries' trade policies. The imposition by the 
United States of trade prohibitions on Dominican limes during the War caused 
a decline in the island's trade in green limes by 58% between 1914 and 1920 275/ (from 45,000 barrels to 19,000 barrels). Britain, which imported the 
island's fresh lime juice and cordial for its Navy and Army, favoured the 
more competitively priced Sicilian lemon juice (against the Dominican products) 
The report by E.F.L. Wood (1921) described the economically depressed 
state of Dominica at the end of the second decade of this century as its 
export economy became severely compressed as a result of these internal and 
external factors. 
272/ The Watts Report, p. 4 paras 6 and 7. Watts is careful to point out, 
however that statistical returns collected for those years are misleading and 
are not always representative of actual production, i.e., some years production 
may be carried over to succeeding years (as may be the case for 1917). 
273/ Ibid, p. 3. 
274/ Ibid, p. 9. 
275/ The Hon. E.F.L. Wood, op. cit.f p. 51 where 1914 to 1920 is referred 
to as a period of bad trade for Dominica. 
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"While all the British West Indian islands are suffering to a 
greater or lesser extent from economic depression brought about 
by the present slump in trade all over,the world, ho island is 
suffering more acutely than Dominica."276/ 
Details of the economic situation during the third decade reveal further 
depression. Lime was dealt another blow by an attack of wither-tip disease 
occasioned by the fungus "Gleosporium Limetticolum (Clausen)" which spread 
rapidly and affected almost all the estates in the island in 1922. The 
effect was immediate, resulting in a slump in production. Recorded production 
values for the years 1922 and 1923 reveal a reduction of 32% within that two-
year period. Actual production of limes fell by 43%. This attack of "blight" 
marked the beginning of the decline of limes on a large scale as occurred 
with coffee during the third decade of the nineteenth century. Drought in 
the years 1923 and 1924 may have contributed to a further deterioration in 
production (by 23%) between 1923 and 1925. 
In 1925 the economic situation was depressed to such an extent that it 
warranted an official investigation into the island's agricultural con-
ditions, with a view to providing recommendations for a revival of suitable 
277 / export crop(s) in order to sustain the population. 
"During the depressed years of the 'thirties' agricultural 
production was stagnant".278/ 
Nevertheless the world depression of the 1930s contributed to the 
inhibition of any revival of the island's export economy. A combination of 
factors - low prices, plant diseases and hurricanes in 1926, 1928 and 1930 -
meant a virtual halt to the island's limited productive capacity for export 
agriculture. 
During the second World War, export agriculture could not progress; 
but by the 1950s lime production had been drastically scaled down to account 
279 / 
for just over one-third of the total value of domestic exports (1953). 
At that time 3,500 acres, 450 acres and 900 acres respectively were devoted 
to limes, oranges and grapefruits. 
276/ Ibid, p. 50 (our emphasis) 
277/ The Watts Report. 
278/ L. Honychurch, op. cit. , p.101. .... 
279/ The Citrus Industry, mimeo. 1955 (unpublished document). 
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The demise of the lime industry paralleled a gradual shift towards the 
production of grapefruit; the cultivation of this staple was promoted, 
resulting in a further decrease in acreage devoted to limes - from 3,500 
280 / acres to 1,000 acres between 1953 and 1974. Later records (1976) show 
281/ that limes had dropped to sixth in importance among export crops. 
Initially, very few Dominicans participated in lime production; sub-
sequently, however, there was increasing of both peasant and estate owners. 
A number of factors contributed to this increased participation. Firstly, 
limes were perennial and hence provided constant cash income to growers. 
In the case of the small holder, it was noted that he was: 
"... an important contributor to the trade and since it (was) 
a cash crop which (bore) all year round, his lime trees (were) 
an important cash crop to him".282/ 
Secondly, the general ease of cultivation meant that it needed very little 
labour - a situation favourable to both estate owners and peasant farmers. 
Thirdly, the security of marketing arrangements further ensured increased 
participation. 
The industry was totally dominated by Messrs. Rose and Company, a 
subsidiary of a British firm, with all the characteristics of vertical 
integration typical of multinational firms. This involvement occurred at 
all levels of the industry from growing to exporting to the parent firm. 
The firm's operations in the island began in the early days of the lime 
industry (the end of the nineteenth century). On the one hand it established 
and assured marketing arrangements for the products, and by so doing con-
tributed to the long history of the industry in the country. On the other 
hand, it ensured a minimal value retained at the local end of the industry 
and a maximising of profits to the parent company. Within the Dominican 
economic situation, however, that minimal revenue seemed to represent 
economic survival. 
280/ Ibid. 
281/ AID Survey, Agricultural Development in the Eastern Caribbean, 1977. 
282/ Weirs Agricultural Consulting Services, Small Farming Study in the 
Less Developed Member Territories of the Caribbean prepared for the 
Caribbean Development Bank, 1976, p. 398. 
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The structure of the industry was such, .that the growers sold their crops 
to processors who fixed the prices for lime oil and lime juice on the basis of 
a price structure agreed to by the foreign firm. The processing plants varied 
from small (those of local individual estate-owners) to large (owned by Rose 
and Co. Ltd.). 
As previously mentioned, the production of other citrus - grapefruit and 
oranges - outstripped limes in terms of acreage and quantity. A stimulus to 
production was the establishment of a citrus packing plant by the Colonial 
Development Corporation. Marketing arrangements were further facilitated 
by the creation of a marketing firm by locally based Dominicans. The existence 
of the firm and its provision of transport for the produce encouraged the 
expansion of these crops around the latter part of the 1950s. The citrus 
industry continued to play an important role in the island during the 1960s 
until the mid-1970s and still remains a contributor, however modest, to 
Dominica's exports. 
Other agricultural products contributed to Dominica's export earnings, 
during the first half of the twentieth century. They nevertheless did not 
achieve the predominance of lime and lime products. Vanilla was introduced 
during the first decade, and by the end of the 1940s this spice had reached 
third and second place in importance among the export crops. Coconuts, bay 
oil, avocado pears and mangoes also had their share in the foreign trade, 
283 / particularly after the Second World War. 
While the production of citrus was declining, banana was on the rise. 
Its introduction and eventual supremacy accompanied a profound transformation 
of the Dominican society. Emphasis will be put in this chapter on the economic 
aspects of the changes. 
The potential of the banana industry was discovered in 1917. It was at 
the time a minor agricultural branch "producing for local and inter-island 
consumption".284/ ^ 1921, export of bananas totalled 2,944 bunches as opposed 
283/ See Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture and the Problems 
of Small Scale Farming in Dominica (Phd. Thesis), University of Wisconsin, 
tables XXXVI and XXXVII, pp. 138 and following. 
284/ J.B. Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture pp. 123-124 
except otherwise indicated, data on the development and impact of the banana 
industry are borrowed from this study. 
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to Jamaica's 9,949,460. Watts (1925) forecasted that viability of the trade in 
Dominica depended on some form of inter-dependency with other islands: 
"Dominica possesses neither the land, the men 
nor the shipping facilities to undertake such 
a business alone, if anything is to be done it 
will have to be in association with similar 
enterprises in neighbouring islands".285/ 
In 1939, Lord Moyne reported that bananas were extensively grown in Dominica 
286 / as well as in other Windward Islands. Between the Watts and Moyne Reports, 
a transnational company had intervened. In 1933, the Canadian Banana Co., a 
287/ subsidiary agency of the United Fruit Co. expressed interest in the bananas 
produced on the island, and as a consequence, the Dominica Banana Association 
288 / 
was established as a Statutory Body in 1934. With World War II, the operations 
of the Canadian firm came to an end, and the dissolution of the Dominica Banana 
Association was contemplated. In 1948, another foreign company, Grayson Shipping 
Lines of Florida, came to the rescue; but arrangements for the resuscitation 
of the industry became effective only in 1949, when Messrs. Brand and Sons of 
Liverpool initiated the process which led to the creation of Geest Industries 
(BWI). 
The "Banana Boom" was sparked off in 1950 by a fifteen-year market contract 
between Geest Industries and the Dominica Banana Association. Upon its 
expiration, a new agreement was negotiated in 1964 and remained valid until 1970. 0 Q Q / 
Thereafter, every year the contractual market arrangements were renegotiated-;;— 
During the first five years, "a scale of fixed, but increasing price levels" 
was agreed upon. From 1955 onwards, the price was to be fixed periodically 
285/ The Watts Report p. 14 para. 78. 
286/ The Lord Moyne Report p. 20 para. 32. 
287/ Ibid. 
288/ J.B. Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture pp. 123-124 
except otherwise indicated, data on the development and impact of the banana 
industry are borrowed from this study. 
289/ J.B. Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture p. 123 and 
followings. 
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i.e. it was allowed to fluctuate Yankey noted: 
"The price is to be based on the market price paid 
by green ripeners of bananas in the United Kingdom. 
tThe price is therefore influenced by the forces of 
supply and demand in the export market." 290/ 
To ensure that foreseeable fluctuations in the selling price did not 
jeopardise the industry, "a Banana Price Assistance Scheme" was established 
covering five years of the contractual market arrangements. 
•'"The objective of the Banana Price Assistance Scheme 
was that a Price Assistance Fund would be established 
in Dominica to which the banana industry would contribute 
!in time of good prices and upon which the industry would 
rdraw when prices were uneconomically low (...) Should 
the fund be insufficient to cover withdrawals it was agreed 
!that the territorial government of Dominica would make 
interest-free loans to the industry, up to specified 
limits.- Four-fifths of such loans were to be provided 
by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingsom." 291/ 
A new Banana Price Assistance Scheme negotiated for the period 1961 to 
1963 was far less favourable than the previous one. Subsequently negotiations 
to secure some measure to stability broke down as the producing territories 
considered the measures put forward by the United Kingdom to be unsatis-
factory. Therefore before the end of the fifteen-year period, the market 
contract guaranteed only the purchase of the commodity, not its price. 
As a result of the original incentives to produce banana, there was some 
surcharge in the use of land for agricultural purposes. Before 1950., land 
tenure in Dominica was characterized by a few large estates and a multi-
plicity of small farms. Some arable land was still under the control of the 
Crown. By the end of the 1940s, the demand for land led to the eviction of 
a large number of tenants established on large estates while the government 
took measures to distribute small plots to farmers and would-be farmers 
until the agricultural frontier of the country was practically reached. The 
basic pattern of land tenure scarcely changed, but the use of the resource 
and of the manpower applied to it was diverted to the production of the 
export crop. 
290/ . Ibid, p. 129. 
291/ " Ibid, p. 130. 
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Banana production reportedly increased in.volume five times between 1950 and 
1956. Data for the twelve-year period 1957-1969 reveal that production increased 
292/ 
from 17,325 tons to 57,677 tons. The value of banana exports in 1961 represented 
8.5 times that of 1950. Two million EC dollars of income to growers in 1957 equalled 
hardly a third of the revenue for the year 1969. 
The decline of the industry started in 1970, concomitant with the need to 
negotiate the contractual market arrangements every year. After reaching over 
EC$6 million in 1969, income fell, according to the Annual Reports of the Growers' 
Association, to just over EC$4 million in 1970; and thereafter, it continued to 
decline for about 4 years until the middle of the decade. The volume of production 
293/ 
registered in 1975 was the lowest attained for fourteen years (27,117 tons) , 
an increased income was nevertheless reflecting high prices on the world market. 
Similarly revenue of EC$13 million accrued to the growers although production 
only reached 37,181 tons. 
By 1970 the United Kingdom market was opened to banana imports from other 
Commonwealth countries with consequent impact on prices. The Windward Islands 
share declined gradually between 1969 and 1974 from 55.3 percent to 34 percent 
294/ 
of the United Kingdom banana import market. The loss of competitiveness in 
the UK market was blamed on the quality of the product and the levels of 
productivity; and numerous strategies were devised to redress the decline. 
During the first few years of the 1970s, a Five-Year Plan proposed by the 
British Development Division, the Windward Islands governments and the Wind-
ward Islands Banana Growers' Association (WINBAN), was designed and undertaken 
to improve crop production and fruit quality. In. addition, the depressed state 
of the industry occasioned an enquiry by a Management Consultant Firm, the 
recommendations of which, added to the development programme, effected some 
recovery in production. 
This recovery was however shortlived due to a severe drought in 1977, 
leaf spot disease and the subsequent devastation brought about by two severe 
292/i Dominica Banana Association, Annual Report, Dominica 1977, p. 3. 
293/ Ibid, p. 2. 
294/ Dominica Banana Growers Association, Annual Report, 1976 p. 5. 
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hurricanes, in 1979 and 1980, arid .strong winds in 1981,—- all of which 
. . i 
created a crisis at the start of the 1980's. In.February 19f$2, the 
Dominica Banana Association turned to the government for assistance to 
. ii 296/ avert collapse. 
The entry of small farmers, attracted by regular cash income, into 
the banana industry had important repercussions on the production of food 
for the domestic market. ¡Eárly in the century, the island was well supplied 
with food grown primarily by the peasants. 
"The holdings furnish the principal part of the food 
of the people; the products being used just to provide 
the food of the owners, the surplus being disposed of 
in the markets of the towns and villages throughout 
the island."297/ 
At that time Dominicans participated in an inter-island trade of fruits 
and vegetablés with Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat and Barbados, as well as 
Guadeloupe and Martinique. Thereafter, poor infrastructural development 
added to restrictions caused by marketing problems contained this trading. 
"One of the greatest disabilities experienced by the 
peasants lies in the difficulty of marketing their 
produce, together with the risk of over-protection, 
of perishable products, such as vegetables and fruit, 
the local markets for. which are small and may be*'over-
supplied, while the overseas markets can only be 
reached at rather irregular intervals and not with-
out difficulty."298/ 
Neglect of domestic agriculture by the government only enhanced the 
attractiveness .of. the .marketing arrangements-which..facilitated the spread i 
of banana. So much so that there was a growing tendency towards a halt in 
the production of food crops for local and regional markets. First of all, 
by the end of,the 1940s some estate owners had evicted their tenants in 
order to allocate the land they occupied to the productions of banana. 
295/ The island has been affected by hurricanes in three consecutive 
years earlier in the decade: 1970, 1971 and 1972. 
' 296/ Trinidad Guardián, 8 February 1982. 
297/ The Watts Report, pp. 17-18. 
298/ Ibid, p. 18. 
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"During this period of widespread evictions, the displaced 
tenants moved into Crown lands for garden-plots, but the 
first effect of the notices to quit from-the estate lands 
was a shortage of food crops experienced in the local 
market".299/ 
Subsequently, small scale farmers also withdrew from the.production of food 
crops for the local market, maintaining their kitchen ..gardens, primarily for 
their family needs. There was a reduction in acreage,-devo-ted.,to local fruit 
and vegetables between 1946 and 1961; if-fell from 6,300-fco 4,000 acres. 
Bartel notes since the first half of the 1960s, an increase-in the price of 
r J 4 A. 300/ some food items. 
The island now imports a large amount of its food. In 1976, the food 
import bill totalled EC$16.2 million or 33 percent of the total import bill. 
Moreover,-whereas the country was a net exporter of food, by 1980 the reverse 
obtained. More and more the earnings deriving from the export of bananas are 
becoming insufficient to purchase food from abroad for local consumption. 
Exports and Imports of Food in Dominica 
(EC$m) 301/ 
Exports Imports 
1970 9.4 7.4 
1975 21.1 14.2 
1980 10.5 25.7 
A World Bank Report nonetheless registers some improvement in the output of 
302/ domestic food crops for local consumption and inter-island trade. 
299/ J.B. Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture, pp. 57 and 58. 
300/ "(...) The Supply of locally grown fruits and vegetables in the local 
market which has traditionally been furnished by the surplus from rural kitchen 
gardens has been restricted already by the increased emphasis on banana,production 
in which the whole family can participate, with a remarkable increase in prices of 
some local food on the market". National Income Statistics of Dominica p. 5, para, 
15, quoted by Yankey, A Study of the Situation in Agriculture, p. 60. 
301/ S. St. A. Clarke "Production of Food for Consumption and Export: the 
need to achieve Optimal Balance", ECLA, CDCC/PWC:A/83/l, October 1983^ 
302/ World Bank Report 1981, p.4. 
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C. Industrial Development and Tourism 319/ 
Whereas other Caribbean islands have sought to diversify the base of their 
economies over the past two, or two and a half decades, in order to reduce the 
high reliance on "agriculture,"Dominica's attempts at so doing have been of minor 
significance. Lacking mineral resources, the obvious choices, following the 
example of other Caribbean countries, are those of manufacturing industries and 
tourism. In both these areas, Dominica has achieved little ~ and not for want 
of development plans and proposals emphasizing such priorities. 
I 
The industrial sector has remained underdeveloped. The manufacturing 
sector contributes approximately 4 percent of the island's GDP and provides 
303 / 
employment to less than 7 percent of the labour force. It is interesting 
to note, however, that of existing industries most are locally owned and are 
mainly involved in agroprocessing (coconuts and citrus), along with the 
production of garments, crafts, building materials, rum, cigarettes and 
soft drinks - all labour-intensive industries. Unfortunately this sector did 
not escape the effect of the 1979 hurricane which caused great set-backs. 
Entry of foreign-based firms have been limited in Dominica because the 
island lacks the basic requirements for exploitation by these firms. The pool 
of labour exists, but infrastructural development is poor and the political 
climate has been unstable over the past decade. As is the trend, expansion of 
industrial development in the Caribbean has been preceded by the establishment 
of Industrial Development Corporation which have a specific role to play in 
encouraging foreign private investment into the islands, as a base for the 
development of an "industrial sector". Even in this "development", Dominica 
has lagged behind - at least two decades. The mere fact that the Industrial 
Development Corporation has never operated-^^ is an indicator of the lack 
of assiduity shown in encouraging foreign investors to the island, 
303/ Ibid. 
i 
304/ Article on Dominica - "Bottling the essence of unity", Interview 
with Prime Minister Eugenia Charles. The Courier-, African Caribbean and 
Pacific European Community, Jan/Feib 1982. The article states that the 
Industrial Development Corporation existed on statute books, but has never 
operated to create policies and incentives to encourage industrial develop-
ment . 
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On the other hand9 the tourist industry-, on which many other Caribbean 
islands depend for foreign exchange, has also been of little significance for 
Dominica. The island does not offer the preferred traditional attractions of 
the Caribbean as advertised by the metropolitan-based airlines and travel agencies; 
and to attract tourists to its natural yet different environment, would require 
' considerable expenditure on promotion; this is an expenditure Dominica could ill 
afford for developing another fragile economic sector. 
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D. LabOtif Fbice 
David Wood of the Dominican National Planning Organization notes the 
limited rate of growth of the population during the period 1946-1976 and 
points out the incidence of "considerable fall in the fertility rate" as 
well as "the continued high levels of e m i g r a t i o n " . T h e information, 
read against the background of "the banana boom" beginning in 1950, 
suggests from the start that social mechanisms were at work to prevent 
the effects of banana bonanza from trickling down and .being so distri-
buted that the society could capitalize on the additional income in 
order to satisfy the values and aspirations of its population. v 
Indeed, the migration flows of the 1960s were "almost entirely 
restricted to the 15 to 44 a g e - g r o u p i n spite of an expected decline 
in such flows due to the closure of some metropolitan outlets, it would 
not seem, according to Wood, that the movement -has -abated- From the constant 
drain on the adult population, at a rate of approximately 800 persons a 
year in the 1960s and 1970s against a total population varying between 
60,000 and 70,000 people, resulted a remarkable predominance of the under 
15-year old age group, which represented 45 percent of the total population 
in 1960 and 50 percent in 1970. 
The repercussion of these phenomena on the social system a decade later, 
when these youths initiated their economic life, is well known. The demo-
graphic scenario could be described as follows: On the one hand, during the 
quarter century from 1946 to 1970 (the decline of the industry started in 
1970) the labour force grew only by 500 persons; in other words it more or 
less remained constant. From 1970 onwards, with the new entrants, it 
increased by 3.5 percent per annum. On the other hand, during these same 
twenty-five years, one observes a constant aging of the working force in 
agriculture: the proportion of males over 35 years of age represented 50 
percent of this population in 1946; the percentage increased=to 60 percent 
305/ David Wood, The Manpower Situation In Dominica, 1946-1976, 
National Planning Organization, August 1978, mimeo. 
306/ Ibid, 
- 1 3 7 -
in 1960s and reached 65 percent in 1970„ ' The young people who grew up during 
the banana boom ching the labour market at this point' in time. It is no 
wonder then that a deep-seated malaise in the society's management of its human 
resources was manifested in the social disturbances of the 1970s. 
In the same vein of ideas, David Wood calls attention to the fact that: 
"The trend in the level cf employment in Dominica 
has been aownwax as over the last 30 years (previous 
to 1976)5 (.c.) The decline in employment has been 
particularly noticeable since 1970 - the same period 
that witnessed a rapid growth in the number of young 
people joining the labour force"„308/ 
In 1970, there were is500 wholly unemployed workers. The figure in 1976 
increased to 4,700. 
Withdrawal from the labour force, a characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s, 
affected above all female workers; actually, the behaviour of the female labour 
force constitutes an latexes ting aspect of the evolution of the employment 
situation. Total female employment from 1946 to 1976 declined by 30 percent 
while male employment increased by 4 percent. Among the adult female 
population not at school» withdrawal from the labour force was particularly 
important for those of 25 years cf age and over. It may be noted, also follow-
ing Wood's indications, trial one is in fact observing the number of employed 
and not exactly the employment situation. Since, from 1960 to 1970, "only 
two-thirds of employed women and approximately three quarters of males in 
309 / 
employment worked 10 or more months a year".—— In other words, if one were 
to focus on the equivalent man-months spent at work by the employed, the 
"dramatic increase in unemployment levels" would have appeared even worse. 
"Female employment in agriculture fell by just under 
60 percent between 1946 and 1970s and male employment 
is slightly over 25 percent".310/ 
This drop in employment corresponds basically to a shift from agriculture to 
the services»Its expansion in the service seetor (trade, restaurants and 
307/ Ibid, p. 19. 
308/ Ibid, p. 9. 
309/ Ibid, p. 13c 
310/ JMeL-
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hotels, C.S.P. and financial services) was more noticeable for men; while employ-
ment in manufacturitg, construction, utilities and transport declined from the 
311/ 1940s to the 1970s - the decline being steeper for females. 
One must note then that whatever factors were affecting the workers in 
Dominica from 1946 onwards were of more serious consequences for the female 
labour force. The steep decline in the employment of women during the whole 
period, their retrenchment in the agricultural sector and the withdrawal from 
the labour force particularly those of child bearing age, have to be related 
to the subsequent arrival on the labour market of large numbers of young 
people during the 1970s. Now it so happens that the male youth raised by this 
generation of women severely affected by unemployment spearheaded the social 
disturbances of the 1970s, in particular the "dread resolution" as will be 
seen in the next chapter. At this level of our knowledge of the Dominican 
situation, one cannot draw any firm conclusion, but it is difficult not to 
pay attention to the global and unitary character of the social processes 
alluded to and to the challenges deriving for Caribbean social sciences. 
Wood offers the following explanation for the much more severe incidence 
of increasing unemployment in the female labour force: changes in crop patterns 
(less pickers of fruit were needed), changes in technology (weeders were 
replaced by the use of weedicide), changes in the composition of the capital 
(more intensive use of it), and changes in the utilization of the labour force 
(allotment of estate lands to tenants for production of banana instead of an 
increase in contract work). These several factors all point to a "saving" of 
the labour force. 
These changes in the utilization of the labour force are of consequence 
for this monograph, and a more detailed analysis will be attempted in the 
next chapter. It should be-noted en passant that work on the estates has 
evolved from pseudo-salaried relationships to the multiplication of pseudo-
independent farming. 
311/ The Credit for this analysis of the female labour force which is 
far from usual goes to David-Wood, not to the-author of this monograph. 
** C.S.P.-- Community, Social- and' Personal Services. 
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"(In the case of employment on estates) the reason 
for the decline in female employment has probably 
not been so much that the land has gone out of 
cultivation but that the crop pattern has shifted 
from citrus and spice (.....) towards small-holder 
banana production where the labour force tends to 
be predominantly male".312/ 
One is tempted to offer the following correction to the quotation: "where 
registered labour-force tends to be predominantly male". It appears that 
the new form of labour utilization - small-holder banana production - has 
forced working women to offer their services to the productive system as 
part of the family unit. If this assumption is correct, it is not surprising 
that a regression towards a dependent status, however mild, would tend to 
force the female labour force out of the labour market altogether. Moreover, 
the data on employment in agriculture seem to indicate that returns within 
this form of "small-holder banana production" was not sufficiently rewarding 
even to retain the male sector of the labour force. 
"The number of young men going into agriculture (...) 
fell by half over the period 1946-1970. In the 1950s 
the number of young men going into agriculture was 
roughly equal to the number of retirals from the 
working force. However, in the 1960s the new 
entrants fell short of the number of retiring by 
approximately 500. Additionally roughly 1,200 adult 
men withdrew (as opposed to retired) from the 
working force in agriculture in the 1960s. We 
suppose that many of these men will have migrated".313/ 
The aging of the labour force in agriculture may be evidence of the 
much celebrated negative attitude of youth towards this activity. But it 
is surely an indication of the impossibility for owner-operated (read 
father/mother operated) family farms to absorb new entrants (particularly 
unpaid or virtually unpaid family workers. It is a known fact that young 
adults - especially females - cannot demand a given level of remuneration 
within a Caribbean peasant venture, let alone could they aspire - as a 
right not a concession - to some participation in the farm's decision-
making process, irrespective of their level of qualification and experience. 
312/ Ibid, p. 16. 
313/ Ibid, p. 18. 
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Nonetheless, while this diseagagemen1r^0m~agriGHlturer as ;a.:.main source 
of employment is being observed, the involvement in-industry remains paradox-
ically unchanged: 
"Something like 18,900 persons of the working age of 
Dominica were classified by the Agricultural Census 
as being 'employed' in agriculture. However we estimate 
that only about one-third of this number work full-
time in agriculture or depend principally on agri-
culture as a source of livelihood. Thus most of the 
working force in Dominica (which we estimate at about 
20,000) have some involvement in agriculture. There 
are, in a sense, two occupational structures in 
Dominica, the structure of primary or main occupations 
- such as described by the Population Censuses, and 
also a structure of secondary occupations from which 
additonal income is derived and about which we know 
very little".314/ 
It is clear that the author is considering agriculture as an occupation 
and the two occupational structures referred to bring the reader back to the 
discovery of L. Comitas oh occupational multiplicity in the Caribbean. Since 
"most of the working force in Dominica, have some involvement in agriculture", 
one is justified in conceiving this society and its economy, as an export-
oriented peasant economy or society. Indeed a peasant society need not 
comprise only peasants, in the same way that a capitalist society is not 
composed of only capitalists. There is an underlying set of non-official 
and unseen institutions regulating this ever-present involvement in agri-
culture upon which rests the visible Dominica, the-everyday society string 
for modernization. It appears that will'be the challenge for future social 
studies on Dominica. It constitutes the economic infrastructure and pervades 
the whole society, its politics and its culture. 
314/ Ibid, p. 25. 
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XI 
PRESENCE AND DECLINE OF 
THE COUNTER-PLANTATION SYSTEM 
In Dominica, the economy being traditionally centred around agriculture 
causes the interplay of economic interests to gravitate towards the issue 
of land ownership and land use« These interests may be manifest in open 
conflicts, only if they meet on certain grounds and are forced to enter 
into some form of negotiations. The market is normally the arena where 
economic interests are arbitrated. In the case of Dominica, the output of 
the society is only of marginal interest for the world market. As a result 
many of the factors of production are allocated and managed according t: a 
rationale which also corresponds marginally to the principles of market 
economy; the output of the country reaches the world economy via different 
mechanisms and economic interests involved in this process are arbitrated 
outside of the market, namely in the sphere of political activity, 
In absence of a free enterprise economy and unless specific mechanisms 
are deliberately institutionalized to replace the interplay of market 
forces, the allocation of labour force to remunerative activities bears 
only incidental relations with the principle of competition. In these 
cases, inherited and/or ascribed positions are of far more important con-
sequences to the welfare of the individuals than their personal achievements. 
In consequence, the underpriviledged. of necessity have to seek refuge in some 
forms of subsistence and self-centred activities in order to survive, until 
they can obtain the necessary instruments of pressure which would enable them 
to offset the political impediments to institutionalized negotiations, especially 
free competition. This entails a major change in the organization of the society. 
In Dominica the attainment of universal suffrage in 1951 must be considered as 
a turning point setting in motion a whole process of transformation to be 
concluded. 
Meanwhile, the fluctuations of the world economy had limited consequences 
for the internal organization of the day to day activities of the population. 
The primary social unit - the family - encompassed both the privacy of the 
inhabitants and their economic production. In the absence of deliberate policies, 
the proportion of resources in manpower and available land dedicated to 
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subsistence economy, varied in the long run with the interest or lack of interest 
of the actors on the international market to impose the principles of market 
economy or to relieve the local productive system from the need to abide by such 
principles. 
Up to 1951 and within the circumstances being described, the focus of 
economic interest of the majority of the population was the production of food 
crops (and shelter) to meet the need of individual families. They would also 
have to produce a given surplus to be exchanged for capital and consume! gcods 
necessary for developing kitchen gardens which they had no cultural or material 
base to fabricate themselves. 
This kind of peasant economy has been typified in previous study on Haiti 
as a counter-plantation system to signify that the attempts of the peasantry to 
withdraw from gang-laboured plantation and to diversify its economy are seen 
alongside with its cultural practices. Language, family and kinship, and religion 
are presented among other institutions as distinct components of the counter-
315/ plantation system. 
As long as some land was made available through one or another form of 
tenancy, the potential conflicts between owners of estates and landless peasants 
could not easily surface, given the lack of institutionalized channel of political 
expression which framed social relations in the colonial setting. 
During nearly 200 years (1763-1951), there became institutionalized a workable 
arrangement between estate agriculture specializing basically in export goods, and 
small-scale farming dedicated mainly to domestic food crops. The distribution of 
land was skewed; but since large estates and mini-^farms-were put to different type 
316/ of uses the evolution of existing economic structures took place without any 
major social unrest. 
315/"Cf. Jean Casimir, La Gultura Oprimida, Mexico, Nueva Imagen, 1981. 
316/ In 1925, the striking feature in agriculture was the relatively large 
number of small scale farmers which existed (...) There is clear evidence here 
that the majority of farmers by then were operating on small acreages of land. 
The principal crops of small scale agriculture during the period 1900-1950 were 
mainly domestic food crops as against export cash crops in the case of estates, 




In any event, these conflicts would have been-related to the 
distribution of land resources and would, have been dealtwith in political 
317 / 
terms and not according to economic principles. Indeed, the country 
has been spared of so called riots and upheavals. Moreover, the lack of 
participation in the labour issues that:rocked the"Caribbean during the 
1930s is not unrelated to this peculiar mix of social interests and social 
forces. In fact the Dominican work-force was not employed, i.e. contracted, 
in agriculture. It occupied itself in agricultural endeavours, and had no 
patron with whom to quarrel. 
The introduction of bananas on. a. massive scale at the end of the 1940s 
brought about a fundamental change in the working arrangement referred to, 
by forcing the whole population to enter the market economy as consumers. 
The basic needs of the population for food and shelter did not change, but 
the possibility of satisfying these needs by the kitchen garden or through 
exchange of provisions so obtained; was gradually destroyed, as evidenced by 
the increase of import bill particularly relating to food. The extent of 
318 / these changes is quantified by Yankey's study of small scale farmers, 
The common denominator between commercial and. subsistence agriculture 
remains the absence of a labour market, and consequently the predominance of 
self-employed farmers in the productive system. The present quandry of this 
peculiar system is the entry of the labour force into the market economy as 
producers of commodity, i.e. as suppliers of labour force to be contracted. 
In other words, a system regulated beyond free competition for allocating 
resources and income has to be found and institutionalized. 
317/ As occurred in Castle Bruce, and Gran Bay in the 1970s. 
318/ Ibid, p. 59. "The study puts in evidence that in farms established 
before the Banana Boom, 68.7% of the farmers produced for subsistence at the 
beginning, while none of them did so after the boom. Of the farms established 
after the introduction of banana, only 3.4% were dedicated to subsistence crops 
during the first year of production, and logically none of them would do so in 
subsequent years". 
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Land and colonial.social policy 
In the Caribbean it would be difficult to find .a national motto - more 
319/ appropriate to the ethos of the people it addresses than "After God, the land". 
The devotion of the Dominicans to the land is probably an expression of a need 
to have access to the resource necessary for surviving in a milieu devoid of 
economic options outside agriculture and of the formidable efforts requested 
from nearly the totality of them to gain and. to secure this access. It should 
be understood that the policy of land distribution enacted by the British in 
pursuance of their colonial objectives was an instrument to-distribute the 
different social groups they found in the territory according to concrete 
patterns of social stratification. Such a policy was necessarily consistent 
with a given social philosophy and consequent strategies which in the final 
analysis was functional to the colonial relationship. Conversely, in the effort 
to extricate itself from bondage, i.e. in the national-building process, the 
population had gradually to create areas of self-expression and self-determination. 
An institutionalized system of land tenure and land use at variance with the 
objectives of the British and beyond their reach developed as a result of these 
attempts to overcome the stringencies of colonialism. 
It will be remembered that the Crown had established its ownership rights over 
the whole territory and only British subjects were allowed to acquire land in the 
country. "Adopted subjects" had to suffer much discrimination in this respect. 
Subsequently, in the nineteenth century as plantation agriculture failed to prosper 
in Dominica, estates owned.by expatriates were abandoned, and"an urban group, 
comprising basically.coloured Creoles, acquired these estates. 
It will also be remembered-that before emancipation small-scale farmers or 
peasant labourers were independent-blacks and maroons, "squatting'' - according to 
the colonial norms - on Crown lands. After emancipation and always in the context 
of an impossible development of the plantation system, other forms of'tenancy beside 
squatting, - share cropping,.tenant"farming and-even free-hold tenancy - added some 
variety in the rural setting; Up to 1950, however, the colonial state sponsored 
319/ The motto reads: . "Apre Bondie, c'est la ter". Honychurch translates 
"After God, the Earth". In his book the Dominican Story"(p.110) the concept 
earth seems far more removed from a peasant outlook, than that of land. 
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no specific land distribution scheme in favour of the rural masses. 
Reference to the workable arrangement in operation up to 1950 i.e. 
that the small scale farmers used to produce domestic foodcrops while the 
estate owners specialized in export crops, is an allusion to the fundamental 
dualistic character of the society. In the light of its land policy the 
Crown eliminated.the bulk of the population from the colonial political 
scenery by the establishment of a franchise. Hence ownership of large 
estates (i.e. legal access to lands originally owned by the Crown), 
cultivation and trading of export crops (i.e. participation in the international 
market economy) and exercise of political rights as well as access to all 
official institutions, were an integrated endowment"defining social dominance. 
Participation into the world economy through the exploitation of estate lands 
facilitated by the Crown was matched with participation into the world politics 
and culture through the politics and culture of the empire. Conversely 
subsistence economy, estate work, illiteracy and exposure only to local culture 
became the lot of the persons - the large majority - deprived from a voice in 
political matters. 
One may therefore quite safely suggest that the cleavage between land-
lords and peasants has been stable throughout the colonial history of Dominica 
and that it followed the lines established by the British. There is a definite 
continuity in the evolution of the dominant and dominated classes of the 
territory at least from the end of the Napoleonic wars up to 1951. 
In fact the whole social.system evolved around the issue of landownership 
and it is not.clear whether land is a tradeable commodity in Dominica. At least 
320/ J.A.N. Burra notes howevers "Crown land squatting is a fairly recent 
development. In 1915 permission was given to the people to cultivate Crown lands 
as an insurance against food shortage, which might be the result of shipping losses 
from "U" Bat attack. No record can be found of any proclamation giving permission, 
similarly permission was not withdrawn in 1918. As a result an entire generation 
has been allowed to practice shifting and permanent agriculture on Crown lands for 
almost forty years. Prior to 1914 bailiffs controlled illegal practices on Crown 
lands. The post was abolished in about 1915. Op. cit., p.13. 
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Its transfer frome one owner to another has to overcome such practical and 
institutional barriers, that one can hardly think in terms of a market of 
landed properties (outside of the urban areas). This difficulty for trans-
ferring land across class divisions cannot be overlooked. On the one hand, 
given the extreme dispersion of small plots, those eventually put to sale, 
could only be attractive to small scale farmers. Estate owners were rarely 
in a position to consolidate and expand their properties by acquiring land 
bordering their domain. On the other hand, as Yankey points out, it is very 
difficult to conceive the fractioning of large estates and their selling to a 
321/ myriad of small scale farmers. 
In economic analysis positing the maximization of profits as a universal 
goal, the collective ownership of land by an extended family, - the family 
property system, - is understandably dismissed as pernicious to rational allocation 
of resources. By rational allocation of resources is meant consistency with a t 
market economy. J. N. Burra states categorically that family land is the cause of 
322/ the greatest land waste in the island. : 
In 1966, the survey by Yankey of small scale farmers showed that 73% of small 
scale farmers interviewed occupied land under freehold system of ownership against 
27% of tenants. Among the freeholders, 33% were operating totally or partially on 
323/ land made available according to the family property system. As for the acreage 
distributed under this system, the same author found; 
321/ Ibid, p. 219 "(...) In the case of private lands which are mainly owned by 
large scale farmers, there are institutional barriers to the sale of such lands. 
These lands are mainly held as a hedge against economic uncertainty or as a means to 
gain prestige and to hold economic power in the community. When there are sales of 
land held by large scale farmers, the buyers are generally among landlords. 
Consequently the majority of the potentially productive lands which are unutilized 
are unavailable to existing and potentially small scale farmers." 
322/ Ibid.' 
323/ Op. cit.. p.181. 
-147 -
"From the total number of small scale farms established during 
two distinct periods of time,.1900-1948, - the period of 
subsistence small scale agriculture - and 1949-1966, the period 
which marked the commercialisation of small scale farms, 58 per 
cent and 42 per cent respectively of small scale farms were 
occupied under freehold system of ownership with customary 
rights (family lands) during both periods."324/ 
It would therefore seem that even though a minority of farmers (17%) operated 
exclusively on land belonging to their family, a sizeable proportion of land 
available for small farming happened to be family land, even after the 
distribution of Crown lands undertaken during the first half of the 1950s. 
Custom determines that the alienation of one's rights to a family land 
can only take place in favour of a member of one's own family. Small land 
owners are not free to dispose of their properties thus the entire community 
prevents a further concentration of land prejudicial to the population of 
small scale farmers. From a sociological point of view and irrespective of 
its implication for an increase in the economic output of the country, a 
perpetuation of the family property system indicates a basic attitude which, 
in fact, pervades the society as a whole. 
Taking into account the different forms of tenancy caused by the colonial 
policy of land distribution, together with the regular seasonal employment of 
small scale farmers on the estates, it follows that the dominant and dominated 
classes have been involved in a very peculiar system of social relations. To 
accompany the deployment of these forms of interaction, it must be kept in mind 
that in the colonial setting, oppression and resistance are inseparable. The 
frailty of Dominica's plantation system allowed more leeway to the development 
of a counter-plantation system; the traditional economic idleness of large 
portions of privately owned estates gave more room to collective administration 
of the family's assets. But plantation and counter-plantation, legal and 
customary ownership rights cannot be de-linked in the social fabric, except for 
analytical purposes. 
The underpriviledged were never completely subservient. On the one hand, 
they produced goods which they had to turn over to the landlords, who in turn 
distributed these goods on the external market; on the other hand, the rural 
population remained sufficiently autonomous to decide on the allocation of the 
324/ Ibid. 
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resources destined to satisfy its own needs. Besides, whileoperating within a 
super-imposed cultural-frame which regulated the exercise of pllitical power, the 
population preserved a sphere of knowledge expressed in a linguistic corpus under 
its exclusive control. - It administered in all sovereignty significant areas of 
family and.community relations, together with this sort of prolongation of family 
and community life constituted by multi-crop small scale agriculture. 
Both subservience-and-self-reliance, domination and liberation resulted from 
this peculiar mix of economic, political and cultural relations. Asymetric 
articulation with the economy of the metropolitan country and with the international 
market economy evolved without destroying, and even re-enforced the political isolation 
of the majority and their self-contained economic and social institutions. 
Finally, it would appear worthwhile to research the extent to which out-migration, 
endemic since the - nineteenth century, could be considered as an answer to the colonial 
strategies of development. Out-migration would be, in the same vein as the family 
property system, the subtraction from the basket of resources available to the local 
dominant economy, of a proportion which is subsequently located beyond the reach of the 
colonial authority. The principles regulating the amount and frequency of monetary 
remittances would then be seen as evidence of some unknown norms and values used by the 
community to ensure the loyalty of the migrants. These remittances would be in the 
same relation to the economic output of the society, as the produce of the multi-crop 
farm was in relation to the produce of the estates. The suggestion is the more 
appealing because small scale farming deriving originally from squatting on Crown lands 
and emigration have in common the seizure by the individuals of their freedom of 
movement. In both cases, the state in Dominica may take note of the events but it 
ca.aii.ot control tiieu directly, or reduce their occurrence by persuasive measures. 
The landlords and their estates 
J.A.B. Burra summarizes the social structure of Dominica in the 1950s by stating 
that the country was still attempting to function with a plantocracy and a peasant-labour« 
325 / system of society. This situation rests on deep historical roots and deep-seated 
vested interests. It is unnecessary to underline that the land reserved in the colonial 
325/ Op. cit., p.7. 
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policies of the.eighteenth century for the British subjects were the best 
lands of the island, 
"Through.public land distribution policies of that period 
(1763 to 1967) estate lands are lands of good quality. 
They are situated on the coast or the valley in land from 
them with access to road and sea systems of communication 
with:the market."326/ 
In 1961, the large scale farmers, established on properties of 100 acres 
and over, owned hardly more than 1 per cent of the total number of farms 
in the country. Yet they controlled an overwhelming proportion of the 
potentially productive land for agricultural development, approximately 
55%—( 
Farms occupying an area less than 100 acres represented 98.9% of the 
total number of farms and covered 46.6% of the total acreage of land in 
farm. Among these farms, a group of medium size farms - of more than 10 
acres and.less than 100 acres - represented 8.3% of the total of farms and 
an area of 22% of the land in farm. The power of the landlords may be 
visualized.by contrasting their estates to the area available to the 
multitude of mini-farms -.90% of all farms - of less than 10 acres in 
extent.. These mini-farms occupied an area less than 25% of the land in farm 
in the country. 
Yankey, who reports these data, adds that the skewed land distribution 
328 / worsened after the Banana Boom. J.M. Marie noted that, contrary to what 
is observed in many Caribbean countries, foreign ownership of land is not 
329 / particularly significant in Dominica, only 1% of the land in farm , 
In .Dominica, the landlords - do not seem to need the totality of their 
estates for productive agricultural undertakings. Yankey points out that 
"by 1960-1961, approximately fifty (50) per cent of lands in farms were in 
326/ Yankey, op,.cit., p. 111. 
327/ Ibid, p.216. 
328 Ibid, p. 111. 
329/ Estates owned by foreigners have nonetheless a size of 450 acres 
in average. (Watty Frank, "Alien Land Ownership and Agricultural Development 
Issues, Problems and the Policy Framework". Proceedings of the 5th West Indian 
Agricultural Economic Conference, 1970, quoted by J.M. Marie, op. cit., 
pp. 44-45). 
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330/ an unproductive state". According.to J.M„ Marie, 65% of the area occupied 
by large farms are not cultivated, against 49% of farms of 5 to 50 acres in 
331/ extent and 3% of farms of less than 1 acre in extent . 
It would have been possible to argue that the proportion of land allowed 
to lie fallow is in accordance with practice and technology at the time, if 
patterns of production on.large estates would evidence some superiority when 
compared to what obtains on intensively exploited small farms. Most observers 
choose to relate this waste of scarce resources to the negative attitude 
towards agriculture displayed by the landlords and the meaning of land ownership 
as an indicator of status. J.A.N. Burra states categoricallys 
"There is no alternative but to recommend the introduction of a 
land tax upon lands classed as Agriculturally productive which 
are unworked. The tax should be such as to either encourage 
idle and absentee landowners to work the land or to sell it."332/ 
J ,M>, Marie argues s 
- "Because ownership of large tracts of land is important in 
determining the social status and political influence of 
individuals in these (plantation) societies, there is a 
, tendency to invest in land beyond the managerial capacity 
of the family, with.the result that the rate of under-
utilization of land increases over time."333/ 
Although in Dominica land ownership is indeed linked with social and political 
preeminence, from the golden times of plantation economies in the eighteenth century 
to the contemporary world, there is no relation between the managerial capacity of 
landed families and the exploitation of their estates. Management was then and still 
is a commodity which is usually contracted by the owner of any given capital. Hence 
the psychology of the landlords does not really explain the derelict situation of 
agricultural land. It has been seen (Chapter III) that they were unable to attract 
the necessary capital resources to organise their economy otherwise. 
330/ Op. cit., p.215. 
331/ Op. cit.. p.44. 
332/ Op. cit..p.38. 
333/ Op. cit.. p.48. 
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J.M. Marie also underlines the fact that the shortage of labour, created 
by the land distribution scheme during the first half of the 1950s cannot be 
adduced to give account of the under-utilization of land resources. £le quotes 
a survey establishing that only a minority (14%) of large farms experienced 
labour shortage mainly of a seasonal nature. Moreover, the same survey 
indicates that workers have a preference for employment on large farms. 
Therefore these farms would normally be the last unit to suffer from shortage.-
In his analysis, Yankey notes that rural people in Dominica have two 
economic opportunities: to be full-time or part-time farmers, or to be full-
time or part-time agricultural workers. He observed between 1949 and 1966 a 
shift from wage employment to self-employment and concludes. 
"that there is a strong judgement by rural people for full-time 
or part-time farming and the problem of land scarcity in the 
future will arise as small scale farmers moved into poorer 
quality of land."335/ 
In the opinion of the same author, the increased demand for banana 
provoked an increased demans for land; the state replied to this by modifying 
its traditional land policy and making land available to actual and potential 
farmers; landlords proceeded to evict their tenants (1949) and once the 
predominance of bananas was established, offered again small plots to tenants. 
Yankey remarks, in the same line of Burra's observation in 1953, thats 
"The sale of Crown land has been considered slow and thus supply 
of land has not satisfied the demand for land. In view of that 
estate agriculture has provided small scale farmers with a source 
of private land for farming through the system of land tenancy."336/ 
Available studies are not sufficient to clarify the issue which emerges 
from these observations. Obviously around 1950 there was a re-allocation of 
productive factors. The difficulty resides in enquiring why among various 
alternatives of management of scarce resources, a specific one, - the land 
tenancy system - was favoured. Given the monopolization of the best lands by 
the landlords and their willingness to rent part of their estate to the 
underprivileged small scale farmers on the one hand; and given the high cost 
334/ Op. cit., p.46. 
335/ Op. cit., pp.217 and fol. 
336/ Ibid, p. 107. 
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of production of small scale farming on freehold land on the other hand, the case 
seems made for comparative studies to determine the relationship between the 
output and returns from tenant farms on good quality land and from freehold farms 
on marginal land. One fears that the profits the tenancy contract offers to the 
tenants are based on the average return obtainable from high cost cultivation on 
freehold farms on marginal lands. Should this be correct, the income of a land-
lord would grow higher as more expensive farming takes place on more and more 
inappropriate farmland. 
In fact nearly 20 years after the introduction of bananas on a massive 
scale, estates were exploited in a large measure through the use of tenant farmers: 
"From a sample survey of estate agriculture (sample contained 30 
per cent of the total population of estates) in 1967, approximately 
50 per cent were occupied by tenants with average size farms and 
number of tenants as listed below. 
i) 67 per cent were occupied by tenant farms under 1 acre in extent; 
ii) 33 per cent were occupied by tenant farms of 1 to 5 acres, in extent'.' 
The number of tenants occupied on the estates of the sample survey was distributed 
according to the following percentages: 
"iii) 46 per cent were occupied by 1 to 10 tenants; 
iv) 40 per cent were occupied by 11 to 50 tenants 
337/ v) 14 per cent were occupied by 51 and over tenants." 
The system of land tenancy for absorbing labour force has a three-fold advantage. 
It allows the eventual use of the labour force of the entire family of the tenants, 
without the intervention of an employer, i.e. with no potential conflicts typical 
of industrial relations. Besides, it provides the country with a sort of 
"landed proletariat", aggregated by family units, each one of them facing the 
landlord in isolation. Finally negotiations are maintained within the political 
arena, since thè position of the landlords derives from their ownership rights and 
bears no relationship to their economic achievements. In a colonial setting, it is 
socially less onerous to enforce law and order than to abide by the principles of 
free enterprise, since these principles are endowed with a dynamic of change 
subversive of colonial economic management. 
337/ Op. cit..p.110. 
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In any event, the evidence at hand shows that the landlords are few, 
they are not foreigners, they control most of the land suitable for 
farming, half of them exploit this land through tenants, and they leave 
idle most of their estates. One suspects that, instead of putting all 
their estates to cultivation, they have a vested interest in fostering at 
national levels, the development of uneconomical owner-operated farms. 
This would allow the fixation of returns acceptable to tenants at lower 
and lower levels, while increasing the cost of the tenancy contract, i.e. 
the price paid to the landlords. For such a mechanism to operate, available 
land must be made scarce. This scarcity seems to be achieved by using one's 
property rights to keep idle large proportions of privately owned estates. 
It will be shown subsequently that the constant variations in the sheltered 
prices of bananas and their general tendency to decline, have caused profits 
to originate in the expansion of trade and not of production proper. 
Qrnjal 1 Cool « Uo^mi nrr v TOÎ-IIJ- T.T/̂-fV 
The Caribbean society is best considered as a counter-plantation system 
in order to underline that its creation and development have taken place 
within and in opposition to the dominant plantation system. It is implied in 
this line of reflexion that the opposition between these two forms of 
production may also be viewed as a structural arrangement, which defines the 
338 / 
classes involved and which individuals are not free to modify. The present 
chapter looks into the dynamics of this binary societal arrangement within the 
circumstances of Dominica. 
One may recall that enslavement of the population in Dominica plantation 
economy was accompanied in many instances with the authorization granted to 
the captives to use small plots of land as kitchen gardens or provision grounds. 
Then, after emancipation, these peasants in embryo, as tenants and sometimes 
outright freeholders, together with the former maroons established themselves on 
the fringe of the area occupied by the estate. While taking care of their 
gardens, they sought seasonal employment in the production of export commodities, 
whenever estate agriculture embarked on such ventures. 
338/ For an elaboration on the implications of this arrangement for economic 
analyses, see Eric B.A. St. Cyr, "Some Fundamentals in the Theory of Caribbean-Type 
Economy" Dept. of Economics, U.W.I., St. Augustine, June 1983, (mjmeo). 
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Dominican peasants therefore have always worked frontier lands. At present 
the situation is the same. Yankey notes that these small farms are located "in 
remote areas, often accessible only by rough tracks over difficult terrain". 
Moreover a small farmer nowadays usually operates several farms, with severe 
3 3 9 / 
consequences for its labour time wasted walking along mountain trails. 
To the adverse consequences due to small size and dispersion, one must add the 
fact alluded to previously, that land available to small scale farming is 
generally of the worst quality. 
It follows, when one comes to focus on the production of bananas, that: 
"Banana productivities have been low in Dominica in comparison 
to that of foreign competitors on the world market. (...) With 
total production increasing at relatively low levels of 
productivity, this suggests that growth in agriculture, so far, 
has been made possible mainly through the cultivation of more 
lands in export crops, particularly bananas".340/ 
In Dominica approximately 52% of the farm acreage is cultivated in bananas. 
Small scale farmers have produced most of the crop, since the beginning of the 
boom, in spite of their minority share in the total cultivable land, j 
"By the end of 1952 (...) almost 60% of the output of bananas 
for export comes from peasants, and possibly half of this is 
from :squatted land."341/ 
J.M. Marie witnesses the same situation in the 1960s: 
"Production of bananas in major producing and exporting countries 
is primarily undertaken by large farm, units, but in Dominica the 
growth of the industry was due principally to the activity of the 
small farmers. According to the West Indies Census of Agriculture 
of 1961, farms of 24 acres and under had 62 per cent of the 
banana stools while farms of 100 acres and above had only 28.7 
per cent of the stools on the island."342/ 
339/ "Approximately 57 per cent of the small scale farmers interviewed in 
1966 (...) occupied more than one plot of land for agricultural production. 
Because of :the distances which are travelled by small scale farmers from one 
plot of land to the other, a high proportion of time and effort of small scale 
farmers which could have been spent in productive activities on the farm is lost 
by so doing1in the process of farming." Yankey, op. cit. p.177. 
340/ Ibid, p.52. 
341/ 4-A.N. Burra, Report on Land Administration in Dominica,.p.26.. 
342/ Op. cit., p. 19. 
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The situation may have deteriorated if the tendency of small farms to grow 
smaller and smaller remained unchanged: 
"The absolute number of farms of all sizes increased by 
approximately 17 per cent between 1946-1958. However 
the mmber of farms between 1-5 acres in extent increased 
by 37 per cent whilst the acreage increased only 10 per 
cent."343/ 
It is no wonder therefore that Dominica is a high cost producer of 
bananas. Since the self-employed small scale farmer is working on marginal 
lands and since the degree of protectionism on the external market has been 
decreasing from 1955 onwards up to the point that only the purchase and not 
the price of bananas is guaranteed (as shown in the previous chapter) one 
would find it very difficult to understand what is preventing the total 
collapse of this high cost producing sector, if attention is not paid to 
the local relations of production. 
As usual the income generated by the peasant/farmer is smaller than that 
of any category of individuals engaged in the industry. From the data 
presented by J.M. Marie, it can be seen that the average net return per acre 
per year being U.S.$41.00 and 75% of the farmers operating exploitations in 
the bracket of less than 5 acres, their annual income does not exceed 
$200.00. A grower receives approximately 14% of the FOB cost of a metric 
ton of banana. The exporter on the contrary is paid 20% of this cost, 
344 / according to a report of FAO quoted by J.M. Marie. Following the same 
source, the economist notes that the cost of production of bananas before 
harvesting is imputable in more than 60% to imported' inputs such as 
fertilizers, materials, plant protection, and only in 39% to labour. 
The level of income of the majority of banana growers is sufficiently 
low to create some concern, since the welfare of the society as a wfyole is 
343/ Yankey, op. cit., p.31. 
344/ FAO, World Banana Economy, Rome 1971, p.42. 
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closely related to the quality of life of its single largest group of 
production workers. Vasantha Narendran of CARDI proposes: 
"The approach to the pricing of bananas of the small farmer seems 
to be the source of the evil. All other agencies that operate in 
the banana industry are in a position to negotiate and obtain 
adequate remuneration. The farmer, on the other hand, is in no 
position to negotiate prices and receives only what remains."345/ 
There is indeed an issue one cannot overlook: why a high cost producing 
country is expanding its production by opening marginal lands, when the best 
ones remain idle? It is important to underline that part of the problem 
resides in the mechanism through which new technology and innovations in 
general are injected into the production of the fruit without involving the 
growers as a distinct interest group. The point can be made by focusing_ 
the range of action of the various agencies operating in the industry - At 
this moment of the analysis it is more appropriate to determine the nature of 
the insertion of the small scale farmer into the banana industry. 
In 1978, Wood discussing the structure of employment by occupation noted 
that changes in employment reflect those occuring in the overall industrial 
structure of the country. 
"One sees a decline in the numbers engaged in agricultural occupations 
while employment in production* and related occupations has remained 
fairly constant. The main growth occupations have been in the 
professional and technical, clerical and sale worker groups reflecting, 
once more, the increase which has taken place in employment, in the 
service sector."346/ 
If the analyst is correct, a. fundamental change is in process in Dominica. 
While the country is reaching the frontier of agricultural land, agriculture as 
such threatens to disappear from the industrial structure of the country as an 
independent primary sector and the farmer to be absorbed as an artisan attached 
to the commercial subsector. An industry is a branch of activity which can grow 
towards more and more complexity due to its internal dynamics. It is often 
assumed that in a market economy this dynamics is derived from a tension between 
capital and labour. As labour strives for better remuneration, capital moves 
towards more sophistication, eliminates unnecessary manual labour and at the same 
time absorbs more qualified manpower. In the process, technicians and professionals 
345/ V. Narendran, "Socio-economic Survey cf Dominica Small Farms", Dominica 
CARDI, 1981, mimeo. p.17. 
'346/ David Wood, "The Manpower Situation in Dominica 1946-1976" National 
Planning Organisation, Roseau, August 1978, p.21 (mimeo). 
* Excluding agricultural workers. 
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find more and more relevant roles in the industry, which gradually becomes 
highly technological and scientific. 
It is quite obvious that this process could not take place in the 
Dominican setting, since capital tends to be administered, as will be 
seen subsequently, by the Dominica Banana Growers Association, while the 
farmer remained responsible for the allocation of labour time. Therefore 
science and technology reach the farm through the good offices of the 
Banana Association and not through the deliberate decisions of productive 
enterprises. 
Since most bananas are produced by the self-employed working on 
minuscule plots, there is no room in the process of agricultural production 
£ 4 ~ r ~ ~ U „,* T „ „ „ ~ ~ —' ~ _ - 1 „ c: • 1— 1 
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accumulation. Hence the structure of employment described by Wood. The 
small holder behaves like a seamstress contracted by the confection industry. 
The dynamism of the confection industry does not reside with the seamstress 
and there is no possible avenue for individuals involved in such trades tc 
keep abreast of modern developments, let alone initiate them. 
It must be mentioned en passant that it cannot be surprising that the 
"seamstrees-like farmer" tends to withdraw from banana production and that 
qualified or at least literate youth prefer to choose other professions. 
This trend obviously makes it even more difficult to change the tendency to 
produce banana at higher and higher costs. Agricultural production in this 
sub-sector is thus converted into a trade rapidly becoming obsolete and 
reserved for senior citizens. To make matters worse, note must be taken of 
the fact that the firm "contracting" the "seamstress-like farmer" is not a 
fabric or a manufacture but a commercial undertaking, monopolising the export 
of bananas and the import of inputs (fertilizers, materials for plant 
protection, pesticides). 
In the present circumstances characterised by the demise of domestic food 
production, the insertion of the peasant of self-employed farmer in agricultural 
production is transformed. Yankey notes pertinently; 
"(...) an export crop can provide a remunerative alternative to 
food production beyond that necessary to feed the family. This 
is because a guaranteed market for farm products provides the 
opportunity for higher expected incomes to meet basic needs and 
growing aspirations of rural people as they entered into a broad 
market economy."347/ 
347/ Op, cit., p.60. 
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The entrance of the small-scale farmer into "the broad market economy" 
modifies the structures for satisfying the basic needs of the rural population 
as well as their aspirations. One must, however, look closely at this 
"revolution of aspirations" when it is anti-economical. Basic needs for food 
were previously met on garden plots and/or exchange of surpluses produced, 
within a peasant economy, that is to say within a peculiar arrangement of 
productive factors whereby land and labour were more relevant than monetary 
capital. Nowadays, the export crop ensures the acquisition of hard currency 
which is in turn used to meet the high bills for imported food. It would seem 
that the policy measures protecting banana production tends to increase the 
inflexibility of the present arrangement, making it more and more difficult 
for the small producers to retreat towards multi-crop farming. 
The problem is not to rediscover that in principle market economy must 
destroy and absorb peasant subsistence farming, but to identify the concrete 
socio-economic mechanisms which, in the case of Dominica, have resulted in 
checkmating the self-reliant satisfaction of basic needs for food. For, as 
Yankey states: 
"The increasing export of bananas (...) and the decreasing quantities 
of food supplies - root crops, vegetables and fruits available on the 
domestic market, indicates the trend towards an expanding export 
agriculture and a declining domestic agriculture. It is evident 
that the forces which made for growth of export agriculture - expert 
market demands and organized marketing arrangements - did not have the 
same effect on the production of the staple foods and vegetables."348/ 
This seems an important enough issue for empirical research. The hard fact 
is that the small-scale farmer is increasingly cornered in a position where he 
has to depend more and more on his production of an export commodity in order to 
acquire larger and larger proportions of consumer goods necessary for his 
349 / 
survival and reproduction. Several social mechanisms have been operating 
to avoid thisvaried production circulating on the market and above all making 
it economically irrational to distribute anything but export crops. 
348/ Op. cit., p.55. 
349/ Including legal impediments, as discussed in the next section. 
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In recapitulating, one observes that: 1) alternative productive choices 
for the small-scale farmer are disappearing rapidly; 2) the small-scale farmer 
does not negotiate the price of his produce on the market; and 3) he does not 
negotiate the price of inputs into his main line of production. He therefore 
receives at the end of a productive cycle an income which indeed ceases to be 
of the same nature of that of a self-employed entrepreneur. 
It has been seen that mini-farmers and the landless have always been 
available for piece-work on larger estates. Obviously, as for any other worker, 
pay is due if the tasks one is hired for are fulfilled. Parallel to the 
retreat of multi-crop farming, the area of autonomous decision making of the 
small farmer has decreased. He is less and less in a position to allocate freely 
any significant resources at his disposal and he has to specialize increasingly 
in the production of bananas, according to a function-production dictated by the 
Banana Association. It follows then that the dominant mechanism to absorb 
labour force in the Dominica banana production should be conceived as a develop-
ment ad absurdum of traditional piece or task work, whereby the labourer is paid 
for the task he is contracted for, irrespective of the time he and/or his family 
invest in completing the contracted work. The novel and aggravating circumstance, 
unknown to the traditional plantation worker, is the apparently inescapable need 
to purchase larger proportions of food on the market of imported goods. One 
comes back to the concept of a "seamstress-like farmer" and of agricultural pro-
duction as an obsolete trade, subsumed within the commercial activities. 
A substitute to market relations 
In 1934, a Banana Association was created to organize the gathering of the 
fruit in order to profit from contracted arrangements with transnational marketing 
agents. The Dominica Banana Growers Association (DBGA) is an enterprise distinct 
from the farms administered by the growers and in which these growers may or may 
not have participation. Article 3 (1) of the Banana Ordinance of December 1961 
states that the DBGA 
"shall be invested with the authority in accordance with the 
provision of this Ordinance to rehabilitate banana plantations 
and stimulate production, to market and control the disposal of 
all bananas produced in the colony of Dominica and intended to 
be exported therefrom and in addition to control the disposal 
of all bananas not intended for export but intended to be used 
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either wholly or partially as an ingredient in any manufactured 
product and to have the general management and control over all 
matters relating to banana disease throughout the colony." 350/ 
There is general agreement, since the Watts Report of 1925 that given the 
large number of producers of bananas the Association was necessary to take 
advantage of opportunities on the external market. For instance J.M. Marie 
proposes in 1979: 
"Because of the large number of farmers involved in the banana 
industry, it was essential that they were organised to take 
advantage of the contract (...) . With the advent of the contract 
the Association became the primary agent directing and influencing 
the course of development of the banana industry in Dominica. 
(...) The Association was primarily concerned with the marketing 
of bananas."35T7! 
The Banana Act goes further and implies that there is need for this special 
type of firm if the product is to leave the sphere where the surpluses obtained 
from the kitchen gardens normally circulate. It places the production of bananas 
for both export and local industrialisation under the control of the Association. 
Article 3 (1) of the Ordinance institutionalized the separation of two markets: 
a market for domestic agricultural food products seen as a prolongation of peasant 
subsistence economy, and a market for commercial agriculture viewed as a prolonga-
tion of the worldwide market. The Banana Association is created as a linkage 
mechanism between the two systems of production/consumption. 
In fact, this Article served to destroy any possibility for the kitchen 
gardens to compete with each other in satisfying even a local industrial demand 
for the fruit; and by so doing, made it impossible for small-scale agriculture to 
evolve into a modern system of farming. While the total production of bananas was 
being stimulated by the interplay of market principles, the output of individual 
producers was being kept away from any influence of the principle of competition. 
350/i The Laws of Dominica in force on the 31st. Day of December,.1961 
Chapter 75, Banana, part 11, art. 3 (1). 
351/ Op. cit., p. 18, our emphasis. 
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By legislative decree, the operators of kitchen gardens were being denied 
access to any economic achievements imputable to their own and self-reliant 
industry. By placing the DBGA between the agricultural producers and the 
eventual development of an agro-industry related to the sub-sector, the 
latter alternative was being cancelled once and for all. For an agro-
industry to transform part of Dominica banana production, it would have to 
produce higher returns and with less risks than what was readily available 
through contract arrangements with the transnational marketing agents, 
Therefore the unforeseen consequence of Article 3 (1) was to ensure that the 
administration of the total output of bananas would always have the upper hand 
over the delivery of the output, or in other words, to ensure that merchants 
would always have precedence over agricultural or industrial producers. 
It should be noted en passant that even though attention is focused 
here on the class relations deriving from these economic facts, it must be 
kept in mind that at the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that the 
Dominican society is a binary arrangement of two structures asymmetrically 
related on social, political and cultural grounds. The advent of bananas is 
cautiously adding an economic bridge between these two worlds without 
affecting the inherited asymmetry. 
The "monopoly" on commercial bananas enjoyed by the DBGA cannot be 
treated as a position achieved by eliminating less endowed competitors. 
Moreover, and contrary to normal monopolistic profit seeking, the relations 
between price and volume of transactions are non existent in the collection 
of bananas for market operations. In the same way that the term "monopoly" 
creates much confusion, words commonly related to this concept and used to 
refer to the transactions between the Association and the growers obscur 
the nature of these transactions. In the Act itself, reference is made to 
the "seller" of bananas and qualification for membership to the Association 
is based on the transference - presumably against payment - of ownership 
rights on certain quantities of bananas to the Association. But the Asso-
ciation does not actually "buy" the island production for "resale". This 
impression which is conveyed in most reports is an illusion. 
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The Association "controls the disposal of all bananas". Between the delivery 
of bananas to the Association and payment to the owner for the goods comes an 
important intermediate step: the very alienation of such goods in favour of a 
third person. It will be readily apparent that the owners of the merchandise 
or of the factors of production used in its production cannot withdraw from the 
transaction in the case where the price offered for the alienation of their 
property rights does not satisfy them. One is not even observing the case of a 
monopsony; and payment made to growers and "sellers" of bananas is anything but 
a market price as will be illustrated= It bears more relations with the cost 
allocation within, division of large enterprises. On this basis, the Banana Act 
can be viewed as a decision of parliament to cancel the principles of market 
economy in the production and internal circulation of commercial bananas. 
Payments for the total output of bananas are cauculated on the basis of the 
so-called Green.Market Price (GMP), that is to say the price of bananas delivered 
to ripeners.in the United Kingdom, minus the contract costs of the marketing agent 
(Geest W.I.,.Ltd.). This payment to the Association is known as the Basic Price. 
The Association, .in. turn, deducts from the Basic Prices its current expenses, 
namely: administrative expenses, packing and internal transportation, leafspot 
control, fertilizers advanced to growers, other credits and their supervision, and 
various other contributions, most important among the costs of an insurance scheme. 
What is left constitutes the payment to the grower. 
While the grower's farm is legally an enterprise distinct from the Association, 
the grower-does not complete his cycle of production until the bananas have reached 
the United Kingdom marketo Therefore the activities of both the Association and 
Geest W.I.,.Ltd. are part of his cycle of production. Transferences of value from 
the farm to the.Association and to Geest, and vice versa, are not regulated by 
price mechanisms, but by agreements between the parties involved in the process of 
"disposing" of the product. 
It is evident, on the one hand, that the Association faces no risks and that 
its activities can hardly be classified as entrepreneurial undertakings. It is also 
clear, on the other hand, that the grower has to cope with so many uncontrollable 
variables that at the end of a given productive cycle he may end up owing money to 
the local and the international intermediaries. To prevent the occurrence of such 
situations which would simply force marketing agents out of business and oblige 
growers to revert to multi-crop cultivation, several measures have been designed and 
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were referred to in the previous chapter. This set of measures represent the 
degree of "protection" to the banana industry granted by the Government of 
the United Kingdom. 
The reason for the Government of the United Kingdom protecting the 
trading of Dominica banana needs not be researched in the present study which 
is not centred on the international relations of the island. The interesting 
point to clarify is the nature of the Dominica Banana Growers Association as 
a "body corporate" responsible for the trade and for maintaining in operation 
the source of the trade. The history .of the Dominica Banana Association, which 
celebrates 50 years of existence in the months to come, would indeed be an 
excellent subject matter for research in Caribbean institution-building. 
A historical perspective allows the observer to search beyond the formal 
characteristics of the Association, and to give account for its shortcomings. 
"The marketing of bananas is highly organized. The Association 
and the purchasing company through the mechanism of the marketing 
contract, combining to provide.all the elements of a good marketing 
system. These include shipping, internal transportation, market 
information, the reconciliation of price and quality with only part 
of the internal transportation being the responsibility of the 
individual farmer. (...) Two of themajor problems facing the banana 
industry are the quality of the fruit and the high cost of 
production. The Association has been actively seeking ways to , 
reduce cost of production and increase the quality of the output". 
While taking note of the formal characteristics of the Association, as well as 
its aims and objectives, one must address the net results of its actions. 
353/ 
In this endeavour, two reports requested by the Government of Dominica, -
one during colonial times, the second after independence, - put in evidence 
certain recurrent results, which may or may not be acceptable from 
administrative and legal points of view, but which, in a sociological analysis, 
have to be considered as a normal behaviour precisely because they were 
recurrent. These reports will be presented in turn. 
352/ J'.M. Marie, op. cit., p.56. 
353/ Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Conduct of the Operations 
of the Board of Management of the Dominica Banana. Association,.August.1958,.mimeo. 
The document will be referred to by the name of the Commission Chairman, 
R. Milton Cato. An Evaluation Report of the Dominica Banana.Industry,.Government 
of Dominica, 1981, mimeo,, The Report was produced by a Task Force chaired by 
Dr. J. Bernard Yankey. It will be referred to as the Evaluation Report. 
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The Dominica Banana Association was created as an association of merchants. 
It maintained this characteristic, during twenty years. Up to 1952, it had less 
than 80 members, 75% of them.residing in Roseau or nearby. After 1949, with the 
expansion of banana cultivation^ participation in the industry suffered important 
modifications.which called for a change in thé structure of the institution. 
Gradually, the membership of the Association increased and at the same time 
Roseau, the capital of the country, lost some of its preeminence vis-à-vis 
the Northern District which delivered 60% of the fruit exported to the United 
Kingdom between.1954 and 1958. In 1958, the Association comprised 1,537 members, 
of whom 1,106 were from the north and 431 from the south. It "would appear at 
first glance that the growers had gained preeminence over the merchants who had 
founded the Association. 
A class conflict developed between growers and merchants but was slightly 
obscured by the.fact.that merchants, as any other Dominicans, also had interest 
in agriculture.as landlords. The 1958 Milton Cato Commission of Enquiry into the 
Conduct of the Operations -of the Board of Management of the Dominica Banana 
Associated depicted the situation as an open "war" between sections of. the Board 
of Management of the Association. 
"The division is generally agreed to be one of the Northern district 
against the Southern,district. We have been able to trace this 
division to certain principal causes, viz;-
1. The resentment of certain members to the agitation (...) 
to enlarge the membership of the Association, and to 
break up the monopoly which was being enjoyed by a few 
members from the South who were elected to the Board of 
Management from year to year and most of whom controlled 
the buying of bananas for their private profit. 
2. The complete lack of land communications between the 
Northern District and Roseau, coupled with a deliberate 
neglect by the Roseau-office to keep any form of liaison 
with the North.(...) 
3. The complete disregard by the Board for the contribution 
the North was making towârds the industry, and their 
failure to make some provision for representation on the 
Association and on the Board for the Northern growers."354/ 
While the Cato Commission of Enquiry defined the members of the Board of Management 
from the South as persons "controlling the buying of bananas for their private profit", 
354/ The Milton Cato Report, pp.2-3. 
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the most vocal representative of the growers from the Northern District 
described them in a Memorandum to the Commission as "a class of old 
members a few of whom were engaged in the buying of bananas from growers 
and selling over to the Association as their own produce". They were also 
355 / described as "some members of the ruling class". 
One can immediately foresee from these words that the.Gonflict Implied 
a challenge to the ruling class. It evolved and was solved in political 
terms. Actually the representative of the Northern growers referred to 
356/ 
earlier was a member of the Legislature, and since the franchise was 
abolished and universal suffrage enforced from 1951 onwards, it may be 
said that changes in the organisation of the banana industry were 
concomittant with a reformulation of the country's political system. 
The first steps taken by the Northern growers to have the Association 
function in their interests were the securing of a majority on the Board of 
Management in 1953 and directing the Executive Secretary of the Association 
to carry out measures consistent with such interests. The Executive 
Secretary ignored these decisions and consequently procedures for his 
dismissal "for dereliction of duty and gross insubordination" initiated. 
By 1957, the Board had endorsed the recommendation to dismiss him. However, 
since the Secretary of the Association "holds his appointment at the 
pleasure of the Governor in Council", no action followed this decision in 
view of the opposition of the Governor. 
In the meantime, the Roseau-based merchants initiated a counter-
offensive to prevent the Northern growers from gaining control of the 
Association. Legislation was passed dividing the country into two zones 
allocating to each zone three representatives on the Board of Management. 
Those with the nominees representing the government would have maintained the 
dominance of the commerce of Roseau in the affairs of the Association. 
Three elements can be noted in these exchanges: first, a distance between 
the Banana Association and its members; second, some degree of autonomy enjoyed 
355/ Ibid. App.2, p.l. 
356/ V.J. Francis Mourillon, The Dominica Banana Industry from Inception 
to Independence, 1928-1978, Tropical Printers Ltd., W.I., p.18. 
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by the administration of the Association vi§-a*vis the Board of Management and 
sanctioned by the colonial government; and third, the use of legislative power 
to perpetuate the economic privileges of the élite. 
In the first instance, since there was no real economic criteria for 
discrimination, a political decision established a bias in favour of the merchant 
class in the original qualifications requested for membership in the Association 
and its Board of Management. The Commission of Enquiry noted that: 
"All owners of one hundred banana stools or sellers of not less 
than fifty stems of bananas per annum are eligible for membership 
of the Association, but the qualification of a member for election 
to the Board shall be the sale of not less than two hundred stems 
of bananas within a period of 12 months immediately preceding the 
date of election."357/ 
The Commission of Enquiry recommended - and government subsequently endorsed the 
recommendation - to equâte qualifications for membership to the Association and 
to its Board. 
In the second case, it so happens that the government participates on the 
Board of the Association. Moreover, the officers of the Association held office 
at the pleasure of the Governor of the Colony. The Commission of Enquiry found it 
out of place that the colonial government intervenes to such an extent in the 
administration of the industry. 
Finally, the Commission of Enquiry clearly suggested that steps taken to 
safeguard the vested interests of the established élite were irrational. 
"We find it difficult to understand why resort had to be taken to 
special legislation for this purpose since had the growers in 
Zone B (the South) been sufficiently interested and responsible 
they could have joined the Association and ensured that their 
point of view was well represented and respected."358/ 
The character of the Association as an interest group using basically political 
influence to secure economic privileges, and its collusion with the colonial 
government are further evidenced by the mismanagement of funds in contracting and 
357/ The Milton Cato Report, p.4. 
358/ Ibid. s 
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promoting employees of the Association, buying and transporting bananas 
from the growers, purchasing and selling fertilizers, implementing capital 
investments, and operating pest control schemes. The findings of the 
Commission were damaging for both the administrative staff and the Government, 
and cases of downright theft of Association funds were recorded. With respect 
to the Management of the Association, the Commission noted in one instance: 
"At the end of 1975 debts owing by buyers amounted to 32,082,56 
in the North and 9,979 in the south, (...) A large percentage of 
the above sums were 'lost' in circumstances which warranted 
criminal action and it is regretted that the persons responsible 
1 did not see fit to initiate such action."359/ 
As for the part played by the Government in the crises, the Commission 
concluded with severity: 
"We were astonished to find that in spite of the clearly 
unsatisfactory state of the Association's affairs Government 
abandoned its responsibility for carrying out the Association's 
Audit without ensuring that any alternative arrangements were 
made. 
It is no wonder that in these circumstances the accounting system 
broke down completely and that certain members of the staff left 
as they were without proper supervision performed their duties in 
the most unsatisfactory manner. 
We would like to point out that during the period under review 
various Government Officers were ex-officio members of the Board 
but these officers took little or no steps to influence the Board 
members nor to bring forcibly to Government's notice the chaotic 
state of affairs."360/ 
It seems evident that the cleavage between production and marketing, or 
in terms of the present analysis, between the-interests of the growers and 
merchants, were solved at this juncture by the Cato Commission of Enquiry, the 
recommendations of which were subsequently embodied in "An Ordinance to 
Regulate the Production and Marketing of Bananas, 18 June 1959." A clash of 
economic interests emerged and was solved through the interplay of political 
force's and arbitration as economic negotiations were hardly useful in the 
process. It was a discussion on the need to abide by economic obligations -
which is a matter of acknowledged rights and commitments - not the give and 
take which characterises the arbitration of economic interests. 
359/ Ibid., p.14. 
360/ Ibid., p.3. 
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These conflicts did not involve the agricultural workers and their quality 
of life» The Dominica Trade Union (DTU) tabled a memorandum, but the summary 
of recommendations by the Commission contained no reference to the plea of the 
plantation workers. These workers had not initiated the conflict and whether 
they were concerned or not, they played no active part in its evolution and 
solution. 
Moreover, small scale farmers as such did not seem to be concerned» The 
class conflict opposed merchants and growers and more specifically Roseau-based 
merchants and Northern growers. This fact calls for some elaboration. Indeed 
following the observations of Yankey one may accept that increased demand for 
bananas triggered a demand for land which was partly satisfied by distributing 
Crown properties to small farmers. It must be underlined however that the land 
so distributed was far from being of the appropriate quality for banana production. 
One may also observe that the élite of the country, Northern growers and 
Southern merchants alike, did not seem overly committed to increasing the production 
of bananas. Influential growers and rich merchants had not used their profits to 
invest in their own estates, nor their influence to enact legislation promoting 
banana production. Considerable areas of large private properties remained 
uncultivated. 
J.A.N. Burra reporting on Land Administration recommended without much success: 
"There is no alternative but to recommend the introduction of a 
land tax upon lands classed as Agriculturally productive which 
are unworked. The tax should be such as either to encourage idle 
and absentee landowners to work the land or to sell it."361/ 
Therefore, even though a reading of the Milton Cato Commission of Enquiry Report 
reveals a class conflict between growers and merchants, it does not seem that the 
growers opposed the merchants for the sake of their interests as producers. A 
closer look at the crises faced by the industry, indicates that there was more interest 
in controlling the Association than in increasing the production of bananas to take 
advantage of favourable marketing circumstances when they existed. 
The logical conclusion would be that a sheltered market for banana did not 
primarily induce the élite to produce and sell more bananas, but to exercise more 
361/ Op. cit., p.38. 
330/ 
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control in the sale of bananas. Higher returns were obtained not from the 
export trade as such, but from tighter controls on trans-actions. In this 
event the issue of low or high cost of production of the fruit became a 
secondary matter and consequently the suggestion by J.A.N. Burra to tax 
idle land missed the point and feel into oblivion. 
If the growers who had provoked the crises in the industry during the 
1950s were more interested in rationalizing the support services to the 
industry than in using appropriate land to expand the productive system, it 
follows that more returns must have been generated in these services than 
in production. The Association, having initiated its activity as a commercial 
concern, remained geared towards maximizing exports and imports (of inputs 
for the industry). Hence the growers, by challenging the Roseau-based merchants, 
were simply aiming at securing part of the profits to be derived from the 
export-import trade, returns from local production per se being insignificant 
if not lnexistent. 
This explanation is corroborated by the fact that some major recommendations 
of the Cato Commission are still outstanding issues. The Commission proposed to 
solve open North-South war by creating District Branches in order to foster the 
involvement of all growers. It in fact changed the very name of the Association 
from Dominica Banana Association (DBA) to Dominica Banana Growers Association 
(DBGA). 
"We feel that the restrictions imposed by this system of zoning 
will tend to perpetuate the very undesirable rift which at 
present exists between the North and the South and we recommend 
that the Board undertakes to establish District Branches through-
out the island. These Branches should be established in every 
area where there is a sufficient membership to warrant the 
formation of a Branch which will be entitled to send a specific 
number of delegates to the Annual meeting of the Association 
(...)."362/ 
This recommendation which follows the practice in St. Lucia and St„ Vincent was 
done with the declared intention of ensuring that the views of the growers were 
channelled to the General Assembly of the Association, that their will be 
362/ The Milton Cato Report, p. 
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manifested in the elections to the Board of Management and that information and 
instructions from the organs of the Association be conveyed without delay to all 
growers. 
Nonetheless the rift between the Association and its "constituency" remained 
unchanged for more than two decades after the introduction of this innovation. 
The Task Force chaired by J.B. Jankey, the Report of which will be analysed 
subsequently, noted that these Branches were not fully operational, when at all 
in existence: 
"This leaves a gap in the flow of information from the Association 
to the grower and generates a festering mistrust that has been 
existing between Management and staff of the Association and the 
growers. This has resulted in negative attitudes."363/ 
As for the efforts of the Cato Commission to reduce Government interference 
in the industry and to give to its management a business-like direction, 
developments which took place from 1958 to 1981 showed that banana production seems 
too vital a part of both the political and economic fabric of the country for the 
Government of Dominica to take some kind of laissez-faire attitude vis-a-vis the 
industry. Guidance or interference on the part of Government continued unabated 
as if it were a fundamental feature of the development of the industry. 
The growth of the banana industry was described in the previous chapter. It 
would be recalled that between 1957 and 1969, income accrued to growers multiplied 
three fold. At the same time, it was seen that the country experienced an 
unprecedented flow of out-migration during the 1960s, resulting in a remarkable 
aging of the population occupied in agriculture. It was also pointed out that the 
decline of.the industry started in 1970 when the United Kingdom opened its door to 
other Commonwealth low cost producing countries. Finally note was taken of a series 
of natural ¡disasters which devastated the island's economy, after the ravages caused 
by the propagation of leaf spot disease and by severe drought in 1977. Such is th.e 
context in which the Government of Dominica appointed in August 1981 a Task Force for 
the "review of all aspects of operation of (the) Dominica Banana Growers Association 
(DBGA) from January 1, 1978 - July 31, 1981". 
I 
363/ Op. cit., p.61(a). 
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The "Evaluation Report of the Dominica Banana Industry" produced by 
the Task Force is quite different from the document put forward by the 
MiÍLton Cato Commission of Enquiry either because the crisis faced by the 
industry was not of the same nature - (its political undertones were not 
as acute as in 1958) - or because much progress had been made and the 
organization of the industry was far more complex. The Task Force seems 
mote concerned by management issues. 
Nevertheless the Evaluation Report shows how certain hardcore 
problems persisted for almost two decades. The development of the banana 
industry is portrayed as the results of the interactions between six 
different actors: workers, growers, management and staff of the Association, 
Board of Management (transformed in 1972 into a Management Committee), 
government and Geest Industries. Of the last actor, not much is said and will 
be related here; while one may dispose of the first one in a few lines. 
Reference is made to the strikes of the women carriers in 1978 and to the fact 
that the workers at the Boxing Plants were unionized. Labour as such is still 
not a differentiated component of the industry and it does not seem to have a 
specific impact on the choices affecting the course of agriculture. The fact 
is that the Task Force did not see fit to register any peculiar position the 
workers might have put forward nor to suggest measures to satisfy their interests. 
It is safe to state that they played - as a collectivity and irrespective of 
their eventual dissatisfaction - no active role in the arbitration of the various 
social demands made on the returns obtained from the banana industry. 
One would expect that the banana growers would be at the centre of all 
activities in the industry and perhaps they are. The Evaluation Report, 
however, highlights two curious conflicts: one between the growers and the 
industry as such, and a second between the growers and the Association. The 
Task Force, in expressing how "disturbed" it was by the fact that some growers 
employed on the staff of the Association were using their position to indulge 
in deplorable malpract ices, made these remarks: 
"The continuation of such a situation (conflict of interests of 
operational staff who are active growers) certainly serves as 
no example to the farmer who is trying hard or who needs to be • 
persuaded to meet the objectives of the industry."364/ 
364/ The Evaluation Report, p.27, our emphasis. 
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The problem seems to be rooted in the inconsistency of running a monccrop 
economy with multi-crop farmers or peasants. A peasant has another frame of 
reference and his own norms for allocating available resources. Moreover, his 
normal preference for poly-cultivation is strengthened by the increasingly 
limited income he received for the sale of bananas. The Evaluation Report 
attests that: 
"Fertilizer and other inputs supplied to farmers by the Association 
are also used in the cultivation of other crops. As a result the 
Banana Industry does not derive the full benefits from the inputs 
distributed to farmers."365/ 
o ¿if. ¡ 
Since there still exists a very large group of marginal producers, 
expenses incurred to service them cannot produce significant yields. 
Unavoidable failure in this respect adds to the lack of credibility of the 
management of the industry. This, can be exemplified by the investments made 
to control the leaf spot disease, which have not given the expected results, 
not only because of shortcomings of an organizational nature, but also because 
of a series of problems inherent, in the cultivation of marginal farms. 
"This (failure) has had a demoralising effect on the affected growers 
and generated lack of confidence among the farmers in the ability of 
the Association to handle the industry."367/ 
This sentence encapsulates much of the nature of the Dominica Banana Growers 
Association. It is not an organization of growers who handle their farms, but 
an organization created in order to handle the farms operated by the growers. 
It may or may not be able to perform, irrespective of the know-how of the 
individual grower. The proposition made earlier that small scale farming was a 
development ad absurdum of task work is corroborated. Even if the Association 
had not been geared since its inception towards marketing bananas and did not have 
only as a secondary purpose the production of the fruit, the hiatus between the 
actual producer and the management of his own affairs by the Association would have 
persisted. As implied in Article 3(1) quoted earlier, the Association is presently 
performing as if it were an institutionalization of the rift between subsistence 
365/ Ibid. , p.49. 
366/ Ibid., pp.41-43. 
367/ Ibid., p.8. 
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economy and its whole cultural framework on the one hand, and market 
economy and its global frame of action'on the .other hand. The 
Association is not striving to make the self-employed farmer a full 
fledged modern entrepreneur, nor at fostering the transition from a 
peasant outlook to a worldwide vision of economic flows. 
The Evaluation Report distinguishes between top and middle 
management. With respect to the higher echelon, a diagnosis of 
incompetence is arrived at: 
"For an industry of such dominant economic importance and 
extensive scale of operations, it lacks the expected 
Management team with strong technical base, tested managerial 
experience and the level of stature to execute action promptly 
and effectively, particularly as this requires competent and 
trusted relationship with farmers, DBGA work force, other 
agriculture field staff, agriculture service institutions, 
particularly WINBAN*, and Aid Donors such as USAID, BDD, CIDA 
and others."368/ 
Misappropriation of funds encountered in 1958 did not lessen and 
management still experienced serious difficulty in disposing of money in an 
orderly and accountable manner. This is evidenced in the payment on an 
acreage basis of subsidy to farmers affected by hurricane: 
"The acreage for which the amounts were paid (...) was grossly 
overstated by approximately 40%"369/ 
The Task Force sees the urgent need to bring the lack of financial 
accountability in the operational system of the DBGA under control: the 
staff of the Association appears as a bureaucracy operating on the one hand 
in the absence of a system of accountability and on the other hand free from 
pressure originating from its constituency. 
* WINBAN: West Indies Banana Association which aggregates all the 
national banana associations. 
368/ The Evaluation Report, p.21. 
369/ Ibid, p.7. 
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"Management identified the present poor financial condition of 
the Association and the dishonesty that pervades the system as 
the two critical problems of the industry. If the lack of 
financial accountability within the operational system of the 
DBGA is not brought under control immediately, whether it be 
public policy in unrealistic price fixing, callous actions of 
some growers and negligent behaviour of field staff; no 
financial institution or Aid Donor will feel comfortable in 
providing any meaningful financial support for the improvement 
of the industry. Both Management Committee and Association 
Management must together get to grips with that deeply-rooted 
problem of malpractices within the industry by executing a 
programme to reduce or eliminate them. These are costing the 
Association over 1.2 million per annum."370/ 
The Evaluation Report describes at length wastage and malpractices by the 
middle management. At the Boxing Plants, considered the "heart" of the industry, 
"worker productivity is low, discipline is poor and accountability is lacking." 
371/ 
"Deliberate cheating" takes place in recording purchases, selection and 
weighing of the fruit. Staff of the Association, who are also active growers, 
profit from their position precisely to mock the established norms of quality and 372/ to attend to their private interests in collusion with the Boxing Plant personnel. 
The paradox which strikes the Milton Cato Commission, of the autonomy of 
management proper vis-â-vis the Board of Management, still persists. The Board of 
Management stands as an actor distinct from management itself. Its role is 
described by the Task Force in the following terms : 
"This component of the structure of the DBGA stands at the apex 
of the organisation. It is principally designed to provide 
leadership and control over the affairs of the Banana Industry. 
Consequently, it must be held responsible and accountable for 
performance, particularly the crucial aspects of the industry, 
i.e. target production of marketable fruit, maintenance and 
improvement of fruit quality as necessary, financial viability 
of the Association, ability to service debts and maintenance of 
credibility to borrow, and recruitment of quality management and 
field operations staff."373/ 
Now even though well informed and aware of the problems of the industry, the Management 
Committee is unfit to ensure the implementation of its decisions and seems unable to 
direct and guide the doings of the administration. 
370/ Ibid., p.19. 
371/ Ibid., pp.13 and 27 
372/ Ibid., p.56» 
373/ Ibid., p.17. 
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Moreover, the Management Committee is in turn ambiguously linked to the 
Government which intervenes at will at all levels of the affairs of the 
industry. The interests of the Government are obviously quite varied in 
an activity which represents the backbone of the economy. Its inter-
ference varies from the level of price fixing to the decision to modify 
the entire structure of the Association. In 1972, it dissolved the 
Board of Management, replacing it by a fully appointed Management 
Committee, followed by one "comprising 3 elected persons by banana growers, 
O "7 / / 
two appointed by Government and two ex-officio members."- Therefore, the 
character and composition of the highest authority in the Association rest 
on a decision of the political directorate. 
Finally the industry is totally dependent on the marketing company, 
Geest Industries (WI) Ltd, The Task Force reports among the "critical and 
specific weaknesses and deficiencies": 
"The ability of the Association to be convinced of the 
reasonableness of Geest Industries (WI) Ltd. expenses 
in spite of professional examination."375/ 
It has no control over the "green market price", the costs of the marketing 
company and "it is hardly an exaggeration to state that the Association has 
376/ no control over the price paid to it". Conversely what the farmer 
receives from the Association seems to vary at random in relation to what the 
Association obtains from Geest, One can safely propose a curious equation 
with respect to payments: the growers are to the Association, what the 
Association is to Geest Industries. 
The guidelines proposed by the Evaluation Report of 1981 aim at 
instituting several levels of self-management, each one with an adequate safe-
guard for the different actors in the industry: 
- In order to control wastage and malpractices, the Report relates that 
in the 1980-1981 Budget Address concern is expressed that the farmers should be 
377 / directly involved at the level of district branches. 
374/ Ibid., pp.16-17o 
375/ Ibid., p. 61. 
376/ Ibid., p. 34, 
377/ Ibid., p. 8a. 
- The.Report pròposésywà&hòut reserve. -.•::> ...  ¿¿j 
"Additional;-Boxing Plantsvare.frequiréd and should be .managed and. , 
operated, growers. ,The..(DBGA shpuld^therefore not increase ite ( 
' dÌrèdt' irìvòìvemént "in JmanàgemenÌ"!ópòr'atiòn óf Boxing'Piants and ' 
in. fact 8hóuld\¿g3:aduall,y.;phase:;0út.̂ as far ae¡/feasible..1 "3i78/y ; 
- TheJTask 'Force!:s.ùggèS(feóaaore|uCJiî nain5<fOvernment inteyfeienseiin th^-ì .1 
affairs of the'dndiistiyaaftd £ùlKà&ton$my,,for3 the.-. Board, ¡ofíManagemeiat.í irî prige,,,)' > 
fixing. -, iUBi->33it3H nsí«loqqíi vl ùiì a \rcí .'1 §.r- i -n í h . ; i •. «, 
», The.-: rpleii oísíthfd Boaardxof Managements-is.., f ur¡theí described,/ as ¡. a.t central 
decieioúímakift^body:.aiadassír oJk&lSlc-xa» own .te.«-.:. ¡•.mw.-.v»» vj u.- j«. 
jft- ."Whatèvèrv thè oy.., ¿ . 
a Management Committee - its core function must be to provide 
leadership to the industry lfiJ tìifeJ itè^iìoiwbènt1 kúft liî liÉettt&'fcióà'-' 
of well defined programmes, to achieve specific targets under 
' varying conditions" faced by the industry. ' In partícula£," it' is 
'. . >.• .required'to igiye-vdir^fcion^ in, sustaining ? financial; yiaìj-ility o,f ; 
the Association and grower and to,prescribe specific and general 
policies to obtain these results."379/ ; ...,...••• 1 
- Taking into account Jfcfoercomposition of the Management Committee i.e. a body 
i • *> ! • 1 • : of elected representatives '-¡of Growers and Government officials, if it is in a 
position to fulfill the role described by the Task Force, it will determine 
specific and implementable targets,' j.èi the equivalent of an explicit sub-sectoral 
plan. Its determinations will certainly, be indicative for growers and mandatory 
for the administration of the Association. • 
• • . > 
Finally the Task Force in fact proposes that negotiations be initiated towards 
achieving some participation in Geest decision-making system: 
"Since the operation of the marketing company seemed profitable 2 
given the present price to grower vis à vis the cost of 
production:?,? q'uestionvaisiseŝ con.oer.ninĝ .the:.. possibility, of. 
growers' participation in aspect(s) of the profitable operations 
oí t'fiè fetali V po'seib'ilíty1 tré' " " * 
investigated, with speí̂ ifótpeífíerefcceiLtOj equity, .-piu-tipipatipn in : 
shipping on the part of WINBAN."380/ 
• ! 1 V' .'':'."! jH ?:<'..t . pi;', V'j ij'^.i tgij, •••*,; -, „•* > ! , •• '• i .-.. • • . 
378/!Tbid;.r; P.15Í' - » » I • ' ••• -i 
— — — • • ' ' ' L ^ ^ ^ y 
379/ Ibid., p.17. - 3 
38°/ Op.cit., p. 33 
••! n 
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In summary, the production of bananas by the growers, the gathering 
of the fruit by the Association and the marketing by Geest Industries, 
are articulated into a system that is sufficiently novel to warrant 
theoretical research and the formulation of the flows of goods and human 
resources into a model, bold enough to by-pass existing economic and 
sociological propositions. The point seems made that the allocation of 
resources during fifty years of existence of the Dominica Banana 
Association is not processed in accordance with the principle of market 
economy. One has to admit to a certain freeness in the appropriation 
of resources owned in principle by the collectivity of banana growers. 
This demands constant government intervention to introduce corrective 
measures. In so doing, the advice of technocrats is invariably sought. 
The recommendations put forward by the two groups of experts in 
1958 and 1981 seem to hesitate between proposing some form of self-
management at least up to the level of District Branches and Boxing 
Plants, harmonized by centrally planned set of guidelines emanating 
from the Management Board and implemented by the employees of the 
Association. In fact in absence of the market as an institution 
responsible for the arbitration of conflicting interests, an economy can 
only operate rationally thanks to an explicit plan. The production of 
banana in Dominica bears more similarities with centrally planned 
systems than with a free enterprise system, or alternatively it could 
be considered as a loosely managed division of a multinational enterprise. 
An analysis of the Dominica Banana Growers Association cannot take 
for granted the overt intentions of the .Association to produce more 
bananas at less costs. It must focus on the net results of the fifty 
years of existence of the Association. From the data unearthed by the 
1958 and 1981 groups of experts and taking into account the analyses 
relating to land use of the largest and most fertile farms, one has some 
difficulty in taking seriously the intentions of the Association as far 
as volume and costs of production are concerned. One cannot explain very 
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easily why so much investment is made to upgrade the output of farms of 
uneconomical size and/or operating on marginal lands, while the best land 
remains idle. There are increasing doubts about the intention of the 
Association, when one considers that the expenditure aimed at improving 
the quality of the fruit and at reducing its costs of production are 
determined unilaterally by the Association itself and deducted from the 
income of the ill-equipped farmers. 
This practice has lasted since 1949, i.e. more than 30 years. It 
seems appropriate to argue that the Association has successfuly protected 
its merchant characteristics and has been more zealous in enlarging the 
difference between the average income accrued to the growers and the 
Basic Price, than in reducing the cost of banana production. 
Conclusion 
Class relations as described in this chapter are slanted towards 
phenomena in the banana industry, the largest and most organized agricultural 
sub-sector. Forceful expression of various urban interests took place during 
the 1970s and will be recounted in the next chapter. Nonetheless, urban 
interests are built into the analysis presented so far. This is due to the 
fact that rural Dominica lacks a dominant class administering its relations 
with the outer world. 
Before 1950, inequalities in Dominica were expressed basically through 
the distance between social groups, the country did not evolve a single set 
of asymmetric relations between all social actors which would have resulted 
into a social system integrated culturally, politically and economically. 
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As a consequence of its deficient participation into the world economy, 
a separate development of each social class followed the integrated 
system of class exploitation implemented by the British during the 
eighteenth century. Social distances took the form of cultural 
differences articulating two different ways of life. However, the 
marginalization of Dominica within the Western Hemisphere gradually 
resulted in the dominant classes borrowing solutions from the culture 
and outlook of the dominated ones, The art of living out of 
insufficient resources was developed by the local underprivileged 
and did not derive from a progressive dissemination of colonial 
culture. The development of common denominators between the opposing 
social classes constitutes the core of Dominica's nation-building 
process. On this basis one understands why colonialism and 
liberation could evolve side by side in the island. 
The development of the banana industry after 1950 is inserted in 
the context of a "workable arrangement" between the two segments of the 
island society. The link it established eroded the segmentation of the 
social fabric. Nonetheless this segmentation was not acknowledged by 
the dominant classes. Deliberate attempts from 1934 to 1958 at harnessing 
the country's resources to profit fully from the opportunities open on 
the international market were an expression of belief held by those who 
created and sponsored the Dominica Banana Association that the country 
was an integrated system operating to their advantage. The process 
for the statement of the dominated to be discussed as a valid proposition 
is not yet complete. 
Latent social conflicts became visible as a consequence of 
re-arrangements of economic factors set into motion by the Banana Boom. 
These conflicts were manifested initially as a divergence of interests 
between Northern growers and Southern merchants; 
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but gradual transformation of the peasant into a new type of self-employed 
- the seamstress.like farmer - devoid of bargaining power, opened the 
possibility for growers exposed to import-export trade to challenge the 
position of the Roseau-based merchants. The original rift developed into 
a short lived "war" between traditional merchants and new ones. It also 
appears as a struggle between old members of the ruling class and newcomers¿ 
or between the capital city - Roseau - and the second city - Portsmouth. 
The conflict was solved, by a modification of the marketing institution, and 
a rapprochement between the. two cities. 
The detachment' from the- totality of growers of a sub-group capable of 
acceding to- the Banana Association without transforming its original 
structure as a marketing firm, calls'for more specific research tc clarify 
the various types' of growers, their ability to understand information 
circulated by the DBGA and to express their views in the meetings of the 
Association (and in Parliament). 
The small growers entertain a peculiar type of class relations which 
confine them to working either on mini-farms rented from the landlords or 
on privately owned Uneconomical size farms, generally located on marginal 
lands. They have no more decision-making power in the running of their 
farms than the full-time task workers have in the management of the estate 
on which they work. The produce of their activity circulates on the market 
through channels outside of their control and their access to the DBGA is 
limited. 
In the legal dispositions relating to the DBGA, there has not been 
found any element which could prevent a grower from participating fully in 
the organs of the Association, The difficulty for the small grower to 
interface with'the large ones, due to the prevailing cultural cleavages must 
have prevented á 'jóint'defénce of their collective interests. The large 
growers, speaking on behalf of the small ones, found an avenue towards the 
riskless role of intermediary, provoking then a disassociation of supposedly 
common interests. 
Landlords inherited the best lands. They are an urban group and share 
with other urban dwellers the running of all official institutions. It can 
be said that the city through their intermediary owns the best part of the 
countryside. Roseau and Portsmouth as administrative and commercial centres, 
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always enjoyed a large degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the hinterland. These 
cities rule and administer the development of agriculture in Dominica. 
This seems perfectly natural to members of Parliament, administrators, and 
all self-appointed educated people. 
On the one hand, the cultivation of bananas assisted in establishing s. 
bridge between the dual components of the society and, in so doing, created 
conditions for accelerating the nation-building process. On the ocher hand, 
however, in the institution which could have spearheaded this altc-nati-e 
evolution, vested interests based on existing social cleavages ware 
reactivated to prevent progress towards higher degrees of social eĉ jjl-j-.. 
Inherited social distances separated the various growers and tha «cric üf 
the small growers from that of the import-export merchants and ¿llisd, 
interest groups, and created a vacuum observable in the lack or accc'm'iabillty 
in which the organs of the Association had operated since their inception. 
These distances became the basis for asymmetric relations favouring those, groups 
in a position to retain illegitimately the economic returns obtainable fruiü the 
banana industry. 
Endemic malpractices became customary form of appropriation of the. 
community's assets. Up to the 1980s the Board of Management of ths. Association, 
in spite of its awareness of these malpractices, remained impotent to implement 
corrective measures. This process of accumulation of economic resources was 
perceived as illegitimate and resulted in mistrust and resentment and festered 
negative attitudes among all those concerned. 
Class exploitation took a very peculiar and uncontrollable and cculd 
not be institutionalized since it materialized through objectionable practices. 
Similarly the degree of exploitation (perceived as unfair by the majority and as 
very clever by the minority) was not negotiable openly. Attempts to enshrine 
rigid political control in the legal system and to have it sanctioned this lack 
of negotiation, met with resistance, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
t 
Malpractices, identified by the groups of technocrats in 1958 ana 1981, which 
can be defined as lawless access to economic returns, constitute tha visible side 
of class exploitation. They vary from outright theft or cheating to processing 
inaccurate insurance claims. However, an economy and an orderly society cannot 
operate if the distribution of rewards follows a lawless pattern, Assuming that 
one sets aside the reprehensible activities condoned by the Management of the 
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Association - on occasion with the blessing of the political authorities -
and assuming that this behaviour could be accounted for by the dishonesty 
of a ffew culprits, it is still not clear that the Association could have 
met its declared objectives» The key issue which would defeat its original 
and avowed intentions would remain the ability to magnify artifically its 
administrative expenses and the volume of fertilizers and pesticide© 
required together with their costs» The Association was operating without 
any form of economic competition or control. 
The present study suggests that the import-export trade insert® itself 
in the Dominican economy, as prime mover of the production of bananas and 
determining the rate of profits obtainable from it, without the intervening 
of a market system. It is proposed that this covert relationship between 
merchants and producers constitutes the centre piece of class conflicts in 
Dominica; the most dynamic sector of the economy - the service sector -
seems sufficiently autonomous to establish unilaterally the average return 
of capital invested in the agricultural sector. 
Conflicts of class interests do hot refer to a person to person 
relationship or to the meanness with which an underprivileged citizen is 
robbed of his due. What is being stated here is that there exists a structural 
relationship operating beyond the good or bad intentions of the individual, 
and this allows greater returns to the administration of the banana trade than 
to the production of the fruit. The modernization of family production appears 
then unthinkable, in view of the vested interests entrenched in the service 
sector. In this context, where political; economic and cultural dimensions 
are involved, forms of self-management of District Branches and of Boxing Plants, 
(both rural-based institutions) proposed since 1958, face insurmountable 
difficulties to get even off the ground. 
These obstacles are implicitly identified in both the Cato Commission 
Report and in the Yankey Task Force Evaluation Report. The organization of the 
production and marketing of bananas is labouriously evolving toward a centrally 
planned activity to be tempered by proposed forms of self-management. If the 
recommendations of both groups of technocrats were to be fully implemented one 
would expect that self-management at the level of District Branches and 
Boxing Plants would indirectly raise the issue of manpower planning, i.e. of 
the excess or scarcity of labour force for the tasks required in each rural 
District. 
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The issue of manpower planning is not catered for and appears of utmost 
importance in the context of Dominica» The investment of most of the 
country's resources in the banana production has forced the population to 
integrate the worldwide market, severely reducing the viability of multi-
crop subsistence economy. Nonetheless, the polarization of DominicaSs 
resources by the international trade has not been accompanied by the 
articulation of a market economy within the country. Merchandise originating 
from the sub-sector analysed including labour time is not exchanged directly 
against payment. As a consequence, the producer, ill at ease in negotiating 
the value of his bananas, finds himself even farther from the possibility of 
negotiating the value of his labour time. 
In these conditions the workforce becomes very vulnerable to the 
attraction of external labour markets, where negotiations of wages ara duly 
institutionalized. In other words, it seems logical - and further study 
should clarify the point - that in the absence of a labour market or of an 
institution to fulfill similar functions, the labour force in agriculture 
tends to migrate. With the integration of the economy fostered by the 
development of the banana industry, ths conditions in which the largest 
single group of producers works set the pattern for absorbing manpower: in the 
rest of the economy. A process of depopulation is triggered. 
One may conclude that thanks tc the important ?tep in the nation-building 
process brought about by the development of the banana industry, most social 
groups are now in close contact and their interests are so interrelated chat 
the basis is laid for an intense social dialogue aiming at self-reliant 
development. However, the integrated economic system evolved with the expansion 
of the banana industry is quite different from current market economies. The 
tardiness in completing the institutionalization of a set of social relations 
adapted to this specific form of production is imputable to the. traditional 
cleavages separating the two basic classes of the country ¿ the dominant class 
comprising the urban based landlord/merchant/member of Parliament/Government 
officer/higher and middle level management, on the one hand, and the rural 
seamstress-like small farmer on the other hand. The bridge between these two 
classes is still in the making. 
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• XII 
THE SOCIAL PREDICAMENT OF ROSEAU 
To study the social structural relations in any given city, there are 
a whole theoretical tradition and accepted methodologies, One is expected 
to describe the classes and strata living in the city, to relate these groups 
to the functions of the urban apparatus, to analyse the sources of capital 
and its mechanisms of reproduction and expansion, the sources of social power, 
the characteristics of income distribution, and so on and so forth. These 
reflections are usually illustrated by detailed statistics on population 
movements, labour force, education and other social services. Further data 
on the links between these various aspects of urban life and. worldwide 
developments assist in explaining the history of the city and of its 
inhabitants and in understanding its impact on the countryside. 
An approach to the social structure of Roseau in the framework of 
traditional theories and accepted methodologies prevents the researcher 
from identifying the key structural relations on which the Dominicans have 
some control and explains the more easily observable urban phenomena. More-
over, these theories and methodologies, while very useful in codifying the 
presence of the outer world in the country, are basically European biased, 
because they posit from the outset that there exists a capital city because 
one ¡agglomeration bears that name. They omit to consider that such a.r„ 
agglomeration has been chosen by the metropolitan country for some purposes 
that may not have been fulfilled. They further assume that as a capital^ the 
agglomeration is the head of its hinterland, which sometimes does not always 
bear close scrutiny. 
This monograph is making the point that Roseau has a history, and in 
the unfolding of its history, it is becoming a capital city. As a matter of 
fact, the present chapter suggests that the 1970s are the period in which 
the capital of Dominica has been created as the sociological point of conver-
gence of influences originating both from the countryside and the outer 
world. This decade is a turning point in a nation-building process, sparked, 
and at the same time stifled, by colonialism. It is therefore implied in the 
chapter that the distinctive characteristics of Roseau and of the country as a 
whole are rooted in concrete and identifiable efforts of the nation to overcome 
colonial dependency. The process is not unilinear and the first part of the 
chapter recounts the main social disputes; the second part offers some hypo-
thetical explanations of the conflicts experienced during the decade and 
signals further studies* beyond the scope of the monograph, which are needed 
to appraise fully the peculiarity of the capital city. 
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The following table presents chronologically the events of the decade 
which warrant attention, along with the Acts passed by government during 
the same period. Some of these events may have been omitted due to the 
limited time devoted to field interviews. 
Events Legislation: 
1968 
The Seditious and Undesirable 
Publications Act No. 16. 
1971 - 16 December 
Disturbances at the.Supreme Court 
Building and its environs in Roseau 
1972 - 15 January 
Farmers' Demonstration 
1972 - 1 March 
Portsmouth School Demonstration 
1972 - 17 March Disturbances at St. Mary's Academy 
1972 - July-August 
Rebellion of workers at 
Castle Bruce Estate 
1973 - June. 
Civil Service Strike (22 days) 
1973 
The Civil Service Act No. 30 
Public Order Amendment Act 
No. 18. 
1973 - 1974 
Numerous violent acts against whites 
in Dominica. 
Pursuit of'Dreads" by Police and 
Defence Forces 
380/ Gupta Supersad, An Analysis of Selected Legislations in Caribbean 
Societies in Dominica MSc. Thesis. U.W.I. St. Augustine, 1977 (mimeo). 
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1974 - March-April 
Revolt at Grand Bay 
1976 - June 
Civil Service Strike (6 days) 
1977 - September 
Civil Service Strike 
1978 
Farmers' Demonstration 
1979 - 29 May 
Mass Demonstration 
1974 
The Telecommunications Act 
No. 25 
The Prohibited and Unlawful 
Societies and Associations Act 
No. 32 
Amendment Act No. 36 
1975 
Industrial Relations Act 
No. 35 
1976 
Amendment to Industrial Relat-
ions Act No. 35 
The Police Amendment Act No.29 
Public Order Act No. 35 
Praedial Larceny Amendment Act 
No. 32 
1977 
Amendment to Industrial Relat-
ions Act 
1979 
Proposed bill of May 1979 
Bill for an Act to amend 
the Industrial Relations Act 
of 1975 
16 December 1971 
Distrubances at the Supreme Court Building 
and its Environs in Roseau 381/ 
The events leading up to these disturbances were said to have begun prior 
to 1971 with the passage of two pieces of legislation in the Houses of Parliament. 
Two Acts passed in 1968 were perceived as being of a repressive nature: 
1. The Seditious and Undesirable Publications Act; 
2. The Aliens Landholding Act. 
381/ Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances at the 
Supreme Court Building and its Environs in Roseau on Thursday 16th 
December, 1971, by E.R.L. Ward. Roseau, Government Headquarters, 20 June, 1972. 
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The former restricted freedom of the press and freedom of speech with 
particular reference to criticism of the Government; it also allowed for an 
invasion of privacy of personal mail. The latter gave a limited definition 
of "persons belonging to Dominica", which tended to exclude those of 
Dominican parentage born outside of Dominica from the right to some aspects 
of landholding; this in a country of a very high percentage of emigrants. 
Public protests caused the Act to be amended in 1969. 
Of more pertinence to the escalation of population tension was the 
proposed Roseau Town Council (Dissolution and Interim Commissioner) Bill. 
This Bill apparently sought to curtail some of the powers of the Town Council 
giving more control to the Central Government. The opposition party which 
controlled the Town Council was responsible for the ensuing protest de-
monstration in order to prevent the passage of the Bill in the House of 
Assembly. It was heavily supported by diverse sections of the community: 
the trade-unions, the Chamber of Commerce and the Manufacturers' Association. 
The crowd that assembled at the Court House (used as the House of 
Assembly) on 16 December 1971 was described then as the largest ever seen 
in Roseau. It was estimated between 3000 to 5000 persons. Activities in the 
town were at a standstill, the commercial sector, schools and the port were 
closed down for the day. Although the crowd was not violent there were some 
instances of confrontation with the Police - a force of 50. There was 
eventually an actual takeover of the Court House by the crowd. 
15 January, 1972 3 g 2 / 
Farmers' Demonstration 
' The downturn in the banana indsutry began in 1970. In response to this 
and the general economic situation, farmers mounted a massive demonstration 
in Roseau in order to bring their plight.and that of the banana industry to 
the government's attention. 
382/ Documented information was unavailable on these demonstrations. 
Details were gleaned from interviews conducted in Dominica in July 1982 and 
from mention in the Report on the Disturbances at the St. Mary's Academy, 
cf. next footnote. 
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382/ Portsmouth School Demonstration 
This demonstration which occurred in Portsmouth was in protest to the low 
status of the Portsmouth Secondary School as compared to the secondary schools 
in Roseau. There was apparently a lack of secondary school places as well as 
problems of physical accommodation and poor staffing among others. 
17 March 1972 . 
Disturbances at the St. Mary's Academy 
Students of St. Mary's Academy, one of the four urban-based prestige 
schools in the island, reacted to the irrelevance of the educational policies 
of the school, i.e. the strict discipline and a curriculum unsuitable to the 
needs of the Dominica students - particularly with respect to compulsory 
participation in courses of religion. The school was owned and administered 
by Roman Catholic priests who at that time were all foreigners. 
More immediate incidents contributed to the explosion of student prc.rest. 
These were:- 1) an incident in which a student was kicked by one of the Brothers.; 
2) the reported dismissal of a teacher because of his mode of dress; and 3) 
general objection on the part of the Brothers to the 'afro' hairstyles of some 
students. 
It was apparently a total rejection by students of the concepts of education 
as provided by the School, this being perceived as the enactment of white 
domination on the minds and actions of young Dominicans. The Black Power doctrine 
was put forward as a valid alternative. 
Demonstrations involved students of all socio-economic strata but generally 
the leaders were from Dominican Families of the upper strata. The disturbances 
generated much interest in the capital Roseau. The trade-unions became involved 
in defence of the dismissed teacher whom they felt was being openly discri-
minated against by the school administrators. The conflict abated with the 
Brothers' departure from Dominica. 
382/ Documented information was unavailable on these demonstrations. Details 
were gleaned from interviews conducted in Dominica in July 1982 and from mention 
in the Report on the Distrubances at the St. Mary's Academy« 
383/ Government of Dominica, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Disturbances at the St. Mary's Academy, Roseau, 1972. 
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July - August 1972 
Rebellion of Workers on , 
The Castle Bruce Estate. 
Castle Bruce Estate covered 1300 acres of land and is located on the east 
coast of the island adjoining the village of Castle Bruce with a population of 
approximately 3000 (1974). In 1948, the estate, was purchased by the British 
Commonwealth Development Cooperation (CDC); organized cultivation began ten 
years later with crops of coconuts, cocoa, limes, grapefruits and bananas. 
In the early 1970s with the problems facing the banana industry, the 
estate phased out bananas and increased cultivation of grapefruit and coconuts, 
both less labour-intensive than bananas. This eventually resulted in a decrease 
of the labour force. (This trend of cultivation is seen later on the Geneva 
Estate)„ 
Castle Bruce Estate, like most other estates, monopolized the best 
farming land in the area and hence was the main source of employment to the 
villagers. The size of the workforce on the estate was 200 to 250 workers. 
At the time of the rebellion villagers were being paid below the official 
minimum wage of $4.00 a day. 
In June 1972, the manager of the Estate was ordered to retrench a large 
number of workers, and refusing to do so, was himself dismissed (July), 
The workers of the estate went on strike to protest his dismissal and 
subsequently offered to purchase the estate and work it collectively. The 
result of this was mass dismissal of workers and a closure of the estate. 
In August, under union representation the workers accepted retrench-
ment in return for settlements of wages and a reduced workforce on the 
estate. In December of the same year, the estate was acquired by the govern-
ment in an effort to reduce the continuing pressure by the workers, who in 
the meantime had formed themselves into The Castle Bruce Co-operative. The 
Co-operative faced numerous obstacles in achieving registration which was 
only accomplished early in 1974. In May of the same year, land was leased 
to the registered co-operative. It is important to note that the supporters 
of the Castle Bruce workers were mainly urban youth. 
384/ Background on the Castle Bruce Rebellion was derived from Caribbean 
Dialogue Vol. 2, Nos. 5 & 6, June/July 1976. New Beginning Movement and Race 
Today Collective, Toronto, Canada. 
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June 1973 
Civil Service Strike 
By the 1970s the Civil Service Association included all civil servants, 
public officers, teachers and nurses. The first major confrontation between 
the government and the Civil Service was a 22 day strike on the issue of 
arbitrary transfer and apparent demotion of a staff member. 
Subsequent to the strike, the government introduced the Civil Service 
Act which sought to restrict freedom of speech, movement and association of 
public officers. A Public Order Act was also passed around the same time, The 
Act defined public procession, prohibited certain types of procession and 
OQC / 
made it compulsory to obtain permission for such from the Governor. 
1973 - 1974 
"The Dreads" 
During the years 1973 and 1974 there were a number of incidents of violent 
attacks on whites living in Dominica or on vacation. These_attacks were all blamed 
on the "Dreads", an unorganized non-cohesive movement of young people which 
had mushroomed in the island since the early 1970s. Subsequently, two "Dreads" 
were arrested on charges of murder. 
The "Dreads" were easily distinguishable by their outward appearance 
specifically the wearing of "locks". They were originally groups of individuals 
seeking a new way of life outside of the existing social context. In retro-
spect, they may be classified into two very distinct groups, one now referred 
to as "Rastas", the other as "Dreads". The similarity is their attire, the 
differences their behaviour and attitudes. 
The "Rastas" are presently perceived as quiet, unassuming young men and 
women pursuing subsistence agriculture and adhering to a certain philosophy 
of life derived from the Rastafarian Cult of Jamaica. The "Dreads" or people 
to be feared, were so termed because they were said to have committed acts 
of violence against members of the farming population and other crimes such 
as praedial larceny. They were perceived as a threat to the general public. 
It is apparent that they became involved with the cultivation and trade of 
marijuana within and outside the island. It would seem that they had connec-
tions with, and acted as traders in alliance with, prominent "respectable" 
Dominicans. 
385/ Gupta Supersad, op. cit.,pp. 48-49. 
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In November 1974, the Prohibited and Unlawful Societies and Associations 
Act was passed and outlawed the "Dreads". This Act violated all the rights of 
persons so described, identifiable by their peculiar hairstyle. It granted 
"Dreads" no bail on arrest, prevented such persons from holding jobs in the 
Civil Service as well as others who associated with them and above all 
protected anyone who killed a "Dread". 
In the same year, the Telecommunication Act No. 25 was passed. This Act 
affected broadcasting of radio and television programmes. It gave the govern-
ment the power to stop or interfere with transmission of any direct telephone 
or telegraph communication, which appeared dangerous to the security of the 
state. It also gave the government the power to censor public programmes and 
public communications 
March - April 1974 oo7/ 
Revolt at Grand Bay 
The Grand Bay area, along the south-east coast consists of a number of 
villages and hamlets with a population of a few thousand. The majority of 
the inhabitants of the area have for generations been dependent on the 
Geneva Estate for wage employment and in addition they usually pursue some 
forms of subsistence agriculture either through squatting or other forms of 
tenancy. Apart from the estate lands, the main village, Berrikua, is hemmed 
in by steep mountains, hence the alternative to employment on the Geneva 
Estate was ekeing out a living on the surrounding difficult terrain. It is 
apparent that the villagers at different times faced problems of eviction, 
restrictions of terms of tenancy, as well as depletion of employed labour 
force, concurrently with the phasing out of crops. Needless to say the 
villagers at the time of the revolt lacked basic services and amenities. 
386/ Ibid, p. 10. 
387/ Summary of the Account of the revolt derived from Caribbean Dialogue, 
vol. 2, No. 5 and 6, June-July 1976. New Beginning Movement and Race Today 
Collective, Toronto 1976. 
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In the early 1970s the majority of the population was below the age of 
twenty with very little educational opportunity as well as no possibilities of 
employment in the area or in the island in general. They obviously faced a 
future of frustration and it is not surprising to find out that Grand Bay was a 
388 / major centre for the "Dreads". 
Towards the end of March 1974, the general malaise took the form of an 
armed rebellion focusing on the Geneva Estate. The estate of 1390 acres was 
then owned by a merchant of Lebanese ancestry. A group of villagers, mainly 
young unemployed workers, occupied it and gave vent to their frustrations. The 
devastation included slaughtering of cattle, chopping down of trees, burning 
of estate houses, seizure of guns, trucks, furniture and food, and distribution 
of food. The youth barricaded the entrances to the village to prevent Police 
access. Throughout, they enjoyed the complicity of the villagers who were 
themselves actively hostile to the Police Forces. The situation of rebellion 
continued in spite of an imposed state of emergency in the entire county of 
St. Patrick. 
The immediate outcome of the revolt was a meeting of village representatives 
with the Premier and the Minister of Agriculture to air their grievances and 
negotiate a settlement of their demands. They demanded that government should 
purchase the estate and turn it over to the villagers. The purchase was in 
fact negotiated but further problems arose concerning the terms under which the 
land was made available to the tenants. 
June 1976 3 g g / 
Civil Service Strike^' 
This was the occasion of a six day strike of the members of the Civil 
Service Association. The workers struck in support of the nurses, who, as 
members of the Association, were protesting the lack of uniforms and other 
conditions of work. The aim of the strike was to force the government to meet 
with the Civil Service Association to discuss the situation. 
388/ Such information derived from interviews in Dominica, July, 1982. 
389/ Information obtained from interviews in Dominica, July,1982. 
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1976 
Acts of Parliament 
The following were the acts passed in 1976:— 
1. The Industrial Relations Act and the Amendments Nos 1, 2, 3 and 
4 of 1976 (and 1977) Intended to formalize industrial relations procedure in 
the light of increased activity of the Civil Service Association. 
2. The Police Amendment Act No. 29 of 1976 prohibited any action 
against the Police Force in pursuance or execution of duty on the basis of 
any Act or any Law. 
3. The Public Order Act. No. 35 of 1976 further restricted demonstr-
ations and defined public processions. It gave the power of granting 
permission for such to the Premier. 
4. The Praedial Larceny Amendment Act No. 32 of 1976 provided, for 
imprisonment for one year for anyone convicted of praedial larceny. It 
implicated the parent or guardian of any young person arrested for that 
crime. 
September 1977 , 
Civil Service Strike^ 7 
The Civil Service Association went on strike to press for payment of 
wages owed to its members since 1975. The strike reportedly lasted 47 days 
and was supported by nurses, officers in the prison and fire services,. The 
Dominican Council of Churches had to mediate to bring an end to the strike. 
1 9 7 8 391/ Farmers' Demonstration 
Vague accounts inform that the demonstration was mounted by farmers to 
press for recognition of a revived farmers' union. The farmers were also 
demonstrating against the numerous problems they were facing in the banana 
industry due to disease attacks on banana trees. In addition, they were 
seeking better prices and secure markets for their food crops. It is import-
390/ Ibid. 
391/ Dominica Farmers Union, Banana and the Dominican Economy — What 
to be done? Roseau 1981, p. 1. Minimal information on this demonstration was 
derived from this document. 
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ant to note that school children participated in this demonstration showing 
support for their parents. 
29 May 1979 3 g 2 / 
Mass Demonstration 
Prior to the protest of May 1979 salary negotiations between the Civil 
Service Association and the Government were inconclusive and the Association 
had announced its intention to take strike action. It is apparent that the 
discussion of a bill to amend the Industrial Relations Act was being proposed 
with undue haste by the Government without allowing time for consultation 
with the trade unions. The amendment was intended, according to the government, 
"to make better provision for the stabilisation, improvement and promotion of 
industrial relations". Agitation was spearheaded by the trade unions which 
perceived the bill as "inimical to the best interests of the trade unions", 
and aiming at frustrating their operations and restricting freedom of 
association. 
The urgency of government action was geared towards preventing the Civil 
Service Association from taking action. A massive demonstration was announced 
on the day that the proposed bill was to be debated. The government retaliated 
by a Proclamation prohibiting public meeting in Roseau for a seven day period 
(29 May to 4 June). The mass protest took place in spite of the Proclamation. 
29 May 1979 has been described as a day never to be forgotten in the annals 
of Dominican history. The massive demonstration took place in the precincts 
of the Government Headquarters Building, with a crowd estimated at between 
8,000 to 15,000 persons (believed to be the largest crowd ever assembled in 
Roseau). 
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the events of that day states 
that the use of ammunition and teargas on the crowd by the Defence Force, was 
unwarranted and impulsive. The unplanned strategy of the Police and Defence 
Forces for crowd control resulted in the fatal shooting of one person and 
injury to approximately 10 others - all by gunshots from Defence Force personnel. 
The report concludes that the use of force was in the final analysis the result 
of the government's decision to inhibit opposition through the use of force. 
392/ Government of Dominica. Report of the Enquiry into the Defence Force, 
Roseau, March 1981. 
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Government action on 29 May was followed by a strike lasting 57 days. 
The increasing pressure exerted on the Government resulted in its resignation,, 
It is important to note that prior to this resignation, public awareness of 
a secret free port agreement between the Government of Dominica and a United 
States firm acting on behalf of.South African and United States oil interests 
had stirred up general dissatisfaction and led to street demonstrations. 
394/ Eventually the agreement was cancelled.—— 
394/ Dominica Farmers' Union, op. cit., p. 1. 
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The two previous chapters have attempted to sketch the principles for the 
distribution of returns obtained in the most important industry of the country. 
The conclusions reached are that the Dominica economy cannot be conceived as a 
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systems. The account of the 1970 disturbances confirms that In Dominica all 
major economic and social conflicts result in placing one or another actor in 
opposition to the state machinery. 
In the absence of the market as the basic institution responsible fcr the 
allocation of resources, the political and administrative apparatus has to 
carry out these functions and must in consequence respond directly to any 
important social demands. The state machinery has evsn less leeway than its 
Western counterparts to behave as a referee and moderator of on-going social 
dialogue. Its role is comparable to the activities entrusted to the director 
of an orchestra. 
Roseau has always been the seat of political power. The present study 
focuses on "the inner Dominica". In view of the conditions in which national 
states have emerged in the Caribbean, one needs to clarify why the internal 
arrangement of social groups is sufficient to explain the core of social 
relations in the capital city, even in its capacity as seat of external 
political power. In any event, the changes In the relationships of the urban 
groups can favour the country as a whole, only if they originate from ''inside" 
the country, _ÍJ_£l. if they are self-propelled-. Evan if it wer® for this sole 
reason, the methodological approach chosen would be justified. Hence the 
formulation of some working hypothesis on the structure of Roseau as perceived 
from the set of social relations between local actors. Subsequently, the 
relationship between the state and the social groups which were vocal during the 
last decade will be examined. 
The original seizure of Dominica by the United Kingdom or France was moti-
vated by the need of these countries to counterbalance their respective influences 
in the Eastern Caribbean. The capital city, appeared in the second half of the 
eighteenth century as a garrison town, fulfilling mainly military and adminis-
trative functions. Early efforts to add a commercial dimension to these functions 
and to transform Roseau into an emporium failed as a consequence of modifications 
in the political and economic geography of the Caribbean and Latin America. The 
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city retained only a limited commercial sector, responsible for the manage-
ment of a depleted import-export trade. Subsequently, during the nineteenth 
and twentieth 'centuries, rivalries between France and the United Kingdom 
over Caribbean territories diminished considerably. The military function 
of the city gradually faded out ana became subsumed within the maintenance 
of law and order in the colony. 
Notwithstanding its reliance on the hinterland - particularly for 
domestic food supply and merchandise for export •• the history of Roseau 
has always been intimately linked with development.-: in the world at large. 
It is commonly believed that these two basic parameters - on the one hand, 
its very participation in a colonial empire* and on the other hand, the 
set of changes taking place in its zone of influence - should explain its 
internal class structure» But gives ¡;he ch&:~g.c¿eristics of the colony of Dominica 
as described in the monograph, its capital city has never been a major 
centre for government and oths.r administrative bodies. Conversely, its 
population has not grown accustomed to resort to a central focal point 
for the usual urban-based social services. Trade and market facilities as 
well as the accompanying financial institutions remained embryonic. Indeed, 
Roseau could not be considered a centre of communication ana intercommunic-
ation between people, goods and services before 1950. It is against this 
background that the banana boom gave rise to a series of social innovations. 
In the context of marginal participation in the British Empire and 
in the International world, the history of the capital of Dominica does not 
show any tradition of manipulating Its hictye-like position to maintain its 
peculiar social order. On the contrary there are indications that during 
two centuries, Roseau became indebted to a large number of innovations 
originating in the rural areas, while exercising limited influence on the 
countryside. 
Therefore, the urban apparatus of Dominica - that is to say, the set of 
city-based institutions responsible for formulating and implementing a given 
formula of economic and social development - was particularly weak at the 
time when the expansion of the banana industry provoked the gradual disruption 
of the level of self-sufficiency achieved through multi-crop peasant agri-
culture. The ideological slant inherited from colonialism and the blindness 
built into this form of dominance, whereby rural folks were portrayed as 
uneducated people, unalterably traditionalist and devoid of any significant 
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level of aspirations, were functional in preventing any questioning of the 
changes in the workable arrangements between estate and peasant-like agri-
culture, mentioned in previous chapters. As a consequence, the official 
institutions of Dominica were unprepared to cope with the pressure from 
the countryside resulting from the destruction of customary rural-urban 
relationships. 
The numerous socio-political upheavals during the 1970s and their 
final disruptive effect on the state administrative machinery are a result 
of a gradual build-up. The eruptions took the form of mass demonstrations 
within the town of Roseau, revolts on two large estates and general unrest 
among the population. The dissatisfied were drawn from all segments of the 
society - youths, farmers, workers organized in trade-unions, public servants, 
business organizations, religious organizations, and last but not least, 
political parties and leaders. 
The 1970 disturbances could be conceived as a breakdown in social 
dialogue caused by mismanagement of the conflicts originating in the structural 
changes brought about by the banana boom. But given the extent of the malaise, 
it cannot be assumed that the conflicts would not have escalated if different 
individuals had been in charge of the ruling institutions. It seems more 
appropriate to consider these disturbances, as a search for a new social 
equilibrium or an expression of on-going negotiations towards the institution-
alization of new patterns of behaviour attuned to the changing positions of 
the contending social forces. Hence the issues raised in the 1970s outgrew 
the frame of the traditional outlook of city dwellers as well as the ambit 
of existing official institutions. 
If the capital city was basically a spokesman for its hinterland, the 
ruling elite would necessarily have looked for a compromise and a new societal 
consensus. On the contrary, if the city was mainly an exponent of external 
economic interests, it would have been endowed with sufficient power to impose 
a new version of the old system of relations upon the rural population. 
To understand how the situation could deteriorate to the extreme described, 
some dimensions of Roseau implied in the analysis carried out so far must be 
highlighted. Both the weakness of Roseau, as the seat of foreign influences 
and as the nerve centre of the country i.e. its loose linkage with its local 
and foreign bases for support - was exposed by the areas and degrees of 
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inadequacy between practices enshrined in the official institutions and new 
demands fostered by the rearrangement of the economic system. The institution-
ality of Dominica seemed to have realised the importance of these demands 
only after the disturbances reached an uncontrollable magnitude. 
Apparently the banana boom put into socio-political contact the two 
main sectors of the population living traditionally in separate cultural 
clusters. However, taking into account the penetration of urban life by 
rural values, and the influence though limited, of urban outlook on rural 
life, it seems proper to consider the main consequence of the banana boom 
as the unforeseen establishment of relations between the two cultural 
clusters themselves. The underlying philosophy of the official institutions 
could not cope with the sudden presence within the socio-political 
activities of values emanating from the counter-plantation system. This 
would explain a decade of agony lived by individual Dominicans, their 
families and their communities, vehicle for and witnesses to both cultur-
al frames of reference. 
The study of the relations between Roseau and its hinterland should 
be complemented by an analysis of the links between the Dominican urban 
elite and its Caribbean counterparts. One suspects that important trans-
formations in the country's political system - the attainment of universal 
suffrage and representative government, the creation of political parties 
and the emergence of national leaders, as well as the obtention of self-
government and subsequently of statehood - bear at least as much relation 
to the regionwide agitations preceding and following the West Indies 
Federation as to the restructuring of the economic base of the society 
provoked by the banana boom. 
In other words, there is need to find out the extent to which the city 
after 1950 conveyed the interests of its hinterland to regional institutions 
and through them or on its own, to the outer world, or inversely the extent 
to which the city functioned mainly as the presence of the outer world 
including the regional institutions in the affairs of the country. It seems 
that in the short and medium term the decolonization process may have 
assisted in a rapprochement between the local, the regional and/or the 
worldwide ruling classes, to the detriment or at least with no obvious 
profit to the strengthening of the links between élite and masses. 
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In this context, the political crisis of the 1970s seems to result from a 
mutation in the sources for legitimizing social power. The population as a 
whole was claiming a greater say in the ruling of the society; the élite at 
the same time by its very conservatism opposed these internal demands 
while outwardly fostering decolonization. 
The inconsistencies between the local institutional apparatus and the 
new social circumstances were further aggravated by some unforeseen conse-
quences of out-migration. A specific inquiry into the relations between 
local and foreign-based Dominicans is necessary to understand fully the 
dynamics of urban change. With the participation of Dominicans in the 
international labour market, the elite residing in Roseau seems to have 
ceased to be the only social group to elaborate, receive and convey new 
ideological developments. 
During the 1970s the shock between the cultural background of the 
Dominican migrants and the metropolitan countries' frame of reference seems 
to have fostered an articulated expression, by young intellectuals abroad, 
of norms and values rooted in the country - particularly those related to 
self-appreciation and ethnic identity. This cultural development fed back 
into the local circumstances added an accrued challenge to the urban 
establishment. The presence of the Dominican nation beyond the physical 
border of the island-country should be studied, and economic, political and 
cultural relations between Dominicans at home and abroad should be clarified. 
Before and after the 1970 demonstrations, the government, being unable 
to solve the economic and social demands of the citizens, attempted to prevent 
any expression of discontent by imposing severe restrictions on their funda-
mental freedoms through the instrument of the law. This could indicate that 
the officialdom was not really aware of the forces unleashed by the expansion 
of the banana industry. In numerous instances, legislation was proposed and 
sanctioned by the Legislature, with the precise aim of curtailing all opposi-
tion and preventing the eruption of public protest. In fact, two of the largest 
demonstrations were in response to proposed legislation. In addition, heavy 
dependence upon the Police and Defence Forces to control the manifestations 
of popular dissatisfaction make sense only if the leaders were relying, as 
they had during the period of Crown colony rule, on support from external 
powers. 
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The ability of the ruling elite in Dominica to resist changes originating 
in its national basis of support derives indeed from traditional colonial 
linkages between Roseau and the outer-world. Profound structural changes in 
the country began (in 1950 ) under Crown Colony government and spanned self-
rule j associated-statehood and full independent status. The coincidence of 
the social convulsions characteristic of the 1970s with the culmination of 
constitutional development is an issue which deserves more attention. It 
cannot be dismissed as a consequence of an erroneous perception by the 
political directorate of the milieu in which it emerged and evolved. 
Firstly, it would appear that the attainment of universal suffrage 
made possible the mobilization of the urban masses and the development of a 
city-based labour movement. One aspect of the decolonization process would 
then be the creation of new avenues of upward social mobility resulting in 
an enlargement of the élite groups. The immediate consequence would be a 
decrease in the cohesion of the highest strata in the society. 
Secondly, the traditional elite having monopolized economic negotiations 
with the outer world, the population at large was not exposed to the regional 
implications of the economic crisis and/or recovery. To a large extent, the 
well-being of the nation was discussed in the framework of the West Indies 
Banana Association (WINBAN), which operated as a sort of private club, as 
far as the average farmer was concerned. 
Thirdly, exposure of the masses, who had recently been integrated into 
the institutionalized political process to the regional dimensions of 
constitutional development took place through the intermediary of the newly 
created political élite. Without monopolizing political power, this new 
elite would lose its claim to social pre-eminence and would have no cred-
entials to oppose the traditional élite. 
The concurrence of these three factors - the novel heterogeneity of 
the ruling élite, the opacity of external economic relations and the opacity 
of external political relations - may have created a vacuum which facilitated 
political manoeuvering aimed at postponing clear-cut solutions to social 
demands and at wearing down the contending forces while exacerbating an already 
authoritarian political culture. 
The main issue of the 1970s was not the extent of the economic crisis 
which was far from being novel in the history of Dominica; usually since 
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not only did the parameters of economic crises escape the control of Dominicans 
but they were usually perceived as solng so. The main issue was how an economic 
crisis could give rise to such a divorce of the political directorate from the 
masses, at a moment when one would expect this directorate to be responding to 
clear popular mandates related to the gradual achievement of statehood. 
Had the decolonization process taken place with closer rapport between 
élite and masses, public institutions would have been more responsive to 
popular demands; or alternatively these demands would not have been formulated 
outside the normative framework of the institutions designed to solve them. The 
issue therefore is the occurrence of social conflicts in which the masses 
opposed the élite, while the very élite was leading them out of colonialism. 
It appears that the relative autonomy of the state apparatus explains 
the untimely opposition between élite and masses. The variety of demands 
made by the different social actors allows the state machinery and those in 
control, to play the role of director of orchestra as suggested earlier. 
Nonetheless, one has to propose that in this case the conductor seemed to 
have his own score which was at considerable variance with that of the 
orchestra. 
The following interest groups openly resisted government actions in 
the 1970s: the Civil Service Association and other trade-unions, the farmers 
and agricultural workers, youth and especially secondary school students. 
Out of 12 situations of conflict, four were spearheaded by the Civil Service 
Association and took place from 1973 to 1979, during a six-year period. It 
would therefore seem that at least the second half of the decade was a period 
of constant confrontation between the administrative and political arms of 
government. It must be noted that these protests were carried out on the basis 
of prevailing constitutional norms and principles. 
The situation is particularly odd for a developing country, since public 
servants constitute the most effective watchdog of established law and order, 
and as such a practically unchallengeable pressure group. Even more remarkable 
was the difficulty of government to pay the salary of public servants. This 
calls for specific inquiry into the sources of income of the state apparatus. 
A state with no control over its revenue cannot contract a stable technocracy 
and therefore cannot ensure the management of the country's affairs. It follows 
that it cannot, on the basis of known systems of government, ensure compatibility 
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between the diverse interests which enter into conflict in any society, much 
less implement policies capable of producing a minimum of consensus- In fact, 
the Civil Service in Dominica was the most prominent force in the overthrow 
of the regime in 1979. 
The trade-unions confronted the government (incidentally a labour govern-
ment) on several matters of principle. Accounts are that they supported nearly 
all lawful protest movements taking place during the decade. This detachment 
of the trade-unions from the policy of a labour government gives the 
impression that the crisis facing the society was due to the characteristics 
of the leadership, and not to any structural quandary. It seems difficult, 
in the light of the previous analyses to grant that the crisis was primarily 
one of leadership. Nonetheless, it appears that this idea became more and 
more accepted after 1973 and helped in asserting a short term solution by 
forcing the government to resign. 
Protests by farmers and youth on which the decade of disturbances 
opened were of a totally different nature in comparison with the confront-
ation spearheaded by organized labour. The Civil Service Association had 
immediate quarrels with the government, while farmers and the youth defied 
the very foundations of the country's institutionality and overtly expressed 
the basic class antagonisms of the society. In Castle Bruce and Grand Bay, 
foreign and local capital were challenged. The students of St. Mary's College 
questioned "white domination", and subsequently the "Dreads" were, perceived 
as antagonizing local and expatriate whites. Government intervened in these 
conflicts to preserve law and order and to negotiate solutions acceptable to 
the parties involved, without being an immediate party to the contentious 
issues. 
The farmers' protests though based in Castle Bruce and Grand Bay, could 
only be solved in the town, where farmers' demonstrations were carried out. 
These conflicts were addressed to the original distribution of agricultural 
land and were not strictly speaking matters of economic relations. They were 
political issues and were dealt with on such grounds. Only the state had 
access to resources capable of modifying the land tenure system of these 
sub-regions, confirming Yankey's assessment quoted earlier. These rural 
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rebellions were both an acknowledgement and an erosion of the primacy of the 
capital city. They may also be conceived as one of the very first political 
statements by the rural people for the rural people. The degree to which 
their demands were satisfied can be viewed as an indicator of the rapprochement 
between city and countryside or the degree of political influence of the 
countryside in the ruling of the country. 
The third group of actors to participate in the 1970 disturbances com-
prised the youth. Their agitations which in one instance was not distinguish-
able from that of the rural folk, was the most challenging of all and will be 
referred to again in the next chapter. It must be noted that the youth 
constituted' a marginal group in Dominica, either because their more vocal 
sector, the secondary school student, did not form part of the economically 
active population, or because most of them and particularly their most 
rebellious sector, the "Dreads", were basically unemployed or about to 
enter the labour force for the first time. 
The protests and rebellions staged by the youth of Dominica questioned 
the whole ideological and economic structure of the state. On the one hand, 
the Black Power doctrine was at variance with accepted norms of the country's 
polJ y. A specific study on the matter will probably show that Dominica as 
part and parcel of the exploited Black community participated in its own right 
in the worldwide movement of Black renaissance. The fact is that in 1970, at 
Sir George Williams University in Canada, a number of West Indian students 
retaliated against what they perceived as racism. Their action involved 
occupation of a computer centre where much physical damage was reported. 
\ 
Now, one of the main activists was a Dominican student of a prominent family. 
Instead of enquiring whether the youth were influenced by or have influenced 
their fellow companions from the Caribbean, it seems more prudent to observe 
them as part of a global trend. 
On the other hand, and this is more relevant for the line of study followed 
in this monograph, while the students were clamouring for an ideological re-
orientation of the society, the members of the Rastafarian cult were taking 
concrete steps to "return to agriculture" and to "the land."If one were to 
overlook the history of class relations in Dominica, one would be at a loss 
to understand why the political regime found it convenient to assimilate them 
to the "Dreads" or why the "Dreads" saw it fit to identify themselves with 
the external distinctive notes of Rastafarianism. 
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It appears that on the basis of a well-articulated doctrine distinguishing 
their origin and culture from the current Western definition of mankind, the 
members of the Rastafarian cult proposed as a means of overcoming the economic 
crisis a radical return to self-reliant,multi-crop peasant agriculture. Their 
aim seems to have been to transform a peasant-like economy into a genuine 
peasant economy. Moreover, after the deterioration of the Dominica counter-
plantation system brought about by the generalization of the profit motive 
which accompanied the expansion of the banana industry, the members of the 
cult went further to withdraw from all pursuit of economic well-being. The 
unemployed youth of Dominica did not have many choices, and could have no 
difficulty with this general attitude. However, without an articulated 
concept of life as proposed by the cult, the sharing of the Rastafarian 
attitude made a "dread" of most dissatisfied unemployed youth. 
Since the returns from the main industry of the country were obtained 
by transforming the pseudo-peasant into a "seamstress-like farmer", the 
society at large could not come to terms with the Rastafarian formula of 
return to the land, since this would checkmate what was perceived as 
achievements due to the banana industry. The "modern" sector of the society 
simply could not cope with a deepening of the peasant economic model. If 
the Rastafari were not actually "dread", their statement then would have 
appeared "dreadful" to the whole society, the youth excepted. So much so 
that the rejection of the profit motive as an organizational principle for 
youth behaviour was an explicit and overt statement of the cult which made 
serious inroads in the school-aged population. 
One understands then why the "return to agriculture" or the "return to 
the land" by the "Rastas" was being opposed by the official proponents of 
this universally accepted policy orientation. The ideological stance of the 
youth, far from overcoming the economic crisis and assisting to insert 
Dominica into the contemporary world, was raising further problems. The new 
generation visualized an organization of isolation and withdrawal and did 
not cater for the demands of other interest groups - particularly urban ones -
which were already enmeshed in worldwide intercourse. 
It should be noted that while most sectors of the society joined forces 
to oppose the government's infringements of civil liberties during the decade, 
the "Dreads" and "Rastas" - international expressions of sympathy aside -
had to face the wrath of the regime with the support of no known urban-based 
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group. On this issue, the government enjoyed tacit approval from the whole 
urban world. It can therefore be argued that the "Dread Act" along with 
consequent infringements of all civil rights was not a product of some 
deranged minds. Rather it expressed the violent reaction of a social system 
against its own youth who were raising the most irritating and insoluble 
problem, namely why the pursuit of modernization since it was leading nowhere? 
The society refused even to consider such a radical statement. 
Should the above line of argument be correct, it would follow that the 
Labour Regime appeared to the urban elite as the guardian of institutionality, 
increasing its legitimacy in spite of its use of questionable methods. Subsequent 
efforts aimed at mobilizing public opinion in favour of independence could be 
viewed in the same light. These efforts tended to satisfy a plea for self-
assertiveness advanced by the young generation and acceptable to the urban-
based groups. More room for political manoeuvering would have derived there-
from and this would also help to explain why the crisis lasted so long. 
However, progress towards independence must also have strengthened the 
position of the Civil Service. The Civil Service, in a country without a 
university or centres of scientific research, is the most stable and organized 
sector of the intelligentsia. The accrued assertiveness of the Civil Service 
Association, in its opposition to the political arm of the government during 
the second half of the decade, suggests the gradual upgrading of the techno-
cratic élite to the position of an Interest group distinct from the other 
sectors of the labour force, church organizations and business community. 
The financial crisis made it impossible for the government to co-opt the 
Civil Service since it could not even meet its contractual arrangements. The 
ensuing agitation escalated and increased the cohesiveness of the political 
opposition, while adding to the ambiguity of a decisive progress towards 
independence with no consensus on a prospective economic system capable of 
ensuring a minimum sharing of profits and sacrifices. 
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to thê ®|iin.,gçonpîtti.ç.,institutions;,,or set (of institutions,. ra,ther.(than the main 
.economici^aetiyities« . ; Up to thet Second..World War the society, evolved undisturbed 
by the successive,ajld sudden grpwthsi of different export-oriented agricultural 
ventures, which stagnated before transforming and polarizing the economic and 
social fabric of so small and so sparsely populated a territory. Transient 
economic growth activity was never strong enough to put an end to activities 
in decline. Coffee, cacao, sugar cane or citrus did'not even force'' the 
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staples required rigid arrangement of productive factors which would impede the 
--rmti &nj u j SJ dfciijS'.»' ••., « ,t - .  : • ;..,• . Hv v: ..,••;••.••< 
successive re-orientations of the economic." system. —9 Xâfi J iisviisb sv&i'j bii;«.,K I j . ; t. . .< i.; , • y „•). ¡set-'i « Jun • «• . • 
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on a massive scale affected the whole social structure. This monograph attempts 
to describe the main features of the social organization of the country and to J. j V f ̂  -3 ri .1 Iv f - - , f . -, ., • ; • • t " . • map out the structural elements which intermix in different ways both before §<1.5 j ¡' b .I'l'̂i'.fn̂v' tj e- : . ; • . ,• • „ 
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self-reliant participation of the population in the implementation process, 
must acknowledge both the structure and organization of Dominican society. 
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the. s.p̂ tcejiiĥ djibAQn ¿estEoy^ and. thow,.tihe, activities, carried ou.t „by; the. Caribs 
bear, Mitjiepsjiitp .a regional .pfitlop.k, c^n .,b,e( ..̂ opted 
harboun<ÂQfb .'aifc si^ojiSi^ajV.jtp.gj¡jç^aj^pi^ to, "run ja,w£iy" from ¡or ,,".d,çsert" 
the new set of regional by, ,th,e risingj.cpionia],, ̂ mpi^es. 
In their efforts to survive, the Caribs and early settlers created an 
economic institution which underwent serious transformations only with the 
advent of the banana industry in the 1950s. 
The owner-operated agricultural venture is riot a self-sustained, isol-
ated enterprise (Chapter X and XI). It emerged in opposition to, and as an 
offshoot of, the plantation system. Its human and material resources had to 
be protected from the expansion, of the system, while capitalizing in the 
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process on the opportunities ofrered by the same system to recruit and harness 
more human and material resources» Organized around the owner operated agri-
cultural ventures was then a total set of self-reliant institutions comprising 
what we prefer to call a counter-plantation system instead of a peasant society. 
The present study does not follow the evolution of the counter-plantation 
system. It is based on the analysis of historiographic data, which does not 
convey such information. Nonetheless the deployment of the country's social 
structure cannot be explained ir '. he existence of such a system is not postu-
lated (ChapteisX, XI and parts ox Cnapter XII). 
A comparison of the social sit.ia.Liun jast before and shortly after in-
dependence with the socio-political. organization of the country prior to its 
official entry into the colonial worxd (1763) would reveal that the counter-
plantation system is not a traditional world resisting changes fostered by a 
dynamic modern one; nor is it the lower echelon of some sort of underdeveloped/ 
folk-developed/urban continuum. The counter-plantation system is a world as 
complex as the modern, or rather the visible one. 
Before 1763, Dominican society was not a plantation society, and after 
this date, progress in this direction was not particularly remarkable. For 
the Caribs and early settlers, in spite or their strained relationships with 
the neighbouring islands, local activities and economic and cultural exchanges 
evolved and were perceived to operate in an inter-island milieu. Their simple 
mercantile economy which entertained relations with the surrounding plantation 
systems, was basically servicing their own needs through direct consumption 
or exchange for foreign goods. In like manner, the local political order, 
while highly dependent on the interplay of colonial forces within the 
Caribbean, was the reflection of negotiations and agreements among the so-
called adventurers and other sett±ers„ Pseudo-national or pseudo-tribal 
cleavages "dividing the population had an impact on both private and public 
life (Chapters I and II)„ Thus isxand-wide intercourse was regulated according 
to the peculiarities of existing villages. Therefore, in the period of time 
which elapsed between the destruction or the core of the Carib organization 
and the establishment of colonial institutions, metropolitan influence in 
the island community resulted from the influence of the metropolitan settlers 
within the island community itself. 
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After 1763 social power could no longer emerge from the community: 
colonialism being by definition the exercise of power over a community, 
as opposed to the exercise in the community of self-generated impulses. 
Local politics became centred on the designs of the metropolitan country 
and cut off from the interplay of indigenous interests. The eventual 
differentiation of owner-operated businesses and the achievement of 
higher degrees of economic complexity rested on the range of self-reliant 
actions tolerated by the colonizing institutions and, experienced a 
blockage which lasted for the whole period of external rule. In other 
words, initiatives emerging from any self-managed enterprise, from any 
hamlet or village, and from the island community as a whole, could not 
evolve beyond the institutional frontiers imposed by the colonial power. 
Traditional inter-island relations lost their self-propelled 
dynamism and became limited to what could materialize within the political 
ordering of the archipelago, as dictated by the rapports between the metro-
politan countries. Thus, in spite of the physical proximity, the neighbours 
of Dominica, namely Guadeloupe, Martinique and Saint Lucia, became far 
removed places; and the bulk of the population together with their self-
reliant initiatives were offered but one alternative to overcome their 
nearly complete isolation i.e. to accept the imposed proximity of London 
as a God-given reality. 
Several obstacles impeded the establishment of a plantation system 
in Dominica (Chapter IV). Chief among them was the fact that the territory 
was actually taken over by a colonial power at a very late stage. In other 
words the same factors which presided over the organization of a counter-
plantation system, impacted on the insertion of the country into the colonial 
world. The island's strategic position became her only exploitable asset for 
the colonial powers. Hence new economic practices sponsored by them could 
not be interfaced into any close-knit set of economic and social relations 
with the existing pre-colonial organizations. A common policy to provide 
the goods necessary to maintain a population, however small, never materialized. 
One cannot observe, in colonial Dominica, the emergence of a set of collective 
principles and guidelines aimed at managing the total environment, or at 
adapting it to the material needs of the metropolitan country or of the 
indigenous population. 
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Colonial administration, being concerned almost exclusively with the 
political control of the island's resources, never contemplated their manage-
ment for economic purposes, never thought of any form of spacial arrangement 
of productive activities nor of the adequate integration of these activities 
into the imperial economy. Dominica did not inherit from its colonial masters 
any particular direction of growth for its available resources. 
This situation was of extreme importance for the nationals of the metro-
politan countries residing in the colony. The failure of large-scale agri-
cultural production and the demise of commercial enterprises resulted, in 
the final analysis in the out-migration of both planters and merchants 
(Chapter IV). It should be noted, en passant, that these migrants could rightly 
be termed "deserters" or "runaways". Their flight from the Dominica situation 
was duly assisted by the partially successful resistance of black settlers, 
maroons and enslaved (Chapter V). 
The peculiar incompleteness of the Dominican class structure is described 
in Chapter VI. This structure differs from those observed in the plantation 
islands where the fragility of the economically dominant groups was offset 
by the sponsorship of a metropolitan power. In Dominica, social dominance 
was not necessarily accompanied by economic success. The control of the island 
by Britain resulted in the super-imposition of an imported class structure 
on an indigenous arrangement of social groups. The dominant imported structure 
was not consistent with the economic fabric of the society while the indigenous 
social structure had no political dimension. 
The territory harboured a fragmented society, but this fragmentation did 
not result from the lack of interrelations between the main economic institutions 
linked individually with the metropolitan country.Fragmentation derived in Dominica 
from the occupation by local economic institutions of the empty space left in the 
economic fabric of the society by the type of colonial policy implemented (Chapters 
III, VII, X). 
The logic of Dominica's historical development cannot be built aroung the 
haphazard evolution of predominant economic activities. A matrix of indigenous 
institutions evolved unimpeded by any colonial policy of growth, but obstructed 
by political and juridical regulations, consistent with the objectives of the 
colonizers. The institutional framework superimposed by the metropolitan' power 
circumscribed an area of interaction, where selected activities and social groups 
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were granted legal status to the detriment of other aspects of the total social 
environment, which were assessed as null, void and of no consequence. 
Laws, regulations and administrative instructions emanating from London 
referred from the very beginning to the "subjects" of the Crown, without any 
concern for actual differentiations between Carib, black, mulattoe, white, 
protestant and catholic settlers. No consideration was directed to indigenous 
institutions, such as family lands, since the territory was assumed to comprise i 
private estates as opposed to Crown lands. Attention was diverted towards 
aspects of Dominica, unforeseen in the institutional frame of colonization, 
with the sole purpose of destroying, restraining or changing them. 
Dominica was lumped within the British Caribbean, a social milieu-to-be, 
alien to the scope of the day-to-day activities of its population. The 
territory within a normative system valid for all countries dominated by 
the United Kingdom, experienced some sort of delocalized and arbitrary 
homogenization. It had imposed upon it characteristics which approximated it 
to Trinidad, Jamaica, and eventually Kenya or Tanzania, while setting it 
far apart from the neighbouring territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique and 
even the day-to-day Saint Lucia (as opposed to colonial official Saint 
Lucia). 
Moreover, given the emphasis on its strategic importance and the lack 
of economic policy designed for its peculiar circumstances, the colony was 
of interest to the empire but not to the British entrepreneurs and would-be 
entrepreneurs. So. after their abandonment of the country, their assets 
became gradually owned by the freed men and their descendants. The emergence 
of the Mulatto Ascendancy and their skillful manipulation of the political 
ladder to pursue their economic objectives evidenced both the economic 
dereliction of the island and its strategic v a l u e ( C h a p t e r s ¡V'lTI and IX). 
The absence of a plantation system or of an alternative economic 
infrastructure on which the Mulattoes could capitalize to support their 
nationalistic fervour, circumscribed the whole process within the political 
395/ This situation seems unique in the Caribbean and approximates quite 
closely the case of the southern peninsula of Haiti at the end of the 
eighteenth century, when the mulattoes felt strong enough to challenge 
Toussaint Louverture. 
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arena. It resulted in the deepening of colonial dependency, in exchange for 
financial support at least for the political and administrative bureaucracy 
of the territory. After being forced into the Federation of the Leeward 
Islands, Dominica became a Crown Colony towards the end of the century. 
Locally generated efforts to negotiate a workable political settlement 
conducive to some form of economic development did not meet with any success. 
Even though the élite of Dominica, comprising landlords, merchants, adminis-
trators, intellectuals and professionals were able to safeguard some economic 
well-being by monopolizing the highest positions of the political ladder, the 
deterioration of the local economy and successive failures of estate agri-
culture were inimical to their class interests. 
The alliance of the Dominican élite with her Caribbean counterparts came 
rather late in history, in fact during the twentieth century. The Mulatto 
Oligarchy was aware of its distinct characteristics vis-à-vis the plantocracies 
of the Leeward and Windward Islands. Its political • - during the 
nineteenth century brought to the surface the prevalence in the colony of a 
specific set of knowledge and principles for social organizations responsible 
for its difference from other British Caribbean colonies. It attempted then to 
secure a locally monitored voice in the negotiations with the masters, resisted 
colonial regionalization and tried its best not tb be swamped by the Leewards 
and Windwards political elite (Chapter VIII). 
Having failed to secure separate colonial government, the Dominican elite 
were left with only one avenue to circumvent the impact of external domination: 
namely to negotiate, with the other British colonies in the Caribbean, a 
diminution of the hold of the metropolitan power over the community. The 
Dominica Conference of October 1932 challenging Crown Colony rule should be 
seen in this light. 
The fact that Dominica, in spite of its self-evident uniqueness, was able 
to fit easily into the Caribbean process of decolonization highlights the ambi-
guity of the process where national and class interests made separate and 
distinct impacts. Neither plantation-like, nor peasant-like agriculture as 
practised, in Dominica were self-contained ventures. The artificial inacces-
ibility of the economies of Guadeloupe and Martinique was in a way replaced 
by the political proximity to London and the British Caribbean. For the inhabit-
ants of the island, access to the metropolitan country in the frame of colonial 
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subordination offered some possibility for development of their self-reliant 
initiatives which would be absent under total isolation. The commerce with 
the neighbouring islands decreased in all its dimensions, while imperially-
sponsored interaction imposed themselves and were perceived as imposing 
themselves as the sole accessible basis for improving the conditions of ...... 
living. 
Intra- and inter-regional relations gained increasing strength and 
consistency as the empire developed. Gradually the reality of this imperial 
division of the world became the inescapable frame of reference of any 
society and any economy for their institutionality and polity. In these 
circumstances, local merchants, planters, bureaucrats, workers and 
intellectuals, as well as any category of persons evolving within public 
life (the only sector of social life where money circulated) became involved 
in interchange with partners located in this political space. Similar sets 
of political issues and practices gave rise to some commonality of interests. 
The mutation of the empire into a worldwide Commonwealth, and the 
specification of the Commonwealth into sub-regions resulted in the formation of 
a' geopolitical area identifiable as the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
The evolving cultural, judicial, political and economic institutions 
created a relatively distinct milieu within the Caribbean and (by the same 
token) generated distinct class conflicts and solidarities. The so-called 
labour unrests of the 1930s are a point in case, but more significant are 
the numerous regionwide institutions channelling the demands of producers and 
workers's associations, groups of professionals, churches and local govern-
ments. The process of Caribbean decolonization, marked by the gradual control 
over the community by the community itself, progressed towards universal 
suffrage and self-rule, the creation of the Caribbean Federation, and finally 
the organization of CARIFTA and CARICOM. At the same time individual terri-
tories moved towards political independence. 
The process is,however, still incomplete, and this incompleteness is 
particularly obvious when the design and implementation of a self-reliant 
economic development policy are considered. The prospects of economic 
viability deriving from integration and co-operation between the countries 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean bring into the discussion a number of 
regional and world-wide issues which have not been analysed in this study. 
Because of this limitation, the analysis of the social structure of the 
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capital city of the country is particularly lopsided (Chapter XII). 
The pattern of Dominica's participation in regional schemes resulted from 
a series of compromises forced upon the country as a consequence of the 
trying economic circumstances in which it evolved. Now, participation in these 
schemes, while assisting the country out of colonialism, increases the alien-
ation of the élite from the masses on both economic and cultural grounds. The 
inner characteristics of the local society - particularly those deriving from 
its ever present counter-plantation system - had to be set aside in order to 
facilitate progress towards self-rule and eventually independence and to 
facilitate the development of the Caribbean Community. 
Dominica shared with her Caribbean sister countries a general pattern of 
fragmentation which needs to be specified. Colonialism brought about three sets 
of cleavages which framed intercourse in the country. In the first place, the 
dislocation of the geographical environment since neighbouring islands belonged 
to different empires; secondly the disarticulation of economic activities which 
was more severe than that obtaining in classical plantation societies; and 
thirdly, the significant distance between prevailing indigenous economic 
institutions and the world of politics and policy formulation. 
Peasant economy was, so to speak, cordoned off and in large measure 
isolated from the developments experienced in the plantations systems, even 
within the British Caribbean. Daily activities of the labouring population 
retained some efficacy only in ordering and transforming their immediate 
environment; and the differentiation of the regional space in terms of 
economic, political and cultural activities, evolved with no impact on the 
concrete experiences controlled or generated by the population. 
Besides, in the plantation islands, colonial policy was geared towards 
developing existing plantation systems. In Dominica actual policy formulation 
only applied to a plantation economy-to-be. The prevailing peasant forms of 
producing goods and services were ignored. The political network within which 
the élite was evolving - and particularly the regional élite - bore no 
relationship to the distinct indigenous social fabric. The changes experienced 
after the Second World War took place against this background. 
Before considering the last thirty years of Dominica's history, there is 
need to describe the aspect of the society, where social consensus emerged in 
spite of the referred cleavages. One often wonders how such fragmented societies 
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as those in the Caribbean did not fall apart. In the case of Dominica, the 
question can be answered if the areas of strength of the British Empire are 
considered in a single process of reflexion with théir built-in powerlessness. 
Since colonial economic policies were not an exercise in transforming actual 
economic institutions, the organizational structure of the local community, 
though not acknowledged by the prospective plantation sector, remained 
relatively untouched. 
In other words, even though the power over the community (colonialism) 
aimed at destroying the power of the community, it missed its objective. It 
wasted all its energy on a destructive endeavour, which it perceived as an 
effort towards development. The actual legacy bequeathed to independent 
Dominica is proof enough that the colonial government could not deliver any 
cumulative and constructive process of betterment adapted to the country. The 
question of deliberately fostering the organization of social life on the 
basis of existing resources, could not even be raised by the colonial admin-
istration. 
For the population of Dominica to be ignored by the colonial administration 
was not a novelty, nonetheless it managed to live and reproduce itself even 
though at a low level of well-being. The point is that this is also true for 
the elite of the country. It must be understood that while negotiations were 
being carried out from the times of Falconer - mid-nineteenth century - to 
those of C.E.A. Rawle in the 1930s, the aristocracy of Dominica - when not 
indulging in day-dreaming - had to organize its living using the resources 
at hand. Therefore its failure to achieve a style of economic development 
consistent with its class interests and with the nineteenth century colonial 
world, is an indication of its adoption and participation in such local 
institutions responsible for the daily life of the population. Had the 
Dominican aristocracy insisted in living according to,the colonial plantation 
culture, it would have had to leave the country as the white merchants and 
planters had done. 
Current historical and sociological literature has emphasised ad nauseum 
the importance of the process of creolization, seen as the adaptation i.e. the 
seasoning of the Caribbean people to the imposed rules of the plantation system. 
In Dominica at least it is rather clear that the élite, which incidentally was 
not white, had to participate with the dominated classes in managing the local 
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resources according to principles elaborated locally and alien to the core values 
of colonial plantations. One must therefore postulate the existence of a national 
consensus emerging gradually, and encompassing the landed aristocracy of Dominica. 
This proposition would explain why a workable arrangement between estate and 
peasant agriculture was possible. 
There is need to clarify that the cleavage between peasant and plantation 
society was not an element of the physical space. The aristocracy of Dominica 
was also the vehicle of this cleavage« Its distinctive characteristic, 
when compared to other landed aristocracies in the Caribbean, is its dual 
frame of reference. The Mulatto Ascendancy was in fact a set of well-to-do 
peasants - (always in want of money like any peasantry) whose specific class 
interests as an aristocracy was kept alive by prospects of better days built 
into the colonial connection. These interests were, however, grounded in their 
aspirations rather than in actual material infra-structures. 
The same can be said of the small-scale farmers whose economic activities 
included the possibility of remunerative employment on local plantations-
to-be or on plantations of neighbouring islands. Regular gang labour, though 
seasonal, on the estates was a welcome opportunity which unfortunately did not 
occur often enough. 
Therefore beneath the outbursts of enthusiasm provoked by the discon-
nected succession of main export-oriented activities, the everyday life of 
the community evolved, organized around owner-cultivated farms and other 
own-account activities, pursuing acknowledgedly economically unsound under-
takings in spite of all contrary odds and for want of better alternatives. 
Hence internal conflicts created by each sudden, ephemeral spurt of economic 
renewal remained unsolved and became gradually submerged in the public aware-
ness. Conversely the potentially conflictive relationships which accompanied 
plantation development continued to operate as parameters of social behaviour, 
even though their existence was not necessarily openly recognized, 
In Dominica, quite obviously the tribal cleavages and the disaggreg-
ation of the population into quasi-national groups, prevalent during the 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth appear to be forgotten. 
In 1930 however there was need for a Commission to report on the disturbances 
in the Carib reserves ( Chapter I). One cannot find any written principles 
regulating the relations among or between Caribs, Blacks, Mulattoes, French 
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or British. But the person who was born a Carib or a Mulattoe had very 
specific life expectations and aspirations. 
The continuing presence of apparently remote conflicts and the ability 
to deal with them as intervening variables in most contemporary issues, point 
to the substantive themes of social consensus in the country. It is this 
actuality of a specific past, in spite of its withdrawal from current public 
awareness, which constitutes the main parameters of the island's social 
fabric beyond class conflicts and actual fragmentation. 
For instance, the demarcation line between the urban elite assembled 
around the newspaper The Dominican and the planters and merchants gathered 
around The Colonist may have gradually moved, with the passage of time, but 
it did not change substantially. This would explain therefore the continued 
opposition of this elite to bring lumped and eventually swallowed up in a 
federal structure well into the twentieth century. 
So even though the inescapable reality of imperial rule created a 
space where communality of interests with other members of the British 
Caribbean emerged, the "frontier" of the original negotiations with the 
United Kingdom and other dominant groups in the English-speaking islands 
did not vanish. 
Federation came alongside the struggle for internal self-government 
and, subsequently the integration process was pursued under the CARICOM 
movement compatible with full political independence. Potentially or in 
o 
actual fact, however, the underlying specificities of Dominica were 
present in the positions carried to the different negotiating tables. 
During the decolonization process, a modified political directorate 
emerged in close relationship with its counterparts in the former British 
Caribbean. The peculiar requirements of the Dominican context, forcefully 
put .forward during the 1970 disturbances, called the attention of this 
directorate to the primacy of internal parameters for achieving political 
status into a decolonized setting (Chapter XII). 
It is therefore possible to describe the frame of social relations in 
the twentieth century as two interlocking systems. The first one evolved 
from an own-account venture to a village community, from this limited 
community to an island-wide one, thereafter to the neighbouring islands 
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and then to other external contexts. It is a dimension which filled the void 
produced from the blocking of Dominica's self-propelled activities and its 
isolation'from its natural neighbours. This frame is best illustrated by the 
itinerary,of the local artists, originating in their village, goint to Roseau, 
then to Paris, via Point-a-Pitre. The second system evolved from within the 
British cqtlonial Empire, from which it departed when the Dominican political 
directorate joined forces with the Caribbean elite antagonistic to external 
rule, andtcreated the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
The évolution of the social structures during the last 30 years of 
Dominican'history is framed by these two aspects of its nation-building process. 
The constitutional history of the country, particularly as it relates to its 
regional Connections and their impact on the society, is not considered in the 
monograph; Attention has been paid to the re-arrangement of the local institutions 
provoked by the entry of the country into the international market, i.e. by the 
introduction of bananas on an extensive scale. 
The relaxation of colonial rule which began with universal suffrage and 
internal self-government, occurred within an unchanged frame of economic 
organization. The validity of the indigenous and self-reliant institutions 
which had ensured the daily life of the Dominicans therefore expanded and 
the potential for self-expression by the island community acquired a renewed 
relevance and instrumentality. The growth of the banana industry and the 
social conflicts of the 1970s occurred under such circumstances. 
There were two main impediments to the economic growth of the past decades 
producing multiplying effects in the country. The seminal economic enterprise 
being an own-account family venture, possibilities for increased differentiation 
and for more complex division of labour were by definition meagre. Such enter-
prises can multiply or reproduce themselves ad infinitum. The three-century-old 
patterns of settlement, reinforced by state monopoly on the cultivable portion 
of the so-called Crown land was broken to ease the multiplication of owner-
managed farms, and landlords made large proportion of their estates available 
to tenants. Agricultural family ventures cannot, however by themselves up-grade 
their internal structure to explore new productive areas. 
Owner-operated farms evolving within the global cultural framework of the 
counter-plantation system were not equipped to control the circulation of their 
output on the international market, nor were they assisted in negotiating with 
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the buying firms. This activity was carried out before the banana boom by the 
merchants belonging to the traditional Roseau-based ruling class. They were 
subsequently joined by Portsmouth-based growers, who were sufficiently 
influential to participate in the main political institution of the country, 
the Parliament. .  . . . 
As the production of banana developed, the small-scale farmer lost the 
possibility of choosing between different alternatives of production, the 
possibility of negotiating the price of the inputs he absorbs in the 
productive process (i.e. of interfering in the cost of production), as well 
as the possibility of negotiating the price of his output on the market. His 
self-reliance was destroyed and not recuperated in the collective management 
of the Dominica Banana Growers Association (DBGS). 
Efforts made to restructure the DBGA did not meet with much success. 
The Association has not so far achieved an effective integration of the 
small-scale farmers through the creation of a sufficiently large number of 
self-managed Branches and Boxing Plants, as proposed in two important occasions. 
. Thus the alienation of the Dominican producers from their own produce 
accompanied their entry into the world economy; and the possibility of their 
controlling the returns expected from their work decreased. It must be 
remembered that at the same time the distance between the elite and the 
masses was also increasing on political and cultural grounds, in view of 
the turn of events linked with the progress towards decolonization. The 
country was moving towards independence with an exacerbated set of class 
conflicts which were not expressed openly at the beginning but were 
evidenced by both the prevalent levels of unemployment and the rates of 
out-migration (Chapter XI). 
It would appear on the one hand that the social groups linked with 
the service sector, particularly with the trade sub-sector, developed 
considerably in the last 30 years, but they failed to give the necessary 
impetus to the rest of the society. On the other hand, the counter-plantation 
system of Dominica seemed to have lost the economic battle and to be destined 
to disappear sooner or later. However the events which took place in Roseau 
in the 1970s (Chapter XII) do not presage the end of the counter-plantation 
system. 
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The 1970 disturbances in particular the social revolution initiated by the 
"Dreads" are of the utmost importance to an understanding of the complexity of 
the country and to assess the conditions in which the ungoverned dimension of 
a Caribbean society surfaced. An essay of interpretation is offered in the 
following lines. 
The crisis of the 1970s is firstly a nation-building crisis and secondly a 
crisis of management of the society. The second half of the decade witnessed an 
escalation in the protests spearheaded by the trade-unions and most particularly 
by the Civil Service Association. These pressure groups dealt with the issue of 
social management. The national question is addressed to the basis of social 
cohesion in the countries of the Caribbean which is an underlying issue of the 
decolonization process still open to discussion. Moreover it indicates that the 
issues of management of natural and human resources cannot be separated from the 
problems of cultural identity. 
Taking into account the changes in the economic structure initiated in 1950 
together with the transformation of the political order, those who were coming 
to adult life in 1970 found most posts already encumbered by their elders. 
Irrespective of their position in the social ladder, no avenue for achievement 
and self-fulfilment was open to them. Lacking any participation in concrete 
economic and political institutions and in the daily negotiations aimed at 
improving their well-being and unaware of any prospect of the sort, they became 
the outward expression of the general malaise of the society. 
Detached from the current class struggle, the youth reacted as the point of 
convergence of the national conflicts. They brought to the surface their hope-
lessness and later their helplessness. From 1976 onwards their statement lost 
its radicalism thanks to the adults' agitation, which achieved the feat of 
transforming a revolutionary question into a matter of opposition to a concrete 
political regime. 
In 1970, one observed in Dominica a generation expressing deep-seated social 
conflicts in which they were not direct actors and which had not surfaced in the 
public awareness for open discussion. There could have been no confrontation 
between the bulk of "potentially proletarized" youth,- actually unarticulated, 
unattached, inexperienced in economic endeavours, newcomers to the labour force,-
and employers, precisely because they were unemployed or about to look for their first 
job. Sons and daughters of relatively rich families, enjoying the best educational 
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facilities at home and abroad, together with the descendants of the rural-
based, presumably peasant families, found themselves virtually"unemployable". 
• Such "unemployable" youths could not possibly raise any issued affecting 
them'within the accepted norms regulating the various social conflicts. The 
process through which they increased the visibility of the "ungoverned" 
(counter-plantation) side of the society can be presented in the following 
manner. 
Unemployment and "unemployability" appear for the persons concerned as 
a total availability of rather well-endowed human resources, facing an 
absolute void of opportunities. No specific social class, dominant, dependent 
or otherwise, could be blamed for a situation created by "the system". So the 
youths scolded the system as such - Babylon-, by appealing to the very basis 
of Dominican nationhood. 
It is difficult, however, to understand how the "never-employed" youth 
started to make significant impacts on the interplay of social forces; how 
they opposed the older generations, - which did not constitute a social 
class -, while sharing with them a wide range of commonalities originated 
in this officially ungoverned side of the national circumstances. 
It has been seen how the self-reliant activities of Dominica were 
contained within a regional frame designed under colonialism. The youths 
of Dominica raised the issues affecting them within the context of a 
nation-building process, where they shared common interests with the local 
establishment and its counterparts in the Caribbean. But their position 
departed from the official one on two accounts. Firstly, they questioned, 
through the Black Power platform, the cultural and ideological basis of 
colonial institutionality. This issue was not being debated by the Caribbean 
political directorate. Secondly, they challenged the insertion of owner-
operated economic ventures into the market economy, by organizing self-
contained communities, quite similar to the model in operation before 1763. 
Their uncompromising search for the original principles of social 
cohesion and nation-building provoked the equivalent of a cataclysm which 
challenged the mental images of the ruling cadres. No dialogue seemed 
possible, since the older and younger generations were using different 
postulates for their demands and counter-proposals. The ensuing irritation 
was expressed in the appelation "Dreads" given to the most vocal spokesmen 
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of the youth. 
The British style of education was the first bastion to be assaulted in 
1970. Then the "Dreads" deepened their position and started to undermine the 
accepted principles of socialization, particularly with respect to private 
property. The "Dread Act" clearly acknowledged the impact of such behaviour 
on public order. It was not possible to oppose what was called "dreadism"* 
without addressing the very concrete difficulties experienced in the whole 
economy especially in the rural sector in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The economic impasse reached by the society failing to distribute the 
banana bonanza more equitably is the outcome of the traditional neglect of 
the counter-plantation system by the various spheres of institutionalized 
political initiatives. From the attainment of universal suffrage and self-
rule, the pre-requisite to eliminate the inherited colonial cleavage between 
the day-to-day living of the population and the world of policy formulation 
was laid down. The process of reformulation of Dominica's polity, i.e. the 
search for a bridge between private and public forms of living, was initiated 
by the youth during the first part of the 1970s. 
A careful reading of the "Dread Act" will show that the document in fact 
set two basic institutions in opposition namely the state and the family. 
The former, for the sake of the common good - as perceived by the élite in the 
1970s - undertook to implement draconian measures to safeguard the traditional 
colonial pattern of public life and to curb the specific type of Dominican 
family and its built-in pattern of private life into the Western mould as 
propounded by the educational and other official institutions. 
"Dreads" could not be seen in any place but at their parents' home. They 
could not therefore have a home of their own. They could not participate in 
the multiplication of independent owner-operated agricultural ventures. So 
"in accordance with the Dread Act", the superposition of private life and 
own-account economic enterprises characteristic of traditional Dominica could 
no longer operate. 
The articulate sector of the youth, which represented 50 percent or more 
of the population, was made outcast. A general malaise spread through the 
whole society. The Draconian measures of the "Dread Act" found no accommodation 
in the framework for the rights of the individual as obtained in the inherited 
legal system; this created much embarassment in the regional political milieux. 
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The explosiveness of the situation arose out of the conflict between 
the statement of the youth and the authoritarian principles of the colonial 
administration. The youth were unable to discriminate between eventual poles 
of class antagonisms. They were, addressing the global arrangement of the 
society and the vicious circle created by this peculiar-arrangement, result-
ing in constant labour surpluses which the country had no prospect of 
absorbing in an expanded export-oriented sector or in domestic ventures. 
There existed no set of common concepts and norms for dialogue, discussion 
or quarrel over such an issue. The local establishment and the youths 
resorted to the use of brute force. 
This study has shown the existence of an inherent underlying hiatus 
in the society. Phenomena and structure relating to the self-reliant 
expression of the people evolved side-by-side, and more often than not, 
imprisoned by structures and phenomena superimposed by colonialization. 
It is interesting to note that social actions resulting from this type of 
hiatus had occurred in Dominica and in the Caribbean on previous occasions 
and had produced rather similar consequences. 
While the urban middle class of Dominica and the political authorities 
during the 1970s viewed all protesting youth as "Dreads", the persons 
involved in the protest movement established a distinction between the 
"Dreads" and the Rastafari. This distinction suggests a comparison 
between the "Dreads" and the maroons. 
i In the case of the Maroons, their opposition to enslavement resulted 
firstly in groups of Blacks, male and female, establishing themselves in 
separate communities with forms of social organization parallel to the 
global society. Like the Rastafari, these maroons could have, - in their 
opinion - coexisted peacefully with the plantation society. But their very 
existence, as an alternative of social life, was considered subversive. 
Secondly and together with this form of structured withdrawal, there 
were also groups of maroons composed mainly of adult males, who wandered 
in the woods and around the plantations and appeared to the existing 
establishment as bandits and were treated as such. The pattern of behaviour 
of the "Dreads" sensu stricto does not seem very different. 
In comparing the maroon and Rastafari communities, one observes a return 
to nature, to own-account economic ventures, to local or indigenous 
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languages, habits and institutions, as well as a supression of the profit motive. 
In both cases, when relations with the global society worsened, the community 
generated a sector of "guerillas", which approximated (fringe element of) the 
"Dreads" or "bandits" and facilitated their fusion with the actual community. 
Even the specific characteristic of the Dominican maroons, entertaining some 
loose contacts with their counterparts in neighbouring islands was also present 
in the recent disturbances, with the novelty though that the Jamaican Rastafari 
speech was used as a king of lingua franca between these groups, alongside with 
the local Kreol. 
It should be recognised that the youth of 1970 Dominica was the main actor 
questioning the validity of the institutions carried over from its colonial past. 
Very gradually this questioning generation is entering the ruling sector of the 
i 
society. Even though the main institutions have not greatly changed, under the 
surface new forms of social cohesion are being experimented with, through an 
enhancement of the local culture and the local language. This is even more 
relevant at a time when the economy of the island, for structural reasons or 
due to natural disasters, is facing its most serious economic crisis. 
Hence, the dimension which emerged from the self-reliant initiatives of 
the community is being discreetly mooted as another alternative for development. 
New avenues for openness are being explored and could become specialized areas 
of public management. The total environment of the Dominican is now becoming 
visible to the community and one may expect the evolution of the indigenous 
perceptions for national development. In any event, thanks to the Dread 
Revolution, the stage is set for a nationwide dialogue where economic returns 
and sacrifices can be discussed and shared. At present compromises between 
private and public life can be elaborated in an effort to achieve some form of 
cumulative progress instead of the cyclical ups and downs resulting from the 
cleavages fostered by colonialism. 
The questioning of the bases of nationhood had then the advantage of 
putting the internal class conflicts into proper perspective. While each 
social class will pursue its economic, political and ideological interest, a 
set of common denominators, referring to the norms of social intercourse within 
the country, will operate as a background for these class interactions. It appears 
that in the first instance the institutionality of the country will more and more 
address the inhabitants of Dominica, in the second the regional environment in 
which the country is located, and finally the frame for other international relations!. 
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